BUSINESS LAW

Neurology Associates, LLP v. Elizabeth Blackwell, M.D.

Learning outcomes checklist:

If you master the material presented here you will be able to:

A. Explain the legal doctrines that govern the use of restrictive covenants.

B. Interpret and apply the rules set forth in the case law presented.

C. Articulate a cogent argument for each party/side in the dispute.

D. Negotiate a tenable solution as an alternative to a judicial forum.

The material in your text provides you with the legal doctrines and rules that govern contract law, an area of law immensely important to business. The purpose of this simulation is to give you an opportunity to apply the topics covered in your text pertaining to contract law and to connect that with the use of a simulated legal dispute. This will require you to apply legal doctrines and use analytical and critical thinking skills.

The simulation consists of three parts:

PART I: a hypothetical fact pattern that sets the stage of the legal dispute between the parties, in the imaginary state of Longville, U.S.A.

PART II: a set of two hypothetical cases from the Longville appellate courts that provide a brief set of fact, some legal points, and short excerpts from the decisions themselves. (The cases here, while only hypothetical, are in fact based on actual cases and represent the view of the majority of state courts in the U.S.).

PART III: your assignment, with instructions.

________________________________________________________________________________________________

PART I: STIPULATED FACTS

1. In May 2005, Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell (“Blackwell”) had earned her Medical Doctor degree and completed all necessary requirements to receive a license to practice medicine in the State of Longville. She specialized in neurological medicine. Although she was offered professional opportunities in several large hospitals, she pursued an employment offer with Neurological Associates, LLC (“NA”). NA is a two-physician practice located in a small town in the southwestern area of the state of Longville and located 20 miles north of the City of Galway, the largest city in Longville. Although the pay was lower than the larger hospitals, Blackwell wanted to be close to her family and did not wish to engage in a practice that required the strenuous schedules associated with larger medical providers.

2. NA was managed by the two partners, Dr. Richard Cohn (“Cohn”) and Dr. Jean Valjean (“Valjean”). While negotiating Blackwell’s Employment Agreement, Cohn was the primary contact and the parties agreed to compensation terms, vacation, on-call duties(after hours), and a fringe benefit package. The agreement included an arbitration clause requiring that the parties agree to nonbinding arbitration in the event of a dispute arising from the Employment Agreement. The Employment Agreement also provided for Blackwell to have paid time off to study for and take the examinations required to become board certified in neurology. NA agreed to a $1,000 payment to be used for a course intended to help prepare candidates for the test. Blackwell began her employment with NA on June 1, 2005.

3. Immediately after hiring Blackwell, NA paid for Blackwell to accompany them to a medical conference at which they were scheduled to speak. At the conference, Cohn and Valjean introduced her to a number of physicians in hopes of building the referral base for the practice.

4. In July 2005, Cohn approached Blackwell and told her that he needed her to sign an additional document that was supposed to be part of her contract, but that Cohn had neglected to mention during negotiations. He explained that the document was standard procedure in medical practices and that he had been so busy during the negotiations period that he had forgotten to mention it to Blackwell. He went on to explain that Blackwell should sign the document by the end of the workday and that this would “make the lawyers happy.”

5. The document was titled ‘Addendum to Contract-Restrictive Covenant and Noncompete Clause” and read in pertinent part:

Section 1: The parties hereby agree, inconsideration of the exchange of good, valuable, and sufficient consideration, to be bound by the following provision:

For a period of three years after the date of her separation from NA, Blackwell

agrees that she will not contract with any provider of neurological services,

nor compete in anyway with NA, within a radius of 50 miles of NA’s practice

location. It is acknowledged that this restriction covers the entirety of the

Southwestern region of Longville.

6. Blackwell felt that she should have a lawyer review the document, but Cohn insisted the addendum was normal procedure and that she needed to sign it quickly to make things “legal.” He emphasized that he would have to

have the document by the end of the day or that, as it was a condition of her employment, Blackwell’s payroll check could not be processed until the document had been signed. Blackwell reluctantly signed the document

and submitted it to Cohn.

7. In August 2009, Blackwell began to have conflicts with Cohn and, to a lesser extent, Valjean. While Cohn and Valjean took frequent vacations during the summer, Blackwell was left to staff the practice alone. She felt overwhelmed and

met with Cohn to discuss a more equitable work schedule. Cohn refused any negotiation explaining that Blackwell was hired as a “workhorse” and that her salary was fair given the size of the practice and market. Cohn urged Blackwell to continue her hard work and not to complain about her work schedule. Eventually, explained Cohn, Blackwell would become a partner in the

practice and would enjoy the fruits of her labor.

8. In September 2009, Blackwell continued to

handle a very heavy caseload seeing almost twice as many patients as Cohn or Valjean. In response to Blackwell’s plea for additional staff, NA hired a new physician to help manage the caseload. Although Blackwell was initially relieved, the situation at work continued to deteriorate. The workload was such that Cohn kept denying Blackwell’s request for time off to prepare for the upcoming board

certification exam, advising her to put if off until the caseload lightened up a bit.

9. Blackwell began to receive phone calls from recruiters trying to lure her away from the practice to work at a new neurology clinic in Galway Hospital (located in the City of Galway). The recruiters offered a significant

amount of money because there was a substantial shortage of neurologists in the southwest region of Longville. However, Blackwell never pursued these opportunities because she believed the restrictive covenant prevented her

from working in Galway.

10. In January 2010, Blackwell was granted her paid leave to prepare for her board certification and she took the exam in February 2010. However, after she returned to the practice, she began to feel even more isolated from the

other physicians.

11. On March 1, 2010, Blackwell, fed up with NA, announced that she was giving NA 60-days notice that she was leaving the practice to join Galway Hospital in the City of Galway and that her resignation was effective on May 1, 2010. She anticipated starting at Galway on June 1, 2010. Galway was forming a new neurology practice group and they had offered to employ Blackwell as one of the

founding physicians in the group.

12. Cohn immediately sent Blackwell a letter informing her that he accepted her resignation, but that she had responsibilities under her contract that prevented her from accepting a new position with a competitor.

PART 2: STATE OF LONGVILLE CASE LAW: Wellspan Hospital and Medical Group v. Phillip Bayliss, M.D., Supreme Court of the State of Longville (2005)

Facts:

· This is the leading case on restrictive covents/noncompete agreements in the context of medical practices in the state of Longville. It has not been modified or reversed since it was decided.

· Wellspan is a not-for-profit health care system located in Columbus County in the southeastern portion of the state of Longville. Bayliss is a physician specializing in OB/GYN services.

· Wellspan hired Bayliss as its medical director in 2000 at which time Bayliss signed an employment agreement that included a restrictive covenant under which Bayliss agreed not to engage in medical practice in Columbus County and five other contiguous counties (this covered the entire southeastern region of Longville) for a period of two years after the separation of employment between Wellspan and Bayliss.

· Wellspan invested over $1 million in equipping Bayliss’s practice, hiring additional physicians, and promotional strategies intended on marketing the practice and increasing the number of referrals.

· Relations between Wellspan and Bayliss deteriorated when they disagreed over Wellspan’s expansion strategy. In February 2004, Bayliss resigned his position at Wellspan and established his OB/GYN practice only 5 miles from the Wellspan practice. This was within the area covered under the restrictive covenant.

· The state’s highest court considered the enforceability of Wellspan’s restrictive covenant against Bayliss.

POINTS OF LAW AND OPINION EXCERPTS

The state of Longville courts will enforce a restrictive covenant only if it is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer and courts may either strike down a covenant altogether or may reform (known as blue-lining) a covenant if it is overbroad in some way.

Excerpt (a)

“Courts in the State of Longville have historically been reluctant to enforce contracts that place restraints on trade or on the ability of an individual to earn a living; however, postemployment noncompetition covenants are not per se unreasonable or unenforceable.”

Point (b)

The threshold requirement* for enforceability of a covenant is that the employer must be protecting a legitimate business interest. The primary legitimate business interests that Longville courts have held to be protectible in a covenant are (1) trade secrets or confidential business information, (2) customer goodwill, and (3) investments in the employee.

Excerpt (b l)

“A trade secret is legitimate business interest because it may include a compilation of information which is used in one’s business that gives one an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors. A trade secret does not include an employee’s aptitude, skill, dexterity, manual and mental ability, or other subjective knowledge. In addition, if a competitor could obtain the information by legitimate means, it will not be given protection as a trade secret.”

Excerpt (b2)

“The interest protected under the umbrella of goodwill is a business’s positive reputation. Goodwill represents a preexisting relationship arising from a continuous course of business which is expected to continue indefinitely. A business’s goodwill is considered a protectable interest even when the goodwill has been acquired through the efforts of an employee. The concept of customer goodwill as a protectable interest has been applied to patient relationships when the noncompetition covenant at issue involves a health care professional. This court has cited the erosion of the ex-employer’s patient relationships as one factor in the decision to enforce a restrictive covenant.

*Definition: Threshold Requirement: A requirement that must be met by the plaintiff prior to the court engaging in further legal analysis to determine the rights of the parties.

Except (b 3)

“A third protectible interest recognized by Longville courts is the efforts and financial resources invested by an employer to provide to its employees specialized training in the methods of the employer’s business. In a past case, the defendant was a salesman of securities who had received extensive and continuous training from his employer, particularly with respect to methods and problems in the sale of mutual fund shares. He then voluntarily left his position with his employer and started his own business selling mutual fund shares. The court enforced the noncompetition covenant at issue, enjoining the defendant from engaging in the business of selling mutual fund shares in Pennsylvania. The court found merit in the argument that it would be inequitable for the defendant to start a new business in direct competition with his ex-employer after having received extensive, specialized training in the methods and problems of the business directly from his ex-employer.”

Point (c)

A medical practice’s patient referral base is a legitimate protectible business interest when a medical practice can demonstrate that they have invested in the production and generation of such a base.

Except (c)

“Recognizing a patient referral base as a protect interest and of protecting the investments required to develop such a base is consistent with our holding in other employer-employee situation outside the health care field. In the context of a noncompetition covenant, we think that the referral bases of a specialized medical care institution are analogous to a physician’s patient relationships or an employer’s customer relationships. Viewed in such a light, recognition of a patient referral base as a protected interest fits squarely within Longville case law.”

Point (d)

If the threshold requirement of protectible interest is met, the next step in the analysis is to apply two balancing tests: (1) the employer’s protectible interest balanced against the employee’s interest in earning a living, and (2) the employee and employer interest with the interests of the public.

Except (d 1)

“In weighing the competing interests of employer and employee, the court must engage in an analysis of reasonableness. First, the covenant must be reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer. In addition, the temporal and geographical restrictions imposed on the ex-employee must be reasonably limited.”

Except (d 2)

“Regarding the second balancing test, in the context of noncompete agreement among physicians, the interests of the public are defined as a function of the availability of appropriate medical services to the community. Since there is no evidence of a lack of availability of OB/GYN physicians within the restricted area, the interests of the public are served and, thus, enforcement of the covenant against Bayliss does not result in public harm.”

HELD: Because Wellspan has shown that they have a legitimate business interest in protecting their patient referral base, and that the court has determined that the restriction is tailored to those interests, and that no public harm will be suffered by enforcement of the restriction, the court finds in favor of Wellspan.

Regional General Hospital v. Anesthesiology Associates, Inc.,

Appellate Court of the State of Longville (2007)

Facts

· Anesthesiology Associates Inc. (“AAI”) is a medical practice that employs physicians

and certified registered nurse anesthetists (“Employee”). In January 2002, AAI entered

into a contract with Regional General Hospital (“Regional”) to provide mutually agreed upon services to Regional’s patients.

· The employment agreements that AAI has with its Employees contained a postemployment rrestrictive covenant wherein Employees agreed to the following restrictions: (1)that for a period of two years from,”separation from AAI, ex-Employees would not contract with or compete against AAI at any facility where AAI was currently the provider of anesthesiology services, and (2) that for a period of one year from separation, ex-Employees agreed not to contract or compete against AAI at any facility where AAI has provided services for the last 12 months ending on the period of the Employee’s departure date. Because AAI provided services to more than 35 hospitals in five different state, the geographic restrictions effectively covered a five-state region.

· Regional let the agreement with AAI expire and offered direct employment to several

AAI Employees. Fearing that Employees of AAI would not accept these employment

offers for fear of a lawsuit by AAI based on breach of the restrictive covenant, Regional

filed suit against AAI, seeking a declaratory judgment* that the Covenant was unenforce-

able because it was overly broad in scope and duration and unduly restricted the AAI

Employees from accepting employment with Regional.

*Definition: Declaratory Judgment : A remedy used to determine the rights of the parties in a set of circumstances (such

as the enforceability of a contract) and is binding on the litigants even though no damages were awarded.

POINTS OF LAW AND OPINION EXCERPTS

Point (a)

In accordance with the Supreme Court of Longville’s decision in Wellspan v. Bayliss, this court will enforce a restrictive covenant only if it is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer.

Point (b)

In addition to the legitimate business interest, the restriction must be narrowly enough tailored so that it is reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the employer. If an employer does not compete in a particular geographic area, enforcement of a covenant in that area is not reasonably necessary for the employer’s protection. Any restriction that is overly broad in geographic scope and duration renders it unenforceable, and courts have the authority to either pare back the restriction or to set it aside entirely.

Excerpt (b 1)

“In determining reasonableness of scope and duration, we must balance the interest the employer seeks to protect against the important interest of the employee in being able to earn a living in her chosen profession. The court finds that neither the time limitations, nor the territorial scope of the agreement are overly broad or unreasonable. Furthermore, although the noncompete clause coveres five states in scope, such restriction is reasonable given the regional nature of their current hospital clientele. In this case, the restrictions are narrowly tailored to be limited only to certain providers within that region.”

HELD: In favor of AAI. AAI’s restrictive covenants in its employment agreements were reasonably related to AAI’s business interests and were not overly broad.

Instructions: Answers to the following questions regarding the case of Neurological Associates, LLC v. Blackwell. Be sure to read this over carefully.

In your answers, make sure you include the legal reasoning needed to show your understanding and mastery of contract law. Make sure to answer the entire question.

1. Identify the formation elements in the first contract signed by the parties.

2. Identify the formation elements in the non-compete agreement, signed later.

3. Could Blackwell reasonably claim that she was under duress when signing the restrictive covenant? What factors would suggest that she could/couldn’t. Is the fact that she subjectively feared for her job relevant? Why?

4. What is the primary factor in deciding whether a party may avoid a contract based on a claim of undue influence? Could it apply to the Blackwell case?

5. Apply the good faith standard that underlies all contract law in terms of how the parties acted in this case. Could either party have breached the covenant of good faith? What actions specifically support your conclusion?

6. Did any of the parties’ actions on either side amount to a breach of contract? Does the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation apply? Why? When, if ever, did one party anticipatorily repudiate the Employment Agreement?

7. Assuming Blackwell prevails (wins), what remedies are available to her? Assuming NA prevails, what remedies are available to it?

8. Can NA legitimately protect their interests in their patient base and referral base in the entire 50-mile radius? Couldn’t Blackwell simply locate her practice outside the restricted area? What arguments could either party make to justify/deny the effectiveness of such a restriction?

9. The case law does not give an exact number of years, but there are no cases that provide for a 3-year covenant such as the one Blackwell signed. Is 3 years necessary to protect NA’s interest? What argument would you make in support of NA’s claim that such an extended time period is required?

10. Given the objectives of each party (e.g. NA’s desire to protect their legitimate business interest; Blackwell’s desire to practice medicine in southwestern Longville), could the parties agree to a tenable, non-judicial solution that is mutually beneficial? What terms would you propose?

 
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Fine Arts In The Modern World: LA_104_

1.Carefully read the information about the Harlem Renaissance in your textbook and focus on Jacob Lawrence’s Migration series (1940-41; figure 36.2).  While your textbook only shows one of the 60 images in the series, you can see all 60 images including the official titles and explanations at:  http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2015/onewayticket/.  Look through all 60 images online and explain the series IN YOUR OWN WORDS.  What did Lawrence achieve with this series?  How does the artist help his audience to understand the exodus of African-Americans who left their homes in the South to re-settle in the North of the US around the time of WWI?  How does the artist portray the rural South?  How does he portray the urban North?  What meaning does the series hold for today’s viewer?  Write a minimum of 100 words including a short explanation of the “Harlem Renaissance.”

 

2. Look at Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party (1974-1979; multimedia; figure 36.12).    Read the information in your textbook as well as texts on REPUTABLE internet sites, such as https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/exhibitions/dinner_party (click on the “Teacher Packet” for detailed imagery).  There are also several Youtube films about The Dinner Party including one with the artist.

To complete this assignment, describe the art work including the history of the work’s creation as well as its position as one of the foremost feminist art works.  Comment on the work’s effectiveness, i.e. does it still have meaning for today’s viewers?  Explain why or why not.  Write a minimum of 100 words.

 

3. The artists Christo (b. 1935) and Jeanne-Claude (1935-2009) created environmental projects on a grand scale.  The costs for all the projects were carried by the artists and their budgets did not aim at major profits.  After the projects had been taken down, all materials were donated to be re-used.  Read your textbook (p. 496) and the links to the artists’ website (listed below).

Focus on The Gates in New York City (2005).  Expand your knowledge by reading the Khan Academy webpage on The Gates (https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/art-1010/minimalism-earthworks/a/christo-and-jeanne-claude-the-gates), and some New York Times articles (http://www.nytimes.com/ref/arts/design/GATES-REF.html).

Describe this NYC project and explain the effect on the visitors in at least 75 words.  In your opinion and based on your reading, what made The Gates so successful and fascinating?

Christo and Jeanne-Claude:  http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/ and http://christojeanneclaude.net/artworks/realized-projects

 
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CJUS 350 #3 Replies

Use proper etiquette in discussion. Quality as well as quantity counts. Present your own opinion on the assigned topic in a 300–500-word thread. Provide at least 1 reference and 1 Scripture in support of your thread.

Discussion Board Grading Rubric

Student:
Criteria Points Possible Points Earned Instructor’s Comments
Thread
All key components of the Discussion Board Forum prompts are answered in a new thread that includes 1 reference and 1 scripture. 25    
Major points are supported by the following:

·      Reading & Study materials

·      Good examples (pertinent, conceptual, or personal examples are acceptable)

·      Thoughtful analysis (considering assumptions, analyzing implications, and comparing/contrasting concepts)

40  
Proper spelling and grammar are used. 25  
Required word count (300–500 words) is met. 10  
Replies
Required word count (150–250 words each) for 2 replies is met. 5    
Major points are supported by the following:

·      Reading & Study materials

·      Good examples (pertinent, conceptual, or personal examples are acceptable)

·      Thoughtful analysis (considering assumptions, analyzing implications, and comparing/contrasting concepts)

20  
Appropriate “netiquette” manners are used (for example, no name-calling or labeling another student’s idea a derogatory term, such as “stupid” or “dumb,” even when disagreeing—see Student Expectations). 5  
Proper spelling and grammar are used. 20  
Total 150    

1 day ago

Eddie Duran

DB Forum 2

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While the Fourth Amendment started off simple, in language,  there have been “millions of pages of text- in the forms of case opinions, law review articles, and legal treaties” trying to interpret the words of the Fourth Amendment (Worrall, 2012, pg. 73-74).  The Fourth Amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects and its foundation prohibits unreasonable search and seizures and prevents warrants from being issued without probable cause.  As stated by Worrall (2012), the language in the Fourth Amendment is constantly evolving which is proven by the number of Supreme Court decisions throughout the years (pg.74).  The exclusionary rule was not a part of the U.S. Constitution and was created by the U.S. Supreme Court. As we learned in Week 2, the exclusionary rule “requires that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution cannot be used in a criminal trial to prove guilt” (Worrall, 2012, pg. 42) and as Donald Dripp (2001) notes, there are “few debates in American law are as sustained, or as biter, as the debate over the exclusionary rule” (pg. 1)

In his article “the Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule”, Donald Dripps presents “constitutional remedies” and how “exclusions and damages might be combined to provide an effective yet politically sustainable remedy for constitutional violations” (pg. 2). The goal would be to set damages and compensate well instead of suppressing evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment which could deter those from violating constitutional rights.  The courts would be allowed to consider the disciplinary actions taken by law enforcement and if it was sufficient, the evidence would be allowed.  This remedy would “encourage honest fact-finding and fair interpretation of the Constitution” (Dripps, 2001, pg. 3). It would also deter police from committing perjury, inspire better police work, and improve police training. Dripps also asserts that by having an effective deterrent remedy, future innocent victims could be protected.

I believe Dripps idea has some merit and could apply in real world application but it would be difficult. Dripps model seems to follow the words of Colossians 3:12-13 which says” Put on then, as God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved, compassionate hearts, kindness, humility, meekness, and patience, bearing with one another and, if one has a complaint against another, forgiving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive” (ESV). His theory would hold law enforcement officers accountable for their decisions on the scene and ensure that there is integrity in the process. It could still preserve evidence that while it may not have been seized legally, is still important to the case. But as much as I think Dripps model could work in the real world, there is still room for manipulation and abuse.  While the model is to deter police and ensure that they do what is right, who is to say the judge imposing the amount of damages is completely honest and moral?  Who is to determine what is the appropriate level of damages, each individual judge or do they have parameters based on the type of evidence, crime, and severity of the rights violated? Also, where would the damages go? Who gains to benefit the most? I also think there is a fine line of having police departments pay fines in order to keep evidence from being excluded which can give the appearance that a case can be bought.

I believe Dripps model is compatible in restorative justice in that it requires police departments to pay for damages for violating someone’s constitutional rights, which is the premise for restorative justice by trying to repair harm, involving all stakeholders, and transforming the relationship between communities and governments (restorativejustice.org).  The goal for any punishment to a crime is to deter a person from even committing it or committing it again and Dripps model tries to make that attempt.

References

Dripps, D. (2001). The case for the contingent exclusionary rule. The American Criminal Law Review, 38(1), 1-46.

Worrall, John L. Criminal Procedure: From First Contact to Appeal. Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon, 2012. Print.

“What Is Restorative Justice?” —. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Nov. 2014. http://www.restorativejustice.org/university-classroom/01introduction

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16 hours ago

Kira Egbert

DB2

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The constitutional criminal Procedure is set in regards to amendments of the constitution in which outline our rights at citizens. “Criminal Procedure is a set of rules and guidelines that describes how suspected and accused criminals are to be handled and processed by the Justice System” (Lab, 2016 pg 31). Mr. Dripps’s argument is compatible with the Criminal Process of restorative justice. Restorative justice is a system of criminal justice that focuses primarily on the rehabilitation of offenders through friendly relations with the offender’s victims as well as the community. The rule is in place in order to eliminate evidence, which was collected in violation to the constitution for a criminal trial in order to prove guilt. “Critics of the exclusionary rule routinely argue that it constitutes a loophole in the criminal justice process that allows guilty criminals to go free.” (Lab, 2016 pg.45)

In the real world, Dripps argument would serve the victim while also serving society to a point. Dripps model seems to hold law enforcement officers accountable for their decisions at the point of arrest or being pulled over, ensure that there is integrity, and respect in the process. It would open various doors for relationships in the community but also leave room for manipulating responses and or abuse. In Proverbs 21:15 the Bible tells us “When justice is done, it brings joy to the righteous but brings terror to evildoers”. (Open Bible, n.d.)

Dr. Kahlib Fischer’s presentation in Module/Week 1 is compatible with Dripps’ Model of “Contingent Suppression” with restorative justice due the relationship’s and restorative justice not being the same and or similar. Based upon Dr. Kahlib Fischer’s presentation, he had mentioned that it is not up to the government officials to build and repair relationships, it is those in the community that are responsible to rebuild and care for one another, that is not left in the hands of  a government official. It is to reenact and restore social justice and help the needy as well as those who truly understand our placement.

Word Count: 370

Works Cited

Lab, S. P. (2016). Crime prevention: Approaches, practices, and evaluations (9th ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Open Bible. (n.d.). Retrieved from Open Bible : https://www.openbible.info

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Case

Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority

U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 134 F.3d 87 (1998)

Brief Background FactsBriefly indicate the reasons for the lawsuit.

Bad Frog is a Michigan corporation that makes and sells alcoholic beverages. One of their beverages displays a label with a frog “giving the finger.” Bad Frog’s distributor applied for the brand to be approved; required by NY State law before the beverage is sold. The NY State Liquor Authority (“NYSLA”) denied the application. Bad Frog filed suit against the NYSLA seeking an injunction against the denial. (An injunction is an order of the court for the defendant to do somethingrefrain from doing something, or to undo something. Here, Bad Frog would like the court to undo the denial).

Procedural PostureOne or 2 sentences describing where the case is in the litigation process.

The Court granted summary judgment. Bad Frog appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Issu e : One or 2 questions that is/are before the court. Concisely phrase, in question format, the essential issue(s) before the court.

1. Does the ban of Bad frog Brewery directly advance the governmental interest to protect children from vulgar and profane advertising?

2. Did NYSLA consider alternatives other than banning the label? In other words, is this the least restrictive means for NYSLA to protect the interests of children?

Rule: What law or rule did the court apply in deciding the issue(s)?

When faced with commercial speech limitation, a court should verify: (1) whether there is a substantial/compelling government interest in instituting the limitation; (2) whether the limitation directly advances that interest, and (3) whether the limitation is necessary to accomplish the government’s objective (are there other alternatives short of an outright ban?).

Analysis: Summarize the reasons for the court’s decision.

Although the NYSLA has a substantial/compelling interest to protect children from vulgar and profane language such as that contained in Bad Frog’s label, the outright ban on the label does not directly advance that interest. The court reasoned that barring such displays from labels on alcoholic beverages cannot realistically be expected to reduce children’s exposure to such displays to any significant degree.

Moreover, it is excessive to prohibit the label from all use in the interest of shielding children from vulgarity. It is plainly excessive to prohibit the manufacture’s labels from all use, especially since children do not ordinarily wander throughout stores where alcohol is sold without parental supervision. NY should perhaps focus on more on placing restrictions on locations where alcohol is sold.

NYSLA did not adequately consider alternatives to the label ban.

ConclusionDid the court uphold/affirm the lower court’s decision? Was the case remanded to the lower court?

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Bad Frog.

BLAW.2210 – Spring Semester – Obiamiwe

 
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For A-Plus Writer Only

—————————–=~!!””””‘

Judson, K., & Harrison, C. (2016). Law and ethics for the health professions. (7th ed. ). New York: McGraw- Hill.

Law&Et • cs FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONS

KAREN JUDSON CARLENE HARRISON

 

dical Records and Informed Consent

LEARNING OUTCOMES After studying this chapter, you should be able to:

LO 7. I Explain the purpose of medical records and the importance of correct documentation.

LO 7.2 Identify ownership of medical records and determine

how long a medical record must be kept by the owners.

LO 7.3 Describe the purpose of obtaining a patient ‘s consent for release of medical information, and explain the

doctrine of informed consent.

LO 7.4 Describe the necessity for electronic medical records and the efforts being made to record all medical records electronically.

175

 

 

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LO 7.1 Explain the purpose of medical records and the importance of correct documentation.

medical record A collection of data recorded when a patient seeks medical treatment .

-.._.,….,.,.~ ~

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF . .. –

SALLY, MICHAEL, AND TERESA handle requests for release of patients’ medical records for a midwestern hospital serving a five-state area. They emphasize that they can release records only with signed authorization from the patient or on subpoena, and that they may then release photocopies, but never original medical records. When some- one visits the hospital to pick up copies of a patient’s records, that per- son is asked to show identification.

Michael lets experience be his guide and checks out any request for release of records that “doesn’t feel right.” For example, if a hus- band brings an authorization form for release of medical records that he says his wife signed, her signature should be checked against the signature on hospital admission forms. It could be that a divorce is in progress in such a situation, and the husband or wife is seeking medi- cal records to prove the spouse an unfit parent.

“Never release medical records because the person making the request has intimidated you,” adds Teresa. “The most officious person I’ve dealt with was an FBI agent who told me, ‘I want this record. If you don’t give it to me, I’ll get it myself.’ I said, ‘Go for it.’ Later the agent called and apologized to me.”

Since the employing hospital is located in a city with an air force base, Sally, Michael, and Teresa often receive requests for medical records for active duty military personnel. “We have now been told that the mili- tary can get the records they request on any active duty person,” adds Sally. “We still ask for an authorization, but it is not required, since the active duty person signs away that right when he or she signs up for the military. This applies to active duty personnel on duty or on leave, but it does not include dependents of the person in the military.”

Michael, Teresa, and Sally know that medical records contain informa- tion that can be used in ways not intended when the health care data were collected. They also know that the hospital that employs them can be legally liable for improper release of medical records. Therefore, they are extremely careful about always obtaining proper consent before releasing records.

From the perspective of individuals seeking medical records for their own purposes, not related to health care or the welfare of patients, Michael, Teresa, and Sally are unrelenting obstacles. From the perspective of the patients whose confidential medical records are conscientiously protected, Michael, Teresa, and Sally are performing their jobs well. From the perspec- tive of their employer, Michael, Teresa and Sally are performing their jobs well and following the laws pertaining to the release of medical records.

Medical Records A medical record is a collection of data recorded when a patient seeks medical treatment. The medical record, as used in this chapter, refers to a patient’s visits to one health care facility. The health record cov- ers all of a patient’s health care issues, and covers all health care facili- ties the patient may have visited. The two terms are discussed in further detail in Chapter 8. Hospitals, surgical centers, clinics, physician

176 Part Two J Legal Issues for Working Health Care Prac titioners

 

 

offices, and other facilities providing health care services maintain patients’ medical records. Medical records serve many purposes:

1. They are required by licensing authorities and provide a format for tracking, documenting, and maintaining a patient’s communi- cation data, both inside and outside a health care facility.

2. They provide documentation of a patient’s continuing health care, from birth to death.

3. They provide a foundation for managing a patient’s health care.

4. They serve as legal documents in lawsuits.

5. They provide clinical data for education, research, statistical tracking, and assessing the quality of health care.

ENTRIES

As a legal document, a patient’s medical record may be subpoenaed (via subpoena duces tecum) as evidence in court. When they are conscien- tiously compiled, medical records can prevail over a patient’s recollection of events during a trial. When there is no entry in the record to the effect that something was done, there is a presumption that it was not done, and when there is an entry that something was done, the presumption is that it was done. Therefore, what is omitted from the record may be as important to the outcome of a lawsuit as what is included.

Records may be kept on paper, microfilm, or computer tapes or disks. For legal protection as well as continuity of care, the following information must be recorded in a patient’s record:

• Contact and identifying information: the patient’s full name, Social Security number, date of birth, and full address. If appli- cable, include e-mail address, horne and work telephone numbers, marital status, and name and address of employer.

• Insurance information: name of policy member and relationship to patient, details such as certificate and group numbers, telephone numbers, copy of insurance card, Medicaid or Medicare numbers if applicable, and secondary insurance.

• Driver’s license information, state, and number.

• Person responsible for payment and billing address.

• Emergency contact information

• The patient’s health history.

• The dates and times of the patient’s arrival for appointments.

• A complete description of the patient’s symptoms and reason for making an appointment.

• The examination performed by the physician.

• The physician’s assessment, diagnosis, recommendations, treat- ment prescribed, progress notes, and instructions given to the patient, plus a notation of all new prescriptions the physician writes for the patient and of refills the physician authorizes.

• X-rays and all other test results.

• A notation for each time the patient telephoned the medical facil- ity or was telephoned by the facili ty, listing date, reason for the call, and resolution.

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 177

 

 

• A notation of copies made of the medical record, including date copied and the person to whom the copy was sent.

• Documentation of informed consent, when necessary.

• Name of the guardian or legal representative to be contacted if the patient is unable to give informed consent.

• Other documentation, such as complete written descriptions; photographs; samples of body fluids, foreign objects, and cloth- ing in cases involving criminal investigations; and so on. All items should be carefully labeled and preserved.

• Condition of the patient at the time of termination of treatment, when applicable, and reasons for termination, including docu- mentation if the physician-patient contract was terminated before completion of treatment.

Five Cs can be used to describe the necessary attributes of entries to patients’ medical records. These entries must be:

1. Concise

2. Complete (and objective)

3. Clear (and legibly written)

4. Correct

5. Chronologically ordered

Medical records should never include inappropriate personal judg- ments or observations or attempts at humor.

PHOTOGRAPHS, VIDEOTAPING, AND OTHER METHODS OF PATIENT IMAGING

In today’s health care environment, it has become increasingly com- mon to record patients’ images through the use of photography, videotaping, digital imaging, and other visual recordings. For example, surgeons may photograph, videotape, or otherwise record procedures used during an operation for purposes of education or review. Cosmetic surgeons and physicians who treat accident victims may want to docu- ment visually the patient’s condition “before” and “after” the incident. Such images then become part of the patient’s medical record, subject to the same requirement for written release as the rest of the record.

Photographing or otherwise recording a patient’s image without proper consent may be interpreted in a court of law as invasion of pri- vacy. Invasion of privacy charges are most often upheld in court if the patient’s image was used for commercial purposes, but such claims have also been upheld under public disclosure of embarrassing pri- vate facts . For example, “before” and “after” photographs published by a cosmetic surgeon may cause embarrassment to the patient if he or she did not give consent for the photographs to be published.

If a health care facility routinely photographs patients to document care, a special consent form should be signed stating that:

• The patient understands that photographs, videotapes, and digital or other images may be taken to document care.

• The patient understands that ownership rights to the images will be retained by the health care facility, but that he or she will be allowed to view them or to obtain copies.

178 Part Two I Legal issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

• The images will be securely stored and kept for the time period prescribed by law or outlined in the health care facility’s policy.

• Images of the patient will not be released and/or used outside the health care facility without written authorization from the patient or his or her legal representative.

If the images will be used for teaching or publicity, a separate con- sent form should be used.

CORRECTIONS

Errors made when making an entry in a medical record or errors dis!=overed later can be corrected, but corrections must be made in a specific manner, so that if the medical records are ever used in a medical malpractice lawsuit, it will not appear that they were falsified. Use these guidelines when correcting errors in a client’s paper medical record:

• Draw a line through the error so that it is still legible. Do not black out the information or use correction fluid to cover it up.

• Write or type in the correct information above or below the orig- inal line or in the margin. If necessary, you may attach another sheet of paper or another document with the correction on it. In this case, note in the record “See attached document A” to indicate where the corrected information can be found.

• Note near the correction why it was made (for example, “error, wrong date,” or “error, interrupted by a phone call”). You can place this note in the margin or, again, add an attachment. Do not make a change in the record without noting the reason for it.

• Enter the date and time, and initial the correction.

• If possible, ask another staff member or the physician to witness and initial the correction to the record when you make it.

Since the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) mandated the conversion of medical records from paper to dig- ital form, most medical records are now hybrids, consisting of both elec- tronic and paper documentation. The federal mandate is for all medical records to be stored electronically by the end of 2014. Methods of correct- ing electronic records should be put in place within a medical practice to coincide with software health care providers choose to use, but all meth- ods must meet qualifications specified in federal and state law.

Rule number one in correcting an electronic medical record is that the original record must be maintained. Some software systems in use in medical practices may allow for a single strike-through line through incorrect information, or a system may use different colored type- face to indicate changed information. In any case, the original record should not be completely obscured.

Adding an addendum to correct or add to the original information is the correct method of correction. An addendum is a significant change or addition to the electronic medical record.

Health care providers should have in place a policy for creating addendums to patient medical records, but typically, an addendum to a patient’s electronic medical record will include the following:

a. Patient name

b. Date of service

addendum A signif icant change or addition to t he electron ic health record (EHR).

Chapter 7 1 Medical Records and Informed Consent 179

 

 

I. Define medical record.

c. Account number

d. Medical record number

e. Original report to which the addendum is to be attached.

f. Date and time of the addendum and the electronic signature of the person creating the addendum.

Examples of documentation errors that are corrected by adden- dum include: wrong dates, wrong locations, duplicate documents, incomplete documents, or other errors. The amended version must be reviewed and signed by the provider.

2. List five purposes served by a patient ‘s medical record.

3. As the person responsible for charting in a medical office, would you record a patient ‘s statement that she often feels “woozy” and thinks she has “dropsy”? Why or why not?

4. If a reconstructive surgeon wants to publish “before” and “after” photographs of patients in a brochure left in the waiting room for distribution to prospective patients, what must she do?

5. If a patient makes critical remarks to you, a medical assistant, about your physician/employer, would you record the remarks in the patient’s medical record? Why or why not?

6. You are charting after a patient’s office visit and you are interrupted by a telephone call. The interruption causes you to incorrectly record results of the patient’s blood tests. When you discover your mistake, can you correct it? If so, how?

7. Briefly explain how corrections made to an electronic medical record differ from corrections made to a paper record.

LO 7.2 Identify ownership of medical records and determine how long a medical record must be kept by the owners.

Medical Records Ownership, Retention, and Storage OWNERSHIP

Patients’ medical records are considered the property of the owners of the facility where they were created. For example, a physician in private practice owns his or her records; records in a clinic are the property of the clinic. Hospital records are the property of the

COURT CASE Loss of Medical Records

A plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against a hos-

pital in Massachusetts. During discovery, the plaintiff learned

that the hospital had lost his medical records. An appeals

court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff

as sanction for the hospital ‘s loss of the plaintiff’s medical

records, and the state supreme court upheld the lower

court ‘s decision. The supreme court stated that the missing

records, which the defendant conceded were irreparably

180 Part Two I Legal issues for Work ing Health Care Practitioners

lost, contained the only documentation of the critical time

period during w hich the alleged malpractice event occurred,

making a determination based on the evidence impossible.

A default judgment was issued in favor of the plaintiff,

since the hospital’s loss of medical records was such an

egregious error.

Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hasp., Inc., 439 Mass. 223 (2003).

 

 

admitting hospital. The facility where the medical records were cre- ated owns the documents, but the patient owns the information they contain. On signing a release, patients may usually obtain access to or copies of their medical records, depending on state law. However, under the doctrine of professional discretion, courts have held that in some cases, patients treated for mental or emotional conditions may be harmed by seeing their own records. Under HIPAA, patients who ask to see and/or copy their medical records must be accommodated, with a few exceptions. If patients need clarification, records may be reviewed in the presence of a trusted health care professional, but this is not a requirement for allowing patients to see their records.

When a physician in private practice examines a patient for a job- related physical, scheduled and paid for by the patient’s employer or prospective employer, those records are still the physician’s property, but the employer is entitled to a copy of the record that is pertinent to the job-related exam. Medical records should never be kept in an employer’s general personnel files. The patient must obtain permis- sion from the employer to release information contained in the records.

Under HIPAA, patients are entitled to access any health care infor- mation a physician generates about them, with a few exceptions.

‘ cs”” •

Check Your Progress

8. How long should medical records be retained?

9. Who owns a patient’s medical record?

I 0. Define doctrine of professional discretion.

doctrine of professional discretion A principle under which a physician can exercise judgment as to whether to show patients who are being treated for mental or emotional conditions their records. Disclosure depends on whet her, in the physician’s judgment, such patients would be harmed by viewing the records.

I I. Are you entitled to a copy of your own medical records on request? Explain your answer.

12. If medical records are lost prior to the filing of a medical malpractice lawsuit where the records are necessary, what might result?

RETENTION AND STORAGE

As a protection in the event of litigation, records should be kept until the applicable statute of limitations period has elapsed, which gen- erally ranges from two to seven years. In some cases, this involves keeping the medical records for minor patients for a specified length of time after they reach legal age. Some states have enacted statutes for the retention of medical records. However, most physicians retain records indefinitely, since, in addition to their value as documenta- tion in medical professional liability suits and for tax purposes, the patient’s medical history may be vital in determining future treatment.

As illustrated in the court case on the previous page, “Loss of Medi- cal Records,” medical malpractice is impossible to prove without med- ical records.

Confidentiality and Informed Consent Since medical office personnel have a duty to protect the privacy of the patient, medical records should not be released to a third party without written permission, signed by the patient or the patient’s legal representative. Only the information requested should be released.

LO 7.3 Describe the purpose of obtaining a patient’s consent for release of medical information, and explain the doctrine of informed consent.

Chapter 7 1 Medical Records and Informed Consent 181

 

 

fiduciary duty A physician’s obligation to his or her patient, based on trust and confidence.

Requests for release of records may ask for records concerning a specific date or time span. Records may also be requested for a spe- cific diagnosis, symptom, or body system, or for results of certain diagnostic tests. Medical records personnel should not send unsolic- ited records. They should carefully review the signed release form to ensure that the correct records are sent.

When medical records are requested for use in a lawsuit, a signed consent for the release of the records must be obtained from the patient, unless a court subpoenas the records. In this case, the patient should be notified in writing that the records have been subpoenaed and released.

ROUTINE RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Medical information about a patient is often released for the following purposes:

Insurance Claims. The medical office supplies specific requested information, but does not usually send the patient’s entire medical record. An authorization to release information, signed by the patient, is required before records may be released, but most health care providers incorporate the release into the patient registration form so that information can be provided in a timely manner.

Transfer to Another Physician. The physician may photocopy and send all records, or may send a summary. The patient must sign an authorization to release records.

Use in a Court of Law. When a subpoena duces tecum is issued for certain records (the subpoena commands a witness to appear in court and to bring certain medical records), the patient’s written consent to release the records is waived.

The court case, “Not Guilty of Breach of Confidentiality,” illustrates that physicians who produce patients’ medical records for use in court, or those who testify in court as expert witnesses, are not liable for breach of confidentiality.

As illustrated in the chapter ‘s opening scenario, individuals respon- sible for releasing medical information must follow procedure to protect against unauthorized release, even in the previous situations where medical records are routinely requested.

The court case, “Breach of Confidentiality Declared-Damages Upheld,” determined that damages were properly awarded to the plaintiff in a suit against a nurse who released confidential medical information without authorization.

COURT CASE Not Guilty of Breach of Confidentiality

A physician cannot be sued for breach of confidentiality

when required to produce a patient’s medical records for

use in court testimony.

A patient (Cruz) sued a physician (Agelides) for breach

of fiduciary duty. (Fiduciary duty is a physician ‘s duty to his or her patient, based on trust and confidence.) In a pre-

vious malpractice action brought by Cruz against another

182 Part Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitione rs

physician, Agelides had given a sworn pretrial affidavit and

video deposition in favor of the defending physician. The

court held that Agel ides was immune from any civil liability

action as a result of his testimony as a w itness in the

previous trial.

Cruz v. Age/ides, 574 So 2d 278 (Fla. App. 3 Dist., 1991 ).

 

 

COURT CASE Breach of Confidentiality Declared- Damages Upheld

A 20-year-old unmarried woman who lived with her parents

decided to terminate her pregnancy at the Long Island

Surgi-Center. Because her parents strongly disapproved of

premarital sex and were implacably opposed to abortion,

she did not tell them of her decision. When she arranged

for the procedure, the woman provided her cell phone

number, but told the clinic never to call her at home.

Nevertheless, a day after the abortion one of the clinic’s

nurses telephoned the young woman at home and spoke

with a person she knew to be the woman’s mother. Because

blood test results had been received at the center that

morning, but had not been entered in the patient’s medical

record, the nurse called the patient’s home to determine

(I) information about the patient’s blood type, and (2) if the

patient was experiencing vaginal bleeding. The nurse did

not explicitly tell the patient’s mother that her daughter had

undergone an abortion, but the mother deduced the truth

from the nurse’s questions. The patient’s relationship with

her parents was irreparably damaged, and she sued the clinic,

charging breaches of confidentiality, privacy, and fiduciary

duty, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The

center conceded liability, and the matter proceeded to trial

on the question of damages. The jury awarded the plaintiff

$65,000 for past and future emotional distress and $300,000

in punitive damages. The Surgi-Center appealed the damages

awarded, but the appeals court upheld the awards.

Randi A. }. v. Long Is. Surgi-Ctr. , 2007 NY Slip Op 06953 ; 46 A.D. 3d 74.

While Michael, Sally, and Teresa, medical records employees, are explicitly aware of the dangers of releasing confidential medical informa- tion, all health care practitioners, like the nurse in the court case, “Breach of Confidentiality Declared-Damages Upheld,” also need to be con- stantly aware of protecting confidentiality of patients’ medical records.

Physicians receive subpoenas for patient medical records for a variety of reasons, including accidents involving patients, workers’ compensation claims, and other nonmedical-liability reasons. When this occurs, the medical office sends a photocopy of the patient’s medical records to the attorney who issued the subpoena.

When a physician is sued for medical malpractice, however, respon- sibility to comply with a subpoena to produce specified medical records in court may fall to the medical office employee in charge of medical records. In that case, the person in charge of medical records should follow these guidelines:

• Check the subpoena to be sure the name and phone number of the issuing attorney and the court docket number of the case are listed.

• If a copy of the subpoena is received, verify with the issuing attor- ney that it is the same as the original in every way.

• Verify that the patient named was a patient of the physician named.

• Verify the trial date and time as listed on the subpoena.

• Notify the physician that a subpoena was received, and then notify the physician’s insurance company or attorney, if so directed.

• Check all subpoenaed records to be sure they are complete, but never alter them in any way.

• Document the number of pages in the record and itemize its con- tents. Make a photocopy of the original to be submitted, if permit- ted by state law and the court.

• Offer sworn testimony regarding the record, if so instructed by the court.

Chapter 7 1 Medical ecords and Informed Consent 183

 

 

Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Patient Records A federal statute that protects patients with hist ories of substance abuse rega rd ing the release of information about treatment.

consent Permiss ion from a person, either expressed or implied, for something to be done by another.

doctrine of informed consent The legal basis for informed consent, usually outl ined in a state’s med ical practice acts.

Some state laws specifically address the release of confidential medical information, especially as it pertains to treatment for mental or emotional health problems, HIV testing, and substance abuse. In addition, the fed- eral statute Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Patient Records protects patients with histories of substance abuse regarding the release of information about treatment. Under no circumstances should information of this type be released without specific, written permission from the patient to do so. The patient also has the right to rescind (cancel) consent to release information, in which case the information should not be released.

The follow ing rules for authorizations for the release of medical records can serve as a general guide for medical assistants, health information technicians, and other health care practitioners:

• Authorizations should be in writing.

• Authorizations should include the patient’s name, address, and date of birth.

• The patient should sign authorizations, unless he or she is not a legal, competent adult. In that case, parents or guardians should sign authorizations.

• Only the information specifically requested should be released.

• Requests for information coming into the medical office from insurance companies, physicians, or other sources should be wit- nessed and dated and include the complete name, address, and signature of the party requesting the information, as well as that of the party asked to release the information.

• Include a specific description of the information that is needed. List the purpose for which the data will be used and the date on which the consent expires.

CONSENT By giving consent, the patient gives permission, either expressed (orally or in writing) or implied, for the physician to examine him or her, to perform tests that aid in diagnosis, and/or to treat for a medical condi- tion. When the patient makes an appointment for an examination, that patient has given implied consent for the physician to perform the exam. Likewise, when he or she cooperates with various diagnostic testing procedures, implied consent for the tests has been given.

Informed Consent For surgery and for some other procedures, such as a test for HIV, implied consent is not enough. In these cases, it is important to ask the patient to sign a consent form, thereby docu- menting informed consent (see Figure 7-1).

The doctrine of informed consent is the legal basis for informed consent and is usually outlined in a state’s medical practice acts. Informed consent implies that the patient understands

• Proposed modes of treatment.

• Why the treatment is necessary.

• Risks involved in the proposed treatment.

• Available alternative modes of treatment.

• Risks of alternative modes of treatment.

• Risks involved if treatment is refused.

184 Part Two I Legal Issues fo r W o rking Health Care Practitioners

 

 

~our Progress

13 . Name three reasons a med ical office might be requested to release a patient’s medical records.

14. In which of the three situations named fo r question 13 might a patient’s written consent to release

records be waived?

15. What is needed before the medical office can send a patient’s medical record to the insurer?

16. If an insurance company submits a request for medical records pertaining to an enrolled patient’s outpatient foot surgery and you are responsible for sending the records, should you send the patient’s

entire file to be on the safe side? Why or why not?

17. As the person who reviews requests for patients’ medical records, do you need to know the purpose

for which the data will be used? Explain your answer.

INFORMED CONSENT for SURGERY and PROCEDURES 1. I hereby authorize stall physicians and resident staff at ——-,-,-,===”-“=='””——- to pertorm upon

(Name of Hospital or Facility) ——-.c(Nc-am”‘e-:

0 .-1 pcccat’ient) ———– , such treatment, procedures and/or operations necessary to treat or diagnose the

condit ion(s) which appear indicated.

2. The operation(s) or procedure(s) necessary to treat and/or diagnose my cond ition and the risks, benefits/alternatives and options associated with them have been explained to me by ___________ .. _ _____ , and I understand the operation(s) or

(Name of Physician or provider)

procedure(s)to be: __________________ _

3. Different Provider: D Not Applicable I understand and approve that a different provider other than the physician named above may actual ly perform the procedure.

4. Operative Side: D Not Applicable D Lett D Right

5. Sedation & local Anesthetics: I authorize the administration of sedation and the use of local anesthetics, drugs and medicines as may be deemed appropriate_ If they witt be used, the risks and benefits/alternatives of sedation have been explained to me by the procedural physician.

6. Blood and Blood Products: D Not Applicable

I understand certain surgeries, procedures, or illnesses may result in loss ot blood. I authorize the administration of blood and/or blood components during the procedure as well as during the course ol my hospital stay. II blood will be used, the risks, benetits/alternatives have been explained to me by the physician. Patient Initials: _ ___ _

7. No Blood Products: o Not Appl icable I request that No blood derivative be administered to me. I hereby release the hospital , its personnel . the attending physician and its agents from any responsibility whatsoever for unfavorable reactions or any untoward results due to my refusal to permit the use of blood or its derivatives. The possible risks and consequences of such refusal on my part have been fully explained and I fully understand such risks and consequences may occur as a result of my refusal.

Signature ot PatienVResponsibte Person: __________ _ Relationship: _________ _

8. Unforeseen Conditions: It has been explained to me that during the course of the operation(s) or procedure(s) unforeseen conditions may be revealed that necessitate an extension of the original procedure(s) or different procedure(s) than those set forth above. I am aware that the practice of medicine is not an exact science and I acknowledge that no guarantees have been made to me concerning the result of the operation(s) or procedure(s).

9. Photography: I consent to the use of photography, closed circuit television recording and to use the photographs and other materials for study, educational and scientific purposes, in accordance with ordinary practices of the facility.

10. I consent to have my procedure/operat ion observed, for educational purposes, by individual(s) other than those assist ing the physician during the procedure/operat ion.

Physician or Provider Signature

Signature of Interpreter (if applicable)

Witness (Telephone consent) Date

Patient’s Signature (if competent) Witness Date

Date Time

Time

Signature of Person Responsible Relationship Date

Second Physician or Provider Signature for Emergencies for incompetent patient and No family

Physician must initial faxed copy

Date

Time

Time

Time

FIGURE 7-1 A Sample Consent Form

Chapter 7 1 Medical Records and Informed Consent 185

 

 

– –

I’

Informed consent involves the patient’s right to receive all infor- mation relatiYe to his or her condition and then to make a decision regarding treatment based on that knowledge. Documents establish- ing that the patient gave informed consent prove that the patient was not coerced into treatment.

Adults of sound mind are usually able to give informed consent. Those individuals who cannot give informed consent include the following:

Minors, Persons under the Age of Majority. Exceptions include:

• Emancipated minors-those who are living away from home and responsible for their own support. A minor becomes “emancipated” through a court hearing where evidence is presented that the minor should be emancipated, and a judge makes a determination that the minor has met certain criteria. The minor is then declared “emancipated” and can consent to his or her health care treatment just as any adult of sound mind determines his or her health care treatment.

• Married minors

• Mature minors-those who, through the doctrine of mature minors, have been granted the right to seek birth control or care during pregnancy, treatment for reportable communicable diseases, or treatment for drug- or alcohol-related problems without first obtaining parental consent.

Persons Who Are Mentally Incompetent. Individuals judged by the court to be insane, senile, mentally challenged, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol cannot give informed consent. In these cases, a competent person may be designated by the court to act as the patient’s agent.

Persons Who Speak Limited or No English. When a patient does not speak or understand English, an interpreter may be necessary to inform the patient and obtain his or her consent for treatment.

The rights of emancipated minors, married minors, and mature minors to consent to their own health care are discussed further in Chapter 11.

Other problems in obtaining informed consent may arise in situations such as when foster children need medical attention or a spouse seeks sterilization or an abortion. In each case, health care practitioners must determine who is legally able to give informed consent for treatment. When in doubt, seek legal advice.

Patient education is vital to the issue of informed consent. Stocking the medical office with brochures about various medical problems is not sufficient if the physician does not review the material with the patient. Patients who sue have successfully claimed lack of informed consent because they did not read the consent form they signed or did not read brochures handed to them. Health care personnel should be sure that patients understand all forms and all treatments/surgeries to be performed before signing.

Before proceeding with treatment, health care practitioners must determine whether or not patients are competent to give informed consent.

186 Part Two I Legal issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

LANDMARK COURT CASE Case Legalizes Abortion

In 1970 a single woman in Texas became pregnant. She had

difficulty finding work because of her pregnancy and feared

the stigma of an illegitimate birth. Under the fictitious name

“Jane Roe,” the woman sued Henry Wade, the district attor-

ney in Dallas County, Texas, claiming that she had limited rights

to an abortion and sought an injunction against the Texas

statute prohibiting abortion except to save a woman’s life.

It took three years for the case to reach the U.S.

Supreme Court, which struck down the Texas statute.

The ruling came too late for Jane Roe to have the abor-

tion she originally sought, of course, but it affected the

rights of all women w ho would seek abortions from that

time on. The Court held that the constitutional right to

privacy includes a woman’s decision to terminate a preg-

nancy during the first trimester (three months) , but that

states could impose restrictions and regulate abortions

after that.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. I 13, 144 “n 39” ( 1973).

Informed Consent and Abortion Law In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, U.S. 833 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 24-hour waiting period, an informed consent requirement, a parental consent provision for minors, and a record-keeping requirement for women seeking an abortion. At the same time, the Court struck down the spousal notice requirement of a Pennsylvania statute, in addition to other specific requirements. Casey and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services before it (1989) upheld Roe v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court decision that legal- ized abortion in the United States (see the above case, “Case Legalizes Abortion”), but allowed state regulation of abortion. A number of state legislatures took the cue and passed new abortion restrictions.

Among a long list of state-imposed abortion restrictions are laws that specify certain changes in informed consent. For example, some states require that a woman seeking an abortion be clearly informed of all alternatives to abortions and be told of all risks associated with such surgeries before she can give informed consent to the abortion. In addition, before a woman can consent to an abortion in many states, she must wait a certain length of time (usually 24 hours) before actu- ally signing a consent form.

Amore recent court case, “Case Allows State Regulation” on the next page, upheld Roe v. Wade, and also allowed a state to regulate abortion.

Technically, abortion is legal in all 50 states, but state legislatures have added many restrictions.

Since abortion law is constantly changing, health care practitioners must stay informed about current abortion laws in their respec- tive states. A good Web site for finding abortion laws in your state is statelaws.findlaw.com/family-laws/abortion.html.

HIV and Informed Consent State public health law varies for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing, but, generally, health care practitioners must consider the following factors:

Can a minor (aged less than 18 in some states, 21 in others) consent to his or her own HIV test? Informed consent law for minors vary, but this determination may sometimes be made without regard to age, depending on the minor ‘s situation:

• Infants and young children do not have the capacity to consent, because they do not yet have the ability to make informed deci- sions. The person legally designated to make health care decisions

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 187

 

 

COURT CASE Case Allows State Regulation

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion con-

trol law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions,

the law required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting

period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abor-

tion required the consent of one parent (the law allowed

for a judicial bypass procedure) . A married woman seek-

ing an abortion had to indicate that she notified her hus-

band of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions

were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians.

A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except

the husband notification requirement.

without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by

Roe v. Wade? In a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a

new standard to determine the validity of laws restrict-

ing abortions. The new standard asks whether a state

abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of impos-

ing an “undue burden,” which is defined as a “substan-

tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion

before the fetus attains viability.” Under this standard,

the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the

husband notification requirement. The question in this case was, can a state require

women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent,

wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 ( 1992).

Good Samaritan acts State laws protecting physicians and sometimes other hea lth care practitioners and laypersons from charges of negligence or abandonment if they stop to help the victim of an accident or other emergency.

for the child has the right to decide whether the child should be tested for HIV.

• Married minors, emancipated minors, and minor parents may have the right to give consent for HN testing, depending on state law.

Can an HIV-infected minor consent to his or her treatment? Generally, parental or guardian consent is required for a physician to treat a minor for HN/AIDS, including treatment in school-based clinics. Married, emancipated, and mature minors can usually consent to their own care.

When Consent Is Unnecessary In emergency situations, when the patient is in immediate danger, the physician is not expected to obtain consent before proceeding with treatment.

All 50 states have passed Good Samaritan acts. These acts were intended to protect physicians and, in some states, other health care practitioners and laypersons from charges of negligence or abandon- ment if they stop to help the victim of an accident or other emergency, provided they:

• Give such care in good faith.

• Act within the scope of their training and knowledge.

• Use due care under the circumstances.

• Do not bill for their services. (If a physician treats a patient as a “Good Samaritan” and later bills the patient for services, he or she may be held as having established a physician-patient relation- ship and may not have the immunity from civil damages that a Good Samaritan law would otherwise provide.)

While some states offer immunity to Good Samaritans, sometimes the act of rescuing an accident victim can result in a legal claim of neg- ligent care if the injuries or illness were made worse by the volunteer’s actions. Statutes typically don’t exempt a Good Samaritan who acts in a wilful and wanton or reckless manner in providing emergency care, advice, or assistance. Furthermore, Good Samaritan laws usually don’t apply to a person rendering emergency care, advice, or

188 Part Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

assistance during the course of regular employment, such as services rendered by a health care provider to a patient in a health care facility.

Good Samaritan in legal terms refers to someone who renders aid in an emergency to an injured person on a voluntary basis. Usually, if a volunteer comes to the aid of an injured or ill person who is a stranger, the person giving the aid owes the stranger a duty of being reasonably careful. A person is not obligated by law to do first aid in most states, unless it’s part of a job description. However, some states will consider it an act of negligence if a person doesn’t at least call for help. Generally where an unconscious victim cannot respond, a Good Samaritan can help on the grounds of implied consent. However, if the victim is con- scious and can respond, a person should first ask permission to help.

If a person helps a victim in an emergency and is later sued, whether or not the defendant can use a state Good Samaritan law for his or her defense may depend on the court’s definition of the state’s law, as shown in the case, “Good Samaritans Can Be Liable for Damages to Person Injured during Rescue Attempt.”

COURT CASE Good Samaritans Can Be Liable for Damages to Person Injured during Rescue Attempt

Good friends Alexandra Van Horn and Lisa Torti spent the

evening partying in a bar; then each woman left the bar in

her own car. Van Horn drove away first, and crashed into

a curb and streetlight standard at 45 mph. Torti, behind

Van Horn in the second car, saw the accident and , afraid

the wrecked car was about to “blow up,” she removed

Van Horn. As a result, Van Horn was paralyzed.

Van Horn sued Torti. Torti ‘s defense was based on

California’s Good Samaritan law, Health & Safety Code

section 1799. 102, which provides: “No person who in

good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency

care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any

civil damages resulting from any act or omission. The scene

of an emergency shall not include emergency departments

and other places where medical care is usually offered.”

Based on this statute, the trial court granted sum-

mary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed,

and the case eventual ly reached the California Supreme

Court, where justices interpreted the state’s Good

Samaritan law to apply strictly to medical care, because the statute appears in the Health & Safety Code, in the

division entitled “Emergency Medical Services. ” (A statute

providing broad immunity would li kely appear in the Civil

Code.) Torti did not render emergency medical care; she

merely pulled Van Horn from her crashed car, and, there-

fore, she was found potentially li able. This ruling meant

that Van Horn could take her case to a jury.

Common law principles applied were that the defendant’s

broad interpretation of Health & Safety Code 1799. 102

would undermine establ ished common law regarding

liability for assisting others. There is no general duty to

give assistance, but under the common law, a person

who undertakes to help others has a duty to exercise

due care. Nothing in the statute overcomes the judi-

cial presumption that the legislature does not intend to

overru le established common law principles when it

enacts legislation. A broad inte rpretation, the court held,

would also render superfluous other California “Good

Samaritan” statutes, such as Govt C. 50086 (immunity for a person trained in first aid who is summoned by

authorities and renders emergency services) and Harb. &

Nav C. 656(b) (immunity for a person who assists at scene of vessel collision) (45 C 4th 333) .

As a result of the ruling, the California legislature

changed the state’s Good Samaritan law. Health and

Safety Code section 1799.102 now reads in part: “No

person who in good faith, and not for compensation,

renders emergency medical or nonmedical care or assis-

tance at the scene of an emergency shal l be liable for civil

damages resulting from any act or omission other than an

act or omission constituting gross negligence or wi lful or

wanton misconduct.”

Trial Court: Von Horn v. Watson (2008) 45 C 4th 322, 86 C.R. 3d 350, 197 P 3d 164. California Supreme Court: Alexandra Von Horn, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Anthony Glen Watson et a/. , Defendants and Respondents; Anthony Glen Watson, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. Lisa Torti, Cross-defendant and Respondent, Supreme Court of California, Dec. 18, 2008. Rehearing Denied Feb. I I, 2009.

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 189

 

 

Check Your Progress .··

18. Who may give informed consent?

19. Who may not give informed consent?

20. Must consent to perform routine medical care, such as a physical examination, always be in writing? Explain your answer.

21. In which health care situations is implied consent not sufficient?

22. What consequences generally ensue if a legally competent adult is treated without consent and an adverse event occurs?

LO 7.4 Describe the necessity for e lectronic medical records and the efforts being made to record al l medical records electronically.

health information technology (HIT) The applicat ion of information processi ng, invo lving both computer hardware and software, that deals with the storage, ret rieval, sharing, and use of health care information, data, and knowledge for communication and decision making.

Health Information Technology (HIT) According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, health information technology (HIT) is “the application of informa- tion processing involving both computer hardware and software that deals with the storage, retrieval, sharing, and use of health care infor- mation, data, and knowledge for communication and decision making.” The broad category health information technology also includes telemedicine and use of the Internet for health information purposes. A central component of HIT is the patient’s medical file, and as elec- tronic medical records become more widely adopted, confidentiality and privacy concerns must be addressed.

As of 2004, President George W. Bush had set a 10-year goal for the broad adoption of electronic medical records in the United States. President Barack Obama, who took office January 1, 2009, continued to urge health care providers to convert records to electronic form. In fact, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law in 2010, physicians could receive up to $44,000 from the government to help with the cost of converting to electronic records.

Government-initiated steps toward broad adoption of electronic health information include the following:

1. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Passed in 1996 and implemented in stages through 2005, HIPAA addresses privacy of health information and mandates certain pro- cedures and standards for the electronic transmission and storage of health care information.

2. Executive Orders. In April2004, President George W. Bush signed an executive order establishing the position of National Coordi- nator for Health Information Technology. The coordinator was charged with the development, maintenance, and oversight of a plan for nationwide adoption of health information technology.

In August 2006, a second executive order stated that all federal agencies would utilize, where available, health information technol- ogy systems and products meeting certain “recognized” standards. These HIT systems and products “shall be used for implement- ing, acquiring, or upgrading health information technology sys- tems used for the direct exchange of health information between agencies and with nonfederal entities.” The order further stipu- lated that federal agencies shall require in contracts or agreements

190 Part Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

with health care providers, health plans, or health insurance issuers that, where available, health information technology systems and products meeting recognized standards shall be used.

3. Adoption of the Health Information Standards Developed by Health and Human Services (HHS). As part of this effort, HHS has negotiated and licensed a comprehensive medical vocabulary and made it available to everyone in the United States at no cost. The results of these projects include standards for the following types of information:

• Transmitting X-Rays over the Internet: Today, a patient’s chest X-ray can be sent electronically from a hospital or laboratory and read by the patient’s doctor in his or her office.

• Electronic Laboratory Results: Laboratory results can be sent electronically to the physician for immediate analysis, diagnosis, and treatment, and could be automatically entered into the patient’s electronic health record if one existed. For example, a doctor could retrieve this information for a hospitalized patient from his or her office, ensuring a prompt response and eliminating errors and duplicative testing due to lost laboratory reports.

• Electronic Prescriptions: Patients save time because prescriptions can be sent electronically to their pharmacists. By eliminating illegible handwritten prescriptions, and because the technology automatically checks for possible allergies and harmful interactions with other drugs, standardized electronic prescriptions help avoid serious medical errors.

4. Use of the Federal Government to Foster the Adoption of Health Information Technology. As one of the largest buyers of health care- in Medicare, Medicaid, the Affordable Care Act, the Com- munity Health Centers program, the Federal Health Benefits program, veterans’ medical care, and programs in the Department of Defense- the federal government can create incentives and opportunities for health care providers to use electronic records.

The federal government maintains that the broad use of health information technology will improve individual patient care by:

• Improving health care quality

• Preventing medical errors

• Reducing health care costs

• Increasing administrative efficiency

• Decreasing paperwork

• Expanding access to affordable care

The previous benefits can be seen in the following examples:

• When arriving at a physician office, new patients do not have to enter their personal information, allergies, medications, or medi- cal history, since these facts are already available.

• A parent, who previously may have had to carry a large folder containing the child’s medical records and X-rays by hand when seeing a new physician, can now keep the most important medical

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 191

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history on a keychain, or simply authorize the new physician to retrie\’e the information electronically from previous health care providers.

• Arriving at an emergency room, an elderly patient with a chronic illness and memory difficulties can authorize his or her physicians to access her medical information from a recent hospitalization at another hospital-thus avoiding a potentially fatal drug interaction between the planned treatment and the patient’s current medications.

Public health benefits will include:

• Early detection of infectious outbreaks around the country. For example, three patients experience unusual sudden-onset fever and cough that would not individually be reported. They show up at separate emergency rooms, and through access to electronic health information, the trend is instantly reported to public health officials, who alert authorities of a possible disease outbreak or bioterror attack.

• Improved tracking of chronic disease management.

• Evaluation of health care based on comparisons of price and quality.

When Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts on August 29, 2005, the destruction that resulted included the loss of countless paper medical records. As a result, many of the survivors couldn’t remember the names of lost prescriptions, or when they had last been immunized against tetanus and other diseases. In addition, storm victims who reported to physicians had no medical records health care providers could use as a basis for treatment, and recon- struction, if even possible, would take valuable time.

By contrast, when Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast on October 29, 2012, many health care providers had already converted paper files to digital files as part of HIPAA-mandated disaster plan- ning. In fact, for most of the providers who suffered through Sandy, the process of compliance began long before the storm. Those provid- ers that had disaster plans in place and had practiced them to be sure they worked were in the best position to ride out the storm without loss of critical data and services. And those providers who had dupli- cated all necessary electronic data at off-site data centers were also able to function during the storm or to restore function more quickly after the storm hit. For example, AtlantiCare, a health care system in New Jersey with a large regional medical center and 70 other locations throughout the state, made it through Sandy with few disruptions, thanks to advance disaster planning.

THE HIPAA DISASTER RECOVERY PLAN

A HIPAA disaster recovery plan for health care providers is a docu- ment that specifies the resources, actions, personnel and data that are required to protect and reinstate health care information in the event of a fire, vandalism, natural disaster or system failure.

A HIPAA-compliant disaster recovery plan must state how oper- ations will be conducted in an emergency and which workforce members are responsible for carrying out those operations. The plan

192 Port Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

must explain how data will be moved without violating HIPAA standards for privacy and security. It must also explain how confi- dential data and safeguards for that data will be restored. Although HIPAA doesn’t specify exactly how to do this, it does note that failure to adequately recover from a disaster could lead to noncompliance, exposing officers of the organization to fines or even jail time.

TECHNOLOGICAL THREATS TO CONFIDENTIALITY

Increasingly, as the federal government mandates and encourages health information technology, modern health care facilities rely on technology for creating, maintaining, and transporting patients’ medical information. HIPAA imposes penalties for breaches of confidentiality regarding medical records that identify patients by name. The following guidelines can help ensure that confidentiality is not breached when employees use photocopiers, fax machines, com- puters, and printers to reproduce and send medical records.

Photocopiers

• Do not leave confidential papers anywhere on the copier where others can read the information.

• Do not discard copies in a shared trash container; shred them.

• If a paper jam occurs, be sure to remove from the machine the copy or partial copy that caused the jam.

Fax Machines

• Always verify the telephone number of the receiving location before faxing confidential material.

• Never fax confidential material to an unauthorized person.

• Do not fax confidential material if others in the room can observe the material.

• Do not leave confidential material unattended on a fax machine.

• Do not discard fax copies in a shared trash container; shred them.

• Use a fax cover sheet that states, “Confidential: To addressee only. Please return if received in error.”

Progress

23. How does an electronic medical record differ from one kept on paper?

24. Define health information technology.

25. Name two measures the federal government has taken to speed the adoption of electronic medical

records.

26. According to the federal government, what are two ways the use of electronic records might improve patient care?

27. You are photocopying a patient’s medical record and an employee from the clinic’s accounting department is reading over your shoulder while he waits to use t he copier. What should you do?

Chapter 7 1 Medical ecords and Informed Consent 193

 

 

r

I ~

…..

Computers

• Locate the monitor in an area where others cannot see the screen.

• Do not leave a monitor unattended while confidential material is displayed on the screen.

• Because it is difficult to ensure the privacy of e-mail mes- sages, sending confidential patient information via e-mail is not recommended .

• When computers are sold or otherwise recycled, it’s vital that hard drives be erased or removed and destroyed.

Printers

• Do not print confidential material on a printer shared by other departments or in an area where others can read the material.

• Do not leave a printer unattended while printing confidential material.

• Before leaving the printing area, check to be sure all computer disks containing confidential material and all printed material have been collected.

• Be certain that the print job is sent to the right printer location.

• Do not discard printouts in a shared trash container; shred them.

Since medical records are legal documents, and their confidentiality is protected by law, health care practitioners must take every precau- tion to properly enter information into medical records and to keep that information confidential.

194 Part Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

Chapter Summary

Learning Outcome Summary

LO 7.1 Explain the purpose of medical records and t he importance of correct documentation.

What purposes do medical records serve?

They are required by licensing authorit ies and provide a format for tracki ng, documenting, and maintaining a patient’s communication data, both inside and outside a health care facility.

They p rovide documentation of a pat ient’s continuing hea lth care, from b irth to death.

• They provide a foundation for managing a patient’s hea lth care.

• They serve as legal documents in lawsuits.

They provide clinical data for education, research, statistical tracking, and assessing the quality of health care.

What information is entered into a patient’s medical record?

• Contact and identifying information.

• Insurance information

Driver’s license information

• Person responsib le for payment and billi ng.

• Emergency contact information

• Patient’s hea lth history

• Dates and t imes of appointments.

• Descriptions of patient’s symptoms and reasons for appointments.

Examinations performed

Physician’s assessment, diagnosis, recommendations, treatment, progress notes, prescriptions, and instructions to patient.

• X-rays and all test results.

• Notations for telephone ca lls.

• Notations of copies made.

Documentation of informed consent.

Names of guardians or legal representatives if patient unable to give informed consent.

• All other documentation

• Condition of patient at time of termination of treatment.

What are the five Cs of entries in medical records?

• Concise • Complete • Clear

Correct

• Chronolog ica lly ordered What is the accepted manner for correcting errors in a paper medical record?

• Draw a line through the error.

Write correct information above or below original line.

Note why correction was made.

• Enter the date, time, and initia l the correction .

• Ask a coworker to witness and intial the correction when it is made.

What is the accepted method of correcting an electron ic medica l record?

Follow policy for software used to create the electron ic medica l record.

If an addendum is added to record, be sure it includes:

Patient name

Date of service

Account number

Medica l record number

• Original report to which the addendum is to be attached.

• Date and time of the addendum and the electronic signature of the person creating the addendum.

Chapter 71 Medica. Records and Informed Consent 195

 

 

Learning Outcome Summary

LO 7.2 Identify ownership of medical records and determine how long a medi- cal record must be kept by the owners.

LO 7.3 Describe the purpose of obtain- ing a patient’s consent for release of medical information, and explain the doctrine of informed consent.

LO 7.4 Describe the necessity for electronic medical records and the efforts being made to record all medical records electronically.

Who owns a person’s medical record?

• The owners of the facil ity where the records were created.

How long should medical records be kept?

Until the applicable statute of limitations period has elapsed.

For w hat purposes is medical information routinely released?

Insurance claims

• Transfer of the patient to another physician.

Use in a court of law.

What information does the patient need to give informed consent?

Proposed modes of treatment.

• Why the treatment is necessary.

Risks involved

• Avai lable alternatives

Risks of alternatives

Risks involved if treatment is refused.

Who cannot g ive informed consent?

Minors

• Persons who are menta lly incompetent.

Persons who speak lim ited or no Engl ish .

W hen do Good Samaritan laws protect health care practitioners who stop to help in emergencies?

• When care is given in good fa ith.

• When caregivers act within the scope of their training and knowledge.

• When careg ivers use due care under the circumstances.

• When caregivers do not b ill for their services.

What benefits does the federal government ascribe to the adoption of health information t echnology, including the conversion to electronic records?

Improving hea lth care quality.

• Preventing medical errors

• Reducing health care costs.

Increasing administrative efficiency

Decreasing paperwork

Expanding access to affordable care.

What is the HIPAA Disaster Recovery Plan?

• A document that specifies t he resources, actions, personnel and data that are required to protect and rei nstate health care information in the event of a fire, va ndalism, natural disaster or system failure .

• disaster recovery p lan must state how operations will be conducted in an emergency and which workforce members are respons ible for carrying out those operations.

• must explain how data will be moved without violating HIPAA standards for p rivacy and security .

must explain how confidential data and safeguards for that data will be restored.

• failure to adequately recover from a disaster cou ld lead to noncompliance, exposing officers of the organization to fines or even jail time.

What machines requ ire special ca re in preventing technological threats to confidentiality?

• Photocopiers

Fax machines

• Computers

Printers

196 Part Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

Ethics Issues Medical Records and Informed Consent

A basic tenet of medical law and ethics is that patients have the right of self-determination. That right, however, can be effectively exercised only if patients have enough information to make an intelligent, informed choice about medical treatment. Health care practitioners do not have the right to withhold infor- mation because full disclosure might prompt the patient to forgo needed therapy.

Dr. Carmen Paradis, a bioethicist with the Cleveland Clinic, says the following to health care practitioners regarding informed consent:

Make information relevant to how the patient thinks. For example, “3 percent” may mean nothing to a patient, where “3 out of 100” will. You may also want to say, “97 out of 100 will not have this problem.”

Benefits must be weighed against risks for the patient. How risky is the treatment under consideration? Is the benefit marginal? In addition, make the information available ~wer time, so the patient is not over- whelmed with information all at once. And in addition to verbal explanations use alternative methods of giving information, such as videos, CDs, written material, and so on.

Medical providers at the Cleveland Clinic are fortunate, in that the clinic has an international center prac- titioners can call on for translations of medical documents into languages other than English, and for transla- tors who can relate to a patient’s native culture and language.

Ethics ISSUE 1: A nurse working in a physician office is helping the physician explain a medical diagnosis and proposed treatment plan to a middle-aged woman who is a recent immigrant from Thailand. The woman speaks no English, and her daughter is attempting to translate the conversation. The woman has metastasized lung can- cer, and her prognosis is not good. The nurse notices a pronounced hesitation in the daughter’s translation of this news to her mother, and she suspects the daughter has not relayed the information correctly, because the patient seems undisturbed by the news.

Discussion Questions

1. As the nurse or medical assistant helping the physician in this scenario, what would you do?

2. Assume that the nurse and the physician must obtain informed consent from the patient in the scenario. Should they rely solely on the daughter’s ability to translate? Explain your answer.

Ethics ISSUE 2: You are an LPN in a reproductive services clinic, and a pregnant patient is suffering a medical condition wherein the pregnancy threatens her life. Her physician suggests that she undergo an abortion.

Discussion Questions

1. Will your personal values allow you to assist with the procedure? Explain your answer.

2. If your answer to question 1 is no, what are your alternatives?

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 197

 

 

Ethics ISSUE 3:

You have observed an LPN with whom you work in a hospital attempting to erase an entry she has made in a patient’s paper medical record. She asks you not to tell that you saw her attempting to erase the entry.

Discussion Question

1. What will you do next?

Ethics ISSUE 4:

You have faxed a patient’s medical record to another physician office and discover you have used the wrong fax number.

Discussion Question

1. What will you do next?

Chapter 7 Review

Enhance your learning by completing these exercises and more at http:/ /connect.mheducation.com!

Applying Knowledge

LO 7.1

a connect®

1. Assume you are in charge of recording medical information in a patient’s record after the patient has seen his or her physician. What seven items will you be sure to record?

2. What are the five Cs for correctly entering information into a medical record?

3. After an entry in the medical record has been written or keyed and an error is discovered, what procedure should be followed to correct the error?

a. Use a pencil eraser to remove the entry on a written record; then write in the correction.

b. Use the delete or backspace key if the entry was keyed in; then key in the correction.

c. Draw a line through the error; then call the patient’s physician.

d. None of these.

4. Which of the following comments should not be included in a patient’s medical record?

a. “Patient complained of pain in her right index finger.”

b. “Blood drawn for CBC.”

198 Part Two I Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitioners

 

 

c. “Patient requests no more Jell-0 .”

d. “Patient is big as a blimp.”

LO 7.2

5. Dr. Wellness works as an employee of Anytown Medical Clinic. Who owns the records of his patients?

a. Dr. Wellness

b. Anytown Medical Clinic

c. Each of Dr. Wellness’s patients

d. The state in which Dr. Wellness practices

6. Dr. Wellness also sees patients at Anytown General Hospital, where he maintains records of hospital stays, procedures, and emergency room visits. To whom do these records belong?

a. Dr. Wellness

b. Each of Dr. Wellness’s patients

c. Anytown General Hospital

d. The American Hospital Association

7. Jan B. is a patient of Dr. Wellness, who practi.ces alone. She is moving and wants to transfer her medical records from Dr. Wellness to her new physician, Dr. Good, who works for the Good Samaritan Clinic. Does Jan have the right to obtain copies of her medical records?

a. Yes, but she must sign a consent form.

b. No

c. Only with a subpoena

d. None of these.

8. In the situation in question 7, who owns Jan’s medical records before she moves?

a. Jan

b. Dr. Wellness

c. The state in which Dr. Wellness is licensed

d. None of these.

9. Who owns the medical records after Jan moves and begins to see Dr. Good?

a. Jan

b. Dr. Wellness

c. Dr. Good

d . The Good Samaritan Clinic

10. Which of the following is not necessary for Jan’s medical records to be transferred to her new physician?

a. Jan must sign a form, requesting the transfer of her medical records and giving her consent.

b. Dr. Wellness must be informed that Jan is moving, and that her records will be transferred.

c. Dr. Wellness’s office personnel must follow up after the records have been transferred, to be sure Dr. Good received them.

d . Jan’s attorney must be present when she signs the request to transfer her records.

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 199

 

 

,…..- -,-

LO 7.3

11. In a court of law, which one of the follmving types of testimony will prevail?

a. A patient’s recollection of events

b. A nurse’s oral recollection of events

c. A physician’s testimony

d. The written documentation in a medical record

12. Medical records are often subpoenaed in court because a patient’s medical record is what kind of document?

a. Confidential document

b . Professional document

c. Error-free document

d. Legal document

13. Which of the following statements is not true of statute of limitations laws?

a. They vary with states.

b . They determine the period of time during which a lawsuit may be filed.

c. The most common time periods specified in such laws are two to seven years.

d . All specify that the time period for filing a medical malpractice lawsuit is two years.

14. Which of the following is not true of requests for medical records?

a. They should not be released to a third party without written permission.

b. A patient’s legal representative can give written consent to release records.

c. Requests for release of records may ask for specific records.

d . A patient’s complete medical record should always be released on request.

15. What is rule number one if you are correcting an entry in a patient’s electronic medical record?

16. The copier malfunctions while you are photocopying a patient’s medical records and prints too many copies of several pages. What will you do with the extra copies?

a. File them with the original copy of the patient’s medical records.

b. Staple them to the photocopies, because you cannot destroy them.

c. Shred them in a paper shredder.

d. None of these.

17. Assume you are in charge of releasing medical records to a third party. Which of the following does not require the patient’s written consent?

a. Release of the records to the patient’s insurance company

b. Release of the records for use in a lawsuit, in response to a court’s subpoena

c. Release of the records for research purposes

d. All of these require the patient’s written consent.

18. Which of the following is not a threat to the confidentiality of a patient’s medical record?

a. Written records are left open on a coder’s desk when she takes her coffee break.

b. A medical transcriptionist allows a friend from another office to read over his shoulder while he transcribes a physician’s dictation.

200 Part Two I Legal Issues fo r Working Health Care Prac titioners

 

 

c. A medical office employee inadYertently leaves pages from a patient’s medical record in the fax machine tray.

d . A physician shows a patient’s medical record to a consulting specialist.

19. Which of the following individuals may not be able to give informed consent for medical treatment?

a. A married woman who falls in her home

b. A child injured on a school playground

c. A pregnant teenager

d. A person who speaks a foreign language

LO 7.4

20. Health information technology (HIT) includes

a. Telemedicine

b. Use of the Internet

c. Digital versions of patients’ medical files

d. All of these.

21. According to the federal government, which of the following is not a benefit of HIT with the wide adoption of technology?

a. Preventing medical errors

b. Reducin_g health care costs

c. Improving health care quality

d . Reducing discrimination in health care workplaces

Match each definition with the correct term by writing the letter in the space provided.

22. Addresses the electronic storage and transmission of health information.

23. Protects patients from being coerced into treatment.

24. Protects health care providers from lawsuits when providing care at an accident or emergency.

25. Provides for a continuum of medical care for patients.

26. Allows physicians to decide whether or not to show medical records to those patients treated for mental or emotional disorders.

27. A federal statute that protects the confidentiality of medical records of patients with histories of substance abuse.

Case Studies

a. Good Samaritan act

b. HIPAA

c. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

d . Doctrine of informed consent

e. Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Patient Records

f. Doctrine of professional discretion

g. Medical record

Use your critical thinking skills to answer the questions that follow each case study.

LO 7.3

A 10-year-old girl suffered from a rare malignancy in her brain and around her spinal cord. She had surgery, and most of the tumor mass was removed, but residual tumor remained in the brain and around the spi- nal cord. The girl’s doctors informed her parents that chemotherapy and radiation were possible treatment

Chapter 7 J Medical Records and Informed Consent 201

 

 

options but could cause serious problems such as sepsis, a permanent loss of IQ and stature, and even death. The parents wished to proceed with the therapy.

While their child was undergoing aggressive chemotherapy and radiation, the parents did independent research and read of several drugs being administered for cancer in other states that were unapproved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and were illegal in their home state but were touted by physicians using them as “miracle cures.” The couple sued their child’s physician for failure to disclose alternative treatments, thus depriving them of informed consent.

A court awarded summary judgment to the physician.

28. In your opinion, does the court’s decision seem warranted? Why or why not?

29. Did the physician involved follow the law? Did he or she act ethically? Explain your answer.

30. Under the doctrine of informed consent, should a physician be responsible for informing patients of all treatment options, even if some of the treatments are illegal or not yet proven effective? Explain your answer.

When Ruth applied for health insurance, she listed a colonoscopy examination as part of her medical his- tory. The insurance company asked for more information. Ruth requested, in writing, that the clinic where she had been examined send only the colonoscopy records to her insurance company. In addition to the requested information on her colonoscopy, the clinic sent all of Ruth’s medical records for the past five years, which included the diagnoses of fibrocystic breast disease and obesity. As a result, the insurance company issued Ruth a policy but attached riders stipulating that it would not pay for any illnesses arising from the fibrocys- tic breast disease or obesity.

Ruth complained to the clinic administrator, explaining that she had requested that only those records concerning her colonoscopy be forwarded to the insurance company. The administrator apologized and assured Ruth that the clinic’s policy concerning release of medical records would be reviewed. He also told Ruth that should she ever incur medical expenses for those conditions excepted in her insurance policy, she should contact him.

31. Did the clinic err in sending all of Ruth’s medical records to the insurance company? Why or why not?

32. In your opinion, did Ruth have a legal cause for action against the clinic? Explain.

33. What would you do, in the clinic administrator’s place, to rectify the situation and make sure that similar problems did not arise in the future?

A patient asked her dermatologist for the name of an internist. She visited the recommended internist several times and then learned that, without informing her, he had sent the dermatologist two detailed reports on her condition and family medical history. Since her gastrointestinal condition had nothing to do with her dermatological complaint, she believed the internist had sent the records to show his appreciation for the referraL She told the internist that she felt her privacy had been violated.

202 Part Twa 1 Legal Issues for Working Health Care Practitione rs

 

 

34. Do you agree with the patient? \\by or why not?

Internet Activities LO 7.2 and LO 7.4

Complete the activities and answer the questions that follow.

35. Determine how long medical records must be kept in your state. Begin your search with the question: “How long are medical records kept in [fill in your state]”?

36. Search online for “health information technology occupations.” What occupations are listed under HIT? List three advantages to pursuing an education in HIT. If your primary interest is in patient care, would a career in HIT interest you? Explain your answer.

37. Visit the Web site for the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) at http://www.amia.org/. Find the association’s ethics philosophy under” About AMIA.” Briefly describe the AMIA’s stance on maintaining confidentiality of electronic records.

Resources

California’s Good Samaritan Law:

Telephone interview November 5, 2007, with Dr. Carmen Paradis, Dept. of Bioethics, Cleveland Clinic.

www.portersimon.com/writ/writ-02-201l.pdf.

Content of medical records:

www.sh.lsuhsc.edu/policies/policy _manuals_ via_ms_ word/hospital_policy/h_6.5.0. pdf.

Informed consent:

www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/ informed-consent.shtml.

Sebelius quote:

Pear, Robert. “Standards Issued for Electronic Health Records.” The New York Times, July 13, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/healthlpolicy/14health.html.

Chapter 71 Medical Records and Informed Consent 203

 
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Business Ethics Chapter 6 – Employee Responsibilities

Multiple Choice Quiz

 

1

Which of the following aspects of the relationship between Enron’s special purpose entities (SPE’s) and Enron itself is not particularly egregious?
A) Enron had no reason for forming SRE’s other than to create a deceptive impression that it was in better financial shape that it actually was.
B) Hedging risks by entering into agreements with oneself does not lower risks.
C) Underwriting one’s own risks is not underwriting them at all.
D) Using Enron’s own stock to finance the SPE’s provided a very strong incentive for Enron management to keep its stock value high.
E) All of the above.
F) None of the above.

2

Which statement is not true of the agency concept?
A) In actual fact, not all agents are employees.
B) Under the common law tradition of the United States, all employees are treated as agents of employers.
C) The primary responsibilities in the employer-agent relationship lie with the employer.
D) The law has described the employee-employer connection as a master-servant relationship.

3

Select the statement that does not support the narrow view of non-managerial employees’ responsibilities to their employer, the idea that the employer exercises a great deal of control over the nature and terms of employment with very little discretion given to the employee:
A) Employees consent to obeying managers when they take a job.
B) Employees who agree to obey employers are not truly abandoning their own responsibility.
C) The choice of obeying someone’s command or jeopardizing one’s job is a fundamentally coercive situation and, therefore, the consent involved is not fully free.
D) Owners have property rights and have to be protected against the harms they might suffer from employees.

4

Identify the statement that does not correctly present the fiduciary relationship that is said to exist between managerial employees and employers:
A) Managers have special expertise that owners must rely on, so they are given wider responsibilities .
B) Managers are free from close day-to-day oversight by owners.
C) Because managers have greater freedom from day-to-day supervision by owners, they are not generally understood to have a strong fiduciary duty to always act in the best financial interest of the owners.
D) The legal duties of loyalty, trust, obedience and confidentiality are understood to override the manager’s personal interests.

5

Identify the statements that reflect the varied owner interests corporate managers are supposed to serve:
A) Investors buy stock because they believe in the company and its products.
B) Investors are playing the stock for short-term gain.
C) Investors see their stock ownership as an investment in a company and its technology.
D) Investors see their stock ownership as a long-term investment for personal retirement and security.
E) All of the above.
F) None of the above.

6

Which statement describes a managerial action that does not unethically impose costs upon stockholders and other stakeholders?
A) The action imposes unwanted costs on stockholders and stakeholder by giving up some alternatives in favor of others in the interest of maintaining the fiscal stability of the enterprise.
B) A personal interest of a manager hinders the exercise of his or her professional judgment.
C) A portion of some payment is kicked back to the payer as an incentive to make the payment in the first place.
D) Financial advisers receive payments from a brokerage house to pay for research and legal services that should be used to benefit the advisers’ clients, not the advisers’ personal interests.

7

Select the statement that, ethically speaking, best represents a valid concept of what loyalty to a firm means:
A) Loyalty means a willingness to sacrifice one’s own interest by going above and beyond ordinary employee responsibilities.
B) Loyal employees are expected to sacrifice for the firm even though the firm is not necessarily bound to sacrifice for the employee.
C) Since the model of agency law lays a legal duty of loyalty on employees, employees clearly have a corresponding ethical responsibility to be loyal.
D) While a willingness to sacrifice might be a part of loyalty, it would seem that devotion and faithfulness to a common good is both more essential to loyalty and what explains the willingness to sacrifice.

8

Identify the statement that challenges Albert Carr’s analogy that, like poker, business is a game that has its own rules and, therefore, is exempt from ordinary requirements of morality:
A) Carr overestimates the prevalence and acceptability of dishonesty within business.
B) Even if business did have its own set of ethical conventions, that fact alone does not exempt it from ordinary ethical evaluations.
C) There are major disanalogies between business and games like poker that weaken the conclusions drawn from Carr’s analogy.
D) Unlike poker games, individual often have no choice but to participate in business practices.
E) All of the above.
F) None of the above.

9

According to Richard DeGeorge, which statement presents a condition that makes blowing the whistle on a company not just permissible but obligatory?
A) A threat of serious harm exists.
B) The whistleblower has exhausted all internal channels for resolving the problem.
C) The harm to be prevented overrides the harm done to the firm and to other employees.
D) The whistleblower has good reason to believe that blowing the whistle will prevent the harm.

10

Select the statement that is not a criticism of insider trading:
A) The insider benefits inappropriately by buying or selling the stock at a price below or above what the market will demand when the inside information is made public.
B) An insider can benefit by trading on bad news as well as good, and this might be an incentive to work against the firm’s best interests.
C) The insider’s action sends the correct message to the market, reflecting the stock’s true value, moving the market toward equilibrium.
D) The insider’s information is often used without the firm’s permission in a way that harms the stockholder’s interests.

 
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Can Answer Question Tonight Correctly

Determine which moral standard of social responsibility the business is observing.

Genie’s company is considering building an annex to its main factory. While deciding on the project, the board of directors discusses the impact the the annex would have on the local community, shareholders, company profits, and nearby landowners.

  •  Profit-Maximizing Moral Standard
  •  Corporate Citizenship Moral Standard
  •  Indeterminable
  •  Moral Minimum Standard
  •  Stakeholder Theory Moral Standard

Country A and Country B have had an informal trading arrangement for many years wherein merchants on the border of the countries may freely trade goods without the restriction of fees. Which of the following is true?

  •  Country A and Country B have no binding agreement under customary international law.
  •  More than one response is correct.
  •  The government of Country A may not arbitrarily begin to charge fees for items brought in from Country B.
  •  Country A and Country B have a binding agreement to this arrangement under customary international law.

Country A and Country B have had an informal trading arrangement for many years wherein merchants on the border of the countries may freely trade goods without the restriction of fees. Which of the following is true?

  •  Country A and Country B have no binding agreement under customary international law.
  •  More than one response is correct.
  •  The government of Country A may not arbitrarily begin to charge fees for items brought in from Country B.
  •  Country A and Country B have a binding agreement to this arrangement under customary international law.

Nation A is neighbors with Nation B. When an international crime lord who operates in both countries is captured by Nation A, it sentences him to a lifetime of heavy labor. Nation B wants to havDetermine which moral standard of social responsibility the business is observing.
Vivian’s company is considering building a huge new department store in a small town. The community argues that the store will disrupt local commerce and harm local business owners. Vivian argues that the store will save money for customers and bring more jobs to the community. Assume both arguments are true.

  •  Corporate Citizenship Moral Standard
  •  Profit-Maximizing Moral Standard
  •  Moral Minimum Standard
  •  Indeterminable
  •  Stakeholder Theory Moral Standard
  1.   Bookmark question for later    Lula thinks that people who discipline their children by spanking should be sent to jail and says she would be glad to go to jail if she was caught spanking her child. Which philosophy of ethics is applicable?
    •  Utilitarianism
    •  Virtue Ethics
    •  Kantianism
    •  Social Justice Theorye the criminal executed, but it defers to Nation A’s judgment. Which principle of International Law is at play?
  •  Act of State Doctrine
  •  Sovereign Immunity
  •  Comity of Nations
  1. Determine which moral standard of social responsibility the business is observing.
    Earl’s company wants to change the material it uses for its products to a cheaper, less-durable material. Processing the material causes more waste and the final products will not be as safe for customers.

    •  Moral Minimum Standard
    •  Profit-Maximizing Moral Standard
    •  Indeterminable
    •  Corporate Citizenship Moral Standard
    •  Stakeholder Theory Moral Standard
  2.   Bookmark question for later    Nation A makes is illegal for its citizens to own more than one vehicle in order to reduce emissions. Nation A’s neighbor Nation B disagrees with the decision and refuses to enforce it in its own borders but refrains from contesting the decision in court. Which principle of International Law is at play?
    •  Act of State Doctrine
    •  Comity of Nations
    •  Sovereign Immunity
  3.   Bookmark question for later    Nation A builds a new highway next to citizens’ properties. In the months following, littering as well as several highway accidents result in damage to the properties. The property owners want to sue the government for damages, but are restrained by:
    •  Act of State Doctrine
    •  Sovereign Immunity
    •  Comity of Nations

Determine which moral standard of social responsibility the business is observing.

Meg’s company decided to build an additional factory in a small community. When the community started a protest because of the negative impact it feels a factory will have on the community, Meg’s company promises to prevent and pay for any negative impact to the community. It also offers to build a community park to balance out the negative impact the factory will have.

  •  Moral Minimum Standard
  •  Corporate Citizenship Moral Standard
  •  Profit-Maximizing Moral Standard
  •  Stakeholder Theory Moral Standard
  •  Indeterminable

Radcliffe is a college business professor with little education but extensive experience in business. A treaty negotiating the free trade of educational opportunities was just passed between Canada and the U.S., and it includes a condition that all university professors must have at least a master’s degree in order to teach. Which of the following is true?

  •  The treaty is only enforceable if it doesn’t conflict with state law in Radcliffe’s state.
  •  Radcliffe may not be restricted from teaching if his university has no rule concerning the need for a master’s degree.
  •  Radcliffe no longer meets the qualifications to teach.
  •  Radcliffe may still teach as long as he only teaches in the U.S.

Moira is ashamed to discover that her son stole an apple from the cafeteria and gave it to another student who had no lunch. She grounds him from watching TV as punishment. Which philosophy of ethics is applies here?

  •  Social Justice Theory
  •  Virtue Ethics
  •  Kantianism
  •  Utilitarianism

asey is on trial under criminal allegations that she engaged in fraudulent behavior at the company she manages. She is worried when the plaintiff alleges that it has “unambiguous proof” that Casey is guilty. Which of the following is most likely true?

  •  Casey need not worry about the plaintiff’s evidence, since parties tend to boast about the level of proof they can establish anyway.
  •  The plaintiff will most likely prove Casey is guilty, since criminal charges only need to meet a prima facie burden of proof.
  •  If the plaintiff provides proof only up to the level of “clear and convincing,” Casey can still be acquitted.
  •  If the plaintiff does have unambiguous evidence that meets a “clear and convincing” burden of proof, Casey will most likely be found guilty.

Which of the following situations would most likely receive a change of venue?

  •  A defendant in a case requests a change of venue because the location of the trial is inconveniently far away from the state where he lives.
  •  A woman wants a change of venue when it appears that all jurors to the case will be male.
  •  A local teacher is taken to court after a video of him beating his students goes viral.
  •  An employer who is accused of racially-discriminatory practices wants a change of venue when it finds out that the local venue judge is African-American.

Which legal school of thought is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 8 

(Just then Calvin, the fit CEO, comes jogging into the room with a water bottle in hand. He spots the donuts and shows his disgust.) Calvin: Why do people inflict such nasty, sugar-coated poison on all of us?! A healthy workplace is a happy workplace. (He takes both boxes of donuts, puts them in a small, dirty, battered trash can and steps on them to squash them down, making them suddenly inedible. He smiles at everyone as if they all agree that he has done them a great service.) That’s my job as CEO, to help everyone realize a long and happy life! Cheers! (He runs from the room as everyone looks on in stunned silence. After a couple of seconds Bob collapses on the floor next to the garbage can, looking at the destroyed donuts as if they were a long-lost love.)

End Part 8 

  •  Legal realism school of thought.
  •  Sociological school of thought.
  •  Command school of thought.
  •  Law and economics school of thought.

Which legal school of thought is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 5 

Derek: We need someone we can trust who can divide up the donuts. One set of rules can’t always be applied here. If we had an impartial judge or two in the mix, someone who doesn’t like donuts perhaps, they could take into account all of the changing factors impacting our donut sphere and make up rules that will bring glazed-happiness to all who seek it.

End Part 5

  •  Critical legal studies school of thought.
  •  Irrational forces perspective.
  •  Legal realism school of thought.
  •  Sociological school of thought.

Which legal theory is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 3 

Joyce: We had a lawsuit filed about this after the pastry rumble of 2017 and there was . . . oh yeah, I remember there were some specific rules that are detailed out in 34 (b), section 4.

Bob: Those stupid rules were made after Winfred face-planted in the donuts when he slipped trying to get past Alison. They don’t apply here. There wouldn’t even be donut rules if he’d paid attention to his own big feet.

End Part 3 

  •  Critical legal studies school of thought.
  •  Historical perspective school of thought.
  •  Irrational forces perspective.
  •  Natural law school of thought.

A law was recently passed in the city of Birmingdon that specifies a long list of restrictions on disposing of different kinds of waste material. The law is long, meticulous, and complicated, and many citizens do not understand all the points of the law or the purpose it is meant to fulfill. Citizens are commonly caught breaking the ordinance. Which law or principle of law which is most relevant to this situation?

  •  Equal Protection Laws
  •  First Amendment
  •  Procedural Due Process
  •  Substantive Due Process

Which legal theory is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 3 

Joyce: We had a lawsuit filed about this after the pastry rumble of 2017 and there was . . . oh yeah, I remember there were some specific rules that are detailed out in 34 (b), section 4.

Bob: Those stupid rules were made after Winfred face-planted in the donuts when he slipped trying to get past Alison. They don’t apply here. There wouldn’t even be donut rules if he’d paid attention to his own big feet.

End Part 3 

  •  Critical legal studies school of thought.
  •  Historical perspective school of thought.
  •  Irrational forces perspective.
  •  Natural law school of thought.

Which jurisprudential school of thought relies the most upon precedent in establishing law?

  •  Irrational Forces
  •  Legal Realism
  •  Natural Law
  •  Historical
  •  Sociological

A television producer/director receives the following script designed to celebrate National Donut Day.  As she reads it, it brings to her mind some principles of jurisprudence she learned in her college business law class.

Help her out: Which legal school of thought is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 1

(The scene is a lunchroom or break room. There are at least three round tables visible and perhaps a vending machine, microwave, or refrigerator in the background. Of the three tables, no one is sitting at the center table as the scene opens.)

Karen: (She walks in carrying two big boxes of donuts and places them on the center table.) Allied Chemical just dropped these off to thank us for our work on the “Expressly Hair” project. Have fun. (She says unenthusiastically. She shows absolutely no interest in the donuts and quickly leaves. Everyone else, except Alison, immediately stands. Alison is still showing an interest in the goodies but not moving toward them. Joyce immediately positions herself between the donuts and Bob.)

Bob: It’s a donut festival!

Joyce: (She moves to block and slow him, as if checking him in basketball.) Just wait a second! We have to first establish the rules.

Bob: Rules, in a donut festival?

Joyce: Yes rules. Last time donuts like these were brought in, Winfred got a broken nose and, once again, Alison didn’t get any. We aren’t animals. If we don’t slow down, someone is going to accidentally eat the cardboard again.

Bob: Oh, no. Here we go. Where’s the PowerPoint?

Joyce: There are guidelines in the employee handbook that have been developed over many years that detail out exactly what is to be done with these kind of employee gifts. (She opens a thick binder.) Nearly any scenario you can imagine has been detailed out in section 34 (b), including pastries from chemical companies. Practices and procedures have been set and we would be smart to follow them.

End Part 1

  •  Historical perspective school of thought.
  •  Critical legal studies school of thought.
  •  Irrational forces perspective.
  •  Natural law school of thought.

Charlie is summoned for jury duty. While still in the selection process, it is discovered that one of the parties to the case used to be an old friend and neighbor of Charlie’s. Which of the following would most likely happen?

ederico is in a financial dispute. He is trying to collect money for services rendered, but the debtor does not want to pay the money owed to Federico. Which court that would most likely address this situation?

  •  U.S. Tax Court
  •  State Small Claims Court
  •  U.S. Bankruptcy Court
  •  Charlie would be excluded through preemptory challenge.
  •  Charlie would be preserved on the jury since he would have inside information about one of the parties.
  •  Charlie would be excluded for cause.
  •  Charlie can refuse to serve on the jury.

Which legal school of thought is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 7

Alison: (She stands during David’s speech as if inspired but sits down once Bob starts talking.)

Bob: Right. Power to the people David. Anyone else hungry? (He tries to slowly move to the donuts and Joyce continues to defend them like a point guard.)

Lee: I have an idea that might address all of these issues. What if none of us have any of these donuts but instead we break up into teams and sell them to our coworkers for a profit? Instead of getting one or two donuts, we can stop on our way home and pick up a dozen of them each with our profits. In this case, we ignore the company stick-in-the-mud book regulations because, as you can see, we are obviously presented with some opportunities for a little economic development. Corporate rules here must bow to economic opportunity. If we let our rules block our prosperity, what kind of company will we become?

End Part 7

  •  Sociological school of thought.
  •  Legal realism school of thought.
  •  Law and economics school of thought.
  •  Command school of thought.

delyn is in a financial dispute with her creditor. She wants to declare bankruptcy because she is finding herself unable to meet the requirements of paying off her debt. Which court that would most likely address this situation?

  •  U.S. Tax Court
  •  State Small Claims Court
  •  U.S. Bankruptcy Court

After a tragic event in which an armed intruder storms into a mall and fatally shoots several people, the city of Belmonte institutes a law that prohibits any form of weapon in public retail establishments. This reaction would be an example of following which school of jurisprudential thought?

  •  Natural Law
  •  Irrational Forces
  •  Sociological
  •  Historical
  •  Legal Realism

Annie is an observer to a legal dispute between two of the tenants in a building she manages. She has documented information relevant to the case but prefers not to get involved in the dispute. Which of the following is true?

  •  Annie can be required via subpoena to provide the information she has.
  •  Annie cannot provide any information since her position as a manager precludes her ability to be unbiased.
  •  Annie is required by Good Samaritan laws to put forth any information she has relevant to the case.
  •  Annie can refuse any attempt to involve her in the dispute between her tenants.

A law which promotes the opportunity for foreign workers to obtain employment, housing, and medical care regardless of their citizenship status would likely fall under which school of jurisprudential thought?Which school of jurisprudential thought is most clearly exhibited in this scenario?

  •  Irrational Forces
  •  Historical
  •  Natural Law
  •  Sociological
  •  Legal Realism

Which of the following situations would not substantiate proper standing to sue?

  •  Tyler wants to sue Kevin after Kevin harms Tyler’s sister in a car crash which leaves her sister in a coma.
  •  Aniesha wants to sue her neighbor Robert after seeing him engage in criminal animal cruelty.
  •  Calvin wants to sue his sister after finding out she has been taking cash from the cash register at the family business.
  •  TreesForDays, an environmental activist group, wants to sue a company dumping chemicals into a river in a different stat

A new law is established in the town of Avery that promotes affirmative action employment for people trans-gender and homosexual individuals. This law would be in pursuance of the tenets of the __________ school of jurisprudential thought.

  •  Sociological
  •  Law and Economics
  •  Command
  •  Irrational Forces
  •  Legal Realism

Clara is suing David because of a property dispute. Clara and David are from different states, so it is not readily clear which state has jurisdiction over this case. Which of the following is true?

  •  Jurisdiction can fall in whichever state has subject matter or personal jurisdiction, likely depending on which state Clara feels will give her a more favorable outcome for her case.
  •  Jurisdiction falls in David’s state of residence, since he is the one being summoned to court.
  •  Jurisdiction depends solely on where the property – the focus of the dispute – is located.
  •  Jurisdiction falls in Clara’s state of residence, since she is the plaintiff.

The government of Sharonville is deep in debt, and consequently enacts a city ordinance that requires citizens to do volunteer work for the city once per week. Such and act would be in accordance with the __________ school of jurisprudential thought.

  •  Irrational Forces
  •  Sociological
  •  Legal Realism
  •  Law and Economics
  •  Command

Dixonville has had fundamentally the same demographics, economic system, and social structure for decades. In recent years these factors have begun to shift, causing many to call for new legislation and legal practices. Shifting the legal structure of Dixonville in order to account for the changes that are occurring would be in accordance with the __________ school of jurisprudential thought.

  •  Natural Law
  •  Irrational Forces
  •  Legal Realism
  •  Sociological
  •  Historical

Sally and Kirk are at odds over the details of a business contract. Neither of them wants to go to court, but they both refuse to make a compromise on the terms they expect from one another. Which of the following would most easily force them to a resolution?

  •  Legally-binding arbitration
  •  Negotiation
  •  Legally-binding mediation
  •  Non-binding arbitration

Claudia feels strongly against a law that was recently passed in her hometown. She proceeds to write letters to the local newspaper criticizing the effect of the law. She also marches up and down the sidewalk in front of city hall loudly publicizing her contradictory point of view. Which law or principle of law which is most relevant to this situation?

  •  Procedural Due Process
  •  Substantive Due Process
  •  First Amendment
  •  Equal Protection Laws

Which legal school of thought is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 6

Bob: Donut spheres? Glazed happiness? Anyone notice who is not eating donuts right now? Are we about to form a blue-ribbon commission here?

David: Bob, don’t you see what’s happening. While we fight over which one of us gets the goodies, our coworkers, who are actually working by the way, are missing out on these delicious chemical donuts. Meanwhile our friend Alison will be left out of the mix as well as Winfred, who is again in the hospital. What about our custodial and shipping people who are relegated to the basement world? Once again, they will get no goodies, and they are the ones doing the actual work. They aren’t even allowed up here in our break room because we don’t want their greasy hands on our microwave. The only good reason for rules here is to protect the donut-less among us. Donut laws are not any good unless they address the glazed inequalities that would not otherwise even be considered.

End Part 6

  •  Command school of thought.
  •  Law and economics school of thought.
  •  Legal realism school of thought.
  •  Sociological school of thought.

Which legal school of thought is illustrated in this dialogue?

DONUT DAY AT THE OFFICE

Part 2 

Bob: Listen, donuts are made to bring joy into our lives and to wake up our glazed faculties. Just let them be distributed according to unchanging moral principles of justice. The donuts will distribute themselves according to natural principles.  We just take what we want and the leftovers will be appreciated by those who enjoy them most. Don’t over complicate this. Where’s the chocolate milk?

End Part 2

  •  Natural law school of thought.
  •  Historical perspective school of thought.
  •  Irrational forces perspective.
  •  Critical legal studies school of thought.

The federal government passes a law which a company, JuneCorp, feels unjustifiably discriminates against the company and harms its ability to operate. Which of the following statements is true?

  •  JuneCorp cannot contest the legality of the law, since the Equal Protection Clause applies to people rather than corporations.
  •  JuneCorp can contest the legality of the law if it passes all three scrutiny tests employed by the courts.
  •  JuneCorp can contest the legality of the law if there is no evident state interest which substantiates the enforcement of the law.
  •  JuneCorp cannot contest the legality of the law if there is anything but a financial impact on the company because of the law.

An appeals court feels that a lower court has made an incorrect judgment concerning a civil law case. Which of the following would be the mostly reason to remand the case back to the lower court?

  •  The appellate court found a mistake of fact that occurred during the initial trial.
  •  The appellate court wants to see more evidence before it can make an informed decision.
  •  The appellate court wants the lower court to handle the case, since it is a civil rather than criminal case.
  •  The appellate court found a mistake of law that occurred during the initial trial.
 
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Business Law Briefing Case 1

Lambert v. Barron 974 So.2d 198 (La. Ct. App. 2008)

 

Donald Lambert and Don Barron were friends. They had a long-standing professional relationship based on their service together on the Louisiana State Board of Licensed Contractors from the 1980s. Lambert had been chairman of the state board, and had established his experience in resolving construction disputes. Barron is a commercial construction contractor doing business in Farmerville, Louisiana. In 1998, Barron’s business began experiencing financial strain because five of his construction projects became mired in various difficulties. Barron and Lambert talked by phone during the summer of 1998 about Barron’s personal problems and financial difficulties, and Lambert was concerned about his friend’s depressed mental state.

 

On November 11, 1998, Lambert flew from New Orleans to Farmerville to meet with Barron. Prior to Lambert’s flight, Barron’s employee had faxed and overnighted copies of various construction contracts and correspondence relating to Barron’s problematic construction projects for Lambert to review. Lambert contends that, while standing on the airport runway before he boarded the plane for his return trip home that day, he and Barron contracted for Lambert to provide consulting services for Barron. Lambert told Barron at that time that he customarily charged his clients $3,100 per month, and the minimum term for his services was one year. He also charged 10 percent of any amount recouped by his clients in settlement.

 

In late 2000, Lambert billed Barron for a $34,100 balance owed on the alleged oral contract. Lambert’s letter dated October 30, 2000, requested payment and stated, “I have preformed [sic] my service for you and I must request that you pay me the balance due me of $34,100.” Two weeks later, Barron wrote Lambert back:

 

I received your bill last week and was very shocked. I do not know where you are coming from, and what you have done to think you deserve any kind of pay. I sent the plane down for you to come up and look over some paperwork and later we sent you some documents for you to take a look at. For your service for a full day and the one to three hours it may have taken, I was planning to pay you $2,000.00 and thought that would be around $150.00 an hour. My people knew you had been here so they paid the $3,100.00 invoice you sent. Then awhile later you called about money and I told you that we had paid you plenty and would not pay you any more. I remember you showing me a long list of people that paid you $3,100.00 a month. I did not tell you I wanted to be on that list. I have not called for any advice since then. All my calls have been to return your call.

Lambert sued Barron for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed Lambert’s case, and Lambert appealed.

 

Caraway, Judge

This case involves the disputed formation of a contract for consulting services. A contract is an agreement by the parties whereby obligations are created. A contract is bilateral when the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the obligation of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other. Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.

 

The trial court’s ruling credited Barron’s testimony that he never orally accepted Lambert’s offer for consulting services under the proposed one-year arrangement with $3,100 per month payments. There was no writing reflecting the parties’ consent. Nevertheless, the trial court’s task was also to review Barron’s alleged acceptance of the agreement from the implications of his actions or inaction. In this regard, Civil Code Article 1942 provides: “When, because of special circumstances, the offeree’s silence leads the offeror reasonably to believe that a contract has been formed, the offer is deemed accepted.”

 

This case involves the special setting of parties with a prior friendship and the aid and advice freely given between friends that existed before Lambert first broached the subject of a consulting contract. In Chaisson v. Chaisson, this court found in a similar setting that an oral loan agreement had been reached be-tween parents and their son. The son admittedly had understood his parents’ intent for a loan for college expenses, but denied his acceptance of the loan agreement. Nevertheless, the son’s actions in receiving the benefits of the loan proceeds in that setting and his subsequent partial payments on the loan were enough for this court to afi rm the lower court’s factual determination of a binding contract. A family setting or close friendship requires the finder-of-fact to determine the offeree’s acceptance of an onerous contract and the offeror’s reasonable belief that a contract has been formed, thus overcoming the competing implications of a benefit extended by one to a friend for a gratuitous reason without obtaining any advantage in return.

 

From our review of the testimony of the two men, we also conclude that there was no clear agreement given by Barron on November 11, 1998, as Lambert boarded the plane to return to New Orleans. Absent a direct oral or written acceptance by Barron, Lambert’s proof of the [supposed] contract rests on his receipt of certain documentation of Barron’s troubled construction projects and invoices for consulting fees sent to Barron. The bulk of the documentation regarding Barron’s five construction projects was forwarded to Lambert days before the Farmerville meeting. Lambert’s review of the details of those construction contracts and Barron’s problems with the projects would have been performed in preparation for the Farmerville meeting with-out any contract binding his friend. More importantly, Barron provided Lambert that documentation without any indication that his friend’s review of the projects would require compensation.

 

After Lambert expressed at the Farmerville airport his offer and desire for a consulting contract, some further documentation was provided to him between April and August 1999. These were transmitted by fax to Lambert without any request for specific services. The faxed documents primarily concerned correspondence from Barron’s attorney to Barron reflecting the scheduling of mediation and arbitration hearings. Significantly, Barron’s attorney never consulted Lambert, and Lambert never responded in writing to Barron regarding any substance concerning the status of the construction project disputes during that time. Moreover, Barron never used the principal subject matter of Lambert’s expertise, arbitration, to resolve disputed construction project issues during the year following the alleged oral contract.

 

From our review of this evidence, we find that the trial court could determine that no tacit acceptance of Lambert’s offer for services was made by Barron. Particularly lacking from the record is evidence of any substantive business benefit realized by Barron from his consultant friend. The trial court ultimately held that the parties’ relationship was that of a “friend helping a friend,” such that Lambert could not have reasonably believed that a contract had been formed.

 

For the reasons expressed above, the trial court’s determination that no contract was formed between the parties is affirmed.

 

Affirmed in favor of Barron.

 
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Business Law Assignment Week 4

Running head: WEEK 3 ASSIGNMENT 1

WEEK 3 ASSIGNMENT 2

Considering Elvis

 

Latoya Bechet

Walden University

BUSI 2001: Business Law

Karen Bond

March 20, 2016

Consideration: Presley vs. Alden

 

Presley’s promise to assist Jo Alden in paying the mortgage was not enforceable against the estate. The estate was not legally obligated to pay the mortgage. It is Presley who had made a promise toward Jo Alden and not the estate. If Presley had left a will instructing the estate to honor his pledge then, it would have been enforceable. Secondly, Presley was already engaged to Ginger when he made the promise of paying the mortgage, therefore, not legally binding. Goldman and Sigismond (2014) described this type of promise as past consideration. Past consideration is not a consideration because a promise is made after an act has already taken place. Thirdly, a promise focused on affection and love is not enforceable. Presley extended the love that he had for Ginger to her mother, an aspect that is not legally recognized. In a court of law, a moral duty is not seen Comment by Karen Bond: In probate law the estate represents the deceased so they are one and the same Comment by Karen Bond: punctuation Comment by Karen Bond: Why? Comment by Karen Bond: No act had taken place Comment by Karen Bond: According to what source? Comment by Karen Bond: maximum word length reached here.

References

Cornes, D. L., & Winward, R. (2008). Winward Fearon on collateral warranties: For construction contracts. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Comment by Karen Bond: Not applicable

Goldman, A., & Sigismond, W. (2014). Business law: Principles and practices (9th ed.). South Western: Cengage Learning. Comment by Karen Bond: Not in APA

Answer

Given that this was based on a true set of facts, the first thing you should have done was look up the case so your answer would be correct.

 

Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862 (1982)

Facts.  Elvis Presley, a singer of great renown and a man of substantial wealth, became

engaged to Ginger Alden. He was generous with the Alden family, paying for landscaping

the lawn, installing a swimming pool, and making other gifts. When his fiancée’s mother,

Jo Laverne Alden, sought to divorce her husband, Presley promised to pay off the

remaining mortgage indebtedness on the Alden home, which Mrs. Alden was to receive in

the divorce settlement. On August 16, 1977, Presley died suddenly, leaving the mortgage

unpaid. When the legal representative of Presley’s estate refused to pay the $39,587

mortgage, Mrs. Alden brought an action to enforce Presley’s promise. The trial court

denied recovery. Mrs. Alden appealed.

Issue.

Was Presley’s promise to pay the mortgage enforceable?

Opinion. Fones, Justice.  In the instant case, the trial court held decedent did make a

promise unsupported by consideration to plaintiff, that no gift was consummated for

failure of delivery, that plaintiff suffered no detriment as she “wound up much better off

after her association with Elvis A. Presley than if he had never made any promise to Jo

Laverne Alden.” The court of appeals concurred in the finding that there was no gift for

failure of delivery, holding that delivery is not complete unless complete dominion and

control of the gift is surrendered by the donor and acquired by the donee.

Holding.  The state supreme court held that Presley’s promise was a gratuitous

executory promise that was not supported by consideration. As such, it was

unenforceable against Presley’s estate. The court dismissed the case and assessed costs

against the plaintiff.

 
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Victimology4

7 Victims and the Criminal Justice System: Cooperation and Conflict Part 2: Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys, Judges, Juries, and Corrections Officials

CHAPTER OUTLINE Victims and Prosecutors

Assisting Victims and Other Witnesses for the State Protecting Victims Who Serve as Witnesses

for the Prosecution Dismissing Charges and Rejecting Cases Negotiating Pleas

Victims and Defense Attorneys

Postponing Hearings Cross-Examining Witnesses during Trials

Victims and Judges

Granting Bail Sentencing Offenders Appealing to the Supreme Court

Victims and Juries

Victims and Corrections Officials

Keeping Track of Offenders and Receiving Reimbursement from Them

Influencing Parole Board Decisions And Justice for All?

Recognizing “Second-Class” Treatment

Summary

Key Terms Defined in the Glossary

Questions for Discussion and Debate

Critical Thinking Questions

Suggested Research Projects

LEARNING OBJECTIVES To recognize the various ways that prosecutors can

serve victims who are their clients.

To realize how conflicts can arise between victims and the lawyers assigned by the government to represent them in court proceedings.

To better understand the complexities of the witness intimidation problem.

To appreciate how victims and defense attorneys might become embroiled in conflicts.

To discover how judges make crucial decisions affect- ing victims.

To become familiar with the many Supreme Court decisions that affect how victims are handled during legal proceedings.

continued

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This chapter examines what might happen in thecases that the police have solved by making an arrest. As the fate of the accused person is deter- mined by the criminal justice system, victims will interact with prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, juries, and—if the defendant is convicted— corrections officials. Cooperation is the desired outcome, but conflict might erupt over certain divisive issues with these criminal justice profes- sionals and the agencies that employ them. Two overriding objectives of the entire legal process ought to be the restoration of the injured party’s personal dignity, and a symbolic reaffirmation of social solidarity with those innocent persons who were targeted by cold-blooded offenders. One concern that lurks in the background throughout this step-by-step walk through the system is: Are all victims treated the same way, or are some indi- viduals and groups handled with much greater care than others?

Note that this chapter does not explore how victims fare within the juvenile justice system. That is a separate system, which dates back to the early 1900s in most states. It resolves cases in which minors are accused of committing crimes of vio- lence against people of all ages, as well as property and drug crimes, plus status offenses (such as truancy and curfew violations). It is supposed to operate according to a different set of principles (emphasiz- ing treatment over punishment) and consequently

handles victims differently: generally worse because they are not permitted to play much of a role and can exercise fewer options and rights. In 14 percent of the violent crime cases that police cleared, the arrestees were under the age of 18. In 23 percent of the solved property crimes, juveniles were taken into custody, according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for 2010. Therefore, a considerable number of victims will discover that “their” solved cases will be diverted into the juvenile justice sys- tem. Persons harmed by these delinquents face a separate set of problems that are beyond the scope of this chapter.

VICTIMS AND PROSECUTORS

Prosecutors are the chief law enforcement officials within their jurisdictions. They represent the inter- ests of the county, state, or federal government. But their agencies also supply the lawyers that deal directly with victims. Therefore, prosecutors’ offices can be viewed as public law firms offering free legal services to complainants who are willing to coop- erate and testify as witnesses. County prosecutors, referred to as district attorneys (or state attor- neys), usually are elected officials (but may be appointed by a governor). The lawyers who actu- ally handle criminal cases and personally work with victims are called assistant district attorneys (ADAs) but are also referred to as assistant prosecu- tors or assistant state attorneys in some jurisdictions. Around the nation, approximately 2,340 prosecu- tors’ offices pursue felony cases in state courts of general jurisdiction. These government lawyers representing victims can become injured parties themselves. About 3 percent of the chief prosecu- tors and 6 percent of their ADAs reported that they personally had been assaulted in 2005, according to a nationwide survey (Perry, 2006).

To a great extent, victims are on the “same side” as the government in the criminal justice pro- cess. Prosecutors and victims therefore are “natural allies” who ought to cooperate with each other. Prosecutors might want to do what is best for victims, but they also are concerned about their

LEARNING OBJECTIVES continued

To explore how jurors might react to victims and their plight.

To realize how corrections officials make decisions that either help or hurt victims.

To become alert to the problem that all victims were not treated equally in the criminal justice process in the past, and the possibility that differential handling probably still occurs.

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careers and political futures, the well-being of their agencies, and the general good of the entire com- munity and society. Attending to these concerns and juggling these competing interests can cause conflicts to erupt between prosecutors and the injured parties they purport to represent.

Prosecutors’ offices can and should serve vic- tims in a number of different ways. First of all, they can keep their clients informed of the status of their cases, from the initial charges lodged against defendants to the release of convicts on parole. Sec- ond, ADAs can help the individuals they represent achieve justice by conveying to the attention of judges their clients’ views on questions of bail, con- tinuances, dismissed cases and dropped charges, negotiated pleas, sentences, and restitution arrange- ments. Third, they can take steps to protect their clients from harassment, threats, injuries, and other forms of intimidation and reprisals. Fourth, ADAs can try to resolve cases as quickly as possible with- out unnecessary delays and help their clients mini- mize losses of time and money by notifying them of upcoming court appearances and scheduling changes. Fifth, ADAs can assist victims in retrieving stolen property recovered by police and seized as evidence (President’s Task Force, 1982).

Sometimes prosecutors are able to balance the interests of the government, their own bureaucra- cies, and their clients without much conflict. But in certain cases, prosecutors cannot do what is best for all of their constituencies simultaneously. Conflicts can arise between the aims of the government and the outcome desired by those who were harmed. Conflicts also can emerge between the bureaucracy that employs prosecutors and injured parties who are the clients, customers, or “consumers” of their services. Finally, prosecutors advancing their careers may not follow unpopular courses of action favored by their clients.

In all of these potential conflicts, if prosecutors must sacrifice the interests of any party, it is most likely to be those of the victim, and not of the government, their bureaucracy, or their own careers. Victims can feel betrayed if “their” lawyers do not look after their needs and wants. Or to put it another way, a lawyer—assigned without choice by

the government and charging no fee—might not do a satisfactory job from a client’s standpoint.

Assisting Victims and Other Witnesses for the State

The difficulties, inconveniences, and frustrations faced by people serving as witnesses for the prose- cution have been well-known for decades. As far back as 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement commented that the administration of justice was suffering because of the economic burdens imposed on citizens who participated in trials. In 1938, the American Bar Association noted that witness fees were deplorably low, courthouse accommodations were inadequate, intimidation went unchecked, and witnesses’ time was often wasted. In 1967, the President’s Commis- sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reached similar conclusions. In 1973, the Courts Task Force of the National Advisory Com- mission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals noted that the failure of victims and witnesses to appear at judicial proceedings when summoned was a major reason for cases being dismissed. Non- cooperation was attributed to the high personal costs of involvement incurred by citizens who ini- tially were willing to meet their civic obligations (see McDonald, 1976).

In the past, victims serving as prosecution wit- nesses often were mistreated in a number of ways. They would be subpoenaed to appear at a court- room, grand jury room, or prosecutor’s office. They would wait for hours in dingy corridors or in other grim surroundings. Busy officials would ignore them as they stood around bewildered and anxious. Often, they wouldn’t be called to testify or make statements because of last-minute adjourn- ments. Accomplishing nothing, they would miss work and lose wages, be absent from classes at school, or fail to meet their responsibilities at home. In most jurisdictions, they would receive insultingly low witness fees for their time and trou- ble. In certain metropolitan areas, they would receive no compensation at all because no official informed them of their eligibility and of the proper

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application procedures. Their experiences often could be characterized as dreary, time-consuming, depressing, exhausting, confusing, frustrating, and frightening (Ash, 1972).

In 1974, the National District Attorneys Associ- ation (NDAA) commissioned a survey to determine the extent to which victims and other witnesses for the prosecution encountered these types of pro- blems. Conducted in Alameda County, California, the survey documented that about 12 percent of vic- tims were never notified that an arrest had beenmade in their case. Nearly 30 percent never got their stolen property back, even though it had been used as evi- dence. About 60 percent of injured persons who were eligible for financial reimbursement were not informed of their right to file a claim. Roughly 45 percent reported that no one had explained to them what their court appearance would entail. About 27 percent of witnesses, including victims, summoned to court ultimately were not asked to testify. Even though 78 percent lost pay to appear, about 95 percent received no witness fees. As a final insult, 42 percent were never notified of the out- come of the case (Lynch, 1976).

To address these problems, the LawEnforcement Assistance Administration funded the first Victim/ Witness Assistance Projects (VWAPs) through the NDAA. Pilot programs were set up in prosecutors’ offices in California, Illinois, Utah, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and New York during the mid-1970s (Schneider and Schneider, 1981; and Geis, 1983). Since then, most prosecutors’ offices have establishedVWAPS.A nationwide survey determined that victim advocates made up 6 percent of all the persons working for prosecutors’ offices. Large offices in big cities employed 13 advocates on average, although the median in all offices, large and small, was just one person (Perry, 2006).

Several assumptions underlie the growth and development of these programs. One is that providing services will elicit greater cooperation from victims and witnesses. Presumably, well-briefed, self-confident witnesses who have benefited from such programs will be more willing to put up with the hardships of testifying in court, leading to lower dismissal rates and

higher conviction rates, the standards by which prose- cutors’ offices are judged. Also, offering services to a group perceived to be highly deserving of governmen- tal assistance will be good for community relations. Public confidence and faith in the criminal justice sys- tem will thus be restored, resulting in higher levels of cooperation within jurisdictions that have these pro- grams (Rootsaert, 1987).

Most VWAPs are charged with the laudable but vaguely defined mission of helping victims, aiding witnesses, and furthering the goals of law enforce- ment. In the best programs, agency personnel inter- vene as soon as possible after an offense is committed, providing immediate relief to the injured parties through services that include hotlines; crisis counsel- ing; and emergency shelter, food, transportation, and immediate lock repairs. Some projects provide trans- lators, guidance about replacing lost documents, and assistance in getting back stolen property recovered by the police. Most make referrals to social service and mental health agencies for those needing long- term care and counseling. All programs furnish infor- mation about opportunities for reimbursement of losses and eligibility for compensation benefits (see Chapter 12). A few offer mediation services for vic- tims who seek to reconcile their differences with their offenders (see Chapter 13). To encourage wit- ness cooperation, pamphlets are distributed about the adjudication process (with titles like “What Happens in Court?” and “Your Rights as a Crime Victim”). Through a case-monitoring and notification system, the staff keeps victims and other witnesses advised of indictments, postponements and continuances, negotiated pleas, convictions, acquittals, and other developments. Linked to the notification system is a telephone alert or on-call system to prevent unnec- essary trips to court if dates are changed on short notice, which also avoids wasting the time of police officers who serve as witnesses.

Some programs also have set up reception cen- ters exclusively for prosecution witnesses in court- houses to provide a secure waiting room so that offenders and their families and friends won’t get any last-minute opportunities for intimidation. Transportation to and from court, escorts, and child

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care frequently are available. Help in obtaining witness fees also is provided. The staff in some pro- grams may go as far as to intercede with employers and landlords and other creditors who might not appreciate the stresses and financial difficulties wit- nesses face (Schneider and Schneider, 1981; Geis, 1983; Weigend, 1983; and Rootsaert, 1987).

Some signs that VWAPs are reducing the mistreatment of victims are evident. In 1974, only 35 percent of the offices of district attorneys routinely notified victims of felonies of the out- comes in their cases; 97 percent of these offices did so by 1992, according to the National Prose- cutor Survey Program (Dawson, Smith, and DeFrances, 1993).

The establishment of VWAPs has raised some constitutional and ethical concerns. To deny ser- vices to a victim whose cooperation is not needed (or who desires to pursue a case that the prosecu- tor’s office wants to drop) would be unfair but not illegal, since the aid is granted as a privilege rather than as a right. To deny similar services (free park- ing, child care, last-minute phone calls canceling a scheduled appearance) to witnesses for the defense would violate notions of fairness within the adver- sary system. As long as the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty, even-handed treat- ment of all witnesses should prevail. Rapport between victims and VWAP personnel that becomes too close can cause another problem: the testimony given in court can be considered coached or rehearsed if it departs from the original state- ments the complainants and witnesses made and covers up contradictions in order to make the most convincing case against the defendant.

Protecting Victims Who Serve as Witnesses for the Prosecution

A 19-year-old alleges he was shot in the face in a playground by a 21-year-old (a repeat offender who has a history of intimidating witnesses). The accused is jailed. A month before the trial, someone fires close to 20 bullets into the 19-year-old’s mother’s home while he is away and three children

and a grandchild are inside. The 19-year-old, who has been living with out-of-town relatives, decides not to testify as a witness for the prosecution. “I’m scared for my family. I’m sorry for the danger I put them in. They don’t deserve this. If I testify and put him away for good, what does that even do? He’s in jail now, and somebody still shot at my family.” (Newall, 2011)

People who are unsure about whether to report crimes, press charges, and testify in court certainly could be dissuaded by chilling tales like this one. Victims who agree to serve as prosecution witnesses need to be protected from intimidation and reprisals. The gravest dangers are faced by indi- viduals harmed by drug-dealing crews, defectors from street gangs and mob syndicates, and battered women trying to break free from abusive mates. Intimidation can range from nuisance phone calls, stalking, and explicit threats of physical attacks to property damage (vandalism) and even deadly assaults. Offenders or the defendants’ friends or relatives can attempt to scare victims during face- to-face confrontations that can take place in police stations and courthouses, as well as in neighbor- hoods and homes. The fear of reprisals can cause a victim to ask that charges be dropped, or simply to not show up to testify, or to recant earlier testi- mony when cross-examined. When intimidation succeeds, prosecutors are forced to drop charges, judges dismiss cases, juries fail to convict, and guilty parties go free (Gately, 2005).

Because complainants’ perceptions of the risks of cooperation determine whether they will testify in court, the primary responsibility for safeguarding the well-being of witnesses for the state falls to the lawyer handling the case for the government. When prosecutors don’t react to acts of intimida- tion by providing police protection, one of the vic- tim’s worst fears is confirmed—namely, that the criminal justice system can’t provide security from further harm and that the only way to avoid repri- sals is to stop cooperating. If left unaddressed, these incidents convey the message that complainants are on their own, and they signify to offenders that

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witness tampering is worth a try. It may have the desired effect, and usually it carries little risk of additional penalties (see Docksai, 1979; President’s Task Force, 1982; Davis, 1983; and Healy, 1995).

Just how serious is the problem of intimidation? How many complainants suffer acts of intimidation after seeking help from the authorities? How many crimes go unreported because the victim fears retali- ation? The annual rates of nonreporting due to fear of reprisal are measured by the NCVS and are pre- sented in Table 7.1. Each year only a small percent- age of respondents admit to interviewers that worries about retaliation stopped them from informing the police about violent crimes. Fear inhibits around 10 percent of all rape victims each year from trying to get their attackers in trouble with the law.Worries about what the offender might do are less of a deter- rent to reporting in cases of simple assaults, aggra- vated assaults (like shootings and stabbings), and robberies. (The percentages can fluctuate consider- ably from year to year because the number of survey respondents who were harmed in these specific ways is extremely small, statistically speaking.) As for changes over time, intimidation levels apparently have not changed substantially over the past few dec- ades; if anything, the percentages might be rising when it comes to robbery and minor assaults. The situation certainly is not improving. However, based on this evidence from NCVS findings, overall, it appears that this problem actually is not of major importance.

But these statistics might yield false impressions. Measuring intimidation is very difficult, in part

because would-be complainants (and witnesses) who are “successfully” intimidated might be too afraid to disclose their plight not only to detectives and prosecutors but also to NCVS interviewers. Also, intimidation can be based on “what if…” fears even if offenders don’t actually threaten repri- sals. The actual number of nonreporting and non- cooperating individuals really cannot be accurately determined. For example, investigative journalists contended that witness fear was a factor in virtually every violent crime prosecution in Philadelphia. In response to this dire prediction about the antici- pated collapse of many prosecutions, a senator pro- posed to make witness intimidation into a federal offense (Phillips and McCoy, 2010).

Several aspects of the intimidation problem still need further study. Which groups are more vulner- able to fears of reprisals than others (in terms of age, sex, race/ethnicity, immigration status, and prior involvement with the justice system either as a complainant or as a defendant)? What behaviors or consequences are considered to be most threat- ening? What form of retribution do victims fear more, acts directed against themselves or their loved ones? Why do some persons brave the risks despite efforts to silence them? What services do some injured parties insist must be provided in order for them to be willing to cooperate and tes- tify? Where do the complainants live and work vis- à-vis the intimidators who threaten them? At what times of day or at what stages in the legal process (before or after lineups or court proceedings), and places (schools, job sites, recreational areas) do they

T A B L E 7.1 Trends in Fear of Reprisal as a Cause of Nonreporting, United States, Selected Years, 1980–2008

Percentage of Nonreporting Victims Who Feared Reprisals

Type of Crime 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2001 2006 2008

Rape 12 11 10 7 12 8 17* 11 Robbery 6 3 7 6 4 6 6* 10 Aggravated assault 6 7 5 6 6 6 11 6 Simple assault 3 4 4 3 3 4 6 7

NOTES: Percentages represent the proportions of respondents citing “fear of reprisal” as the primary reason for not reporting a crime to police that they did disclose to NCVS interviewers.

*indicates that this figure is based on a small number of cases and might be unreliable.

SOURCES: BJS, NCVS, Criminal Victimization in the United States, selected years, 1980–2008.

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feel most vulnerable? Are issues of shared responsi- bility, prior victim–offender relationships, family ties, and neighborhood subcultures significant factors in the intimidation equation (see Dedel, 2006)?

Various studies have yielded contradictory findings about how often injured parties are effec- tively intimidated by the persons that they accuse of harming them. The willingness of complainants to cooperate with prosecutors was not seriously undermined by attempts at intimidation, and these attempts did not influence conviction rates to any statistically significant extent, according to a sample of about 1,000 New Yorkers interviewed at the start of the 1980s (Fried, 1982). But when the same agency conducted another study about 10 years later, the researchers arrived at a different conclusion: attempts to intimidate often succeeded. New Yorkers who were threatened were more than twice as likely to ask that charges be dropped as those who were not contacted by defendants. Individuals who had close prior relations (romantic involvements or family ties) with defendants were more likely to receive menacing looks, to be warned about bodily harm or damage to property, or to be assaulted than those who lodged com- plaints against complete strangers (“Study Shows Intimidation,” 1990). Between 1980 and 2003, at least 19 witnesses to serious crimes, some of whom were warned to “lie or die,” were permanently silenced by lethal attacks in New York City (Glaberson, 2003). Police departments and prosecu- tors’ offices certainly have not eliminated fear of reprisals as a genuine concern, and that continuing threat holds down cooperation rates, solution rates, and conviction rates.

The problem of intimidation goes beyond direct threats. Would-be complainants may experi- ence strong pressures from families and friends not to come forward and tell police what happened. As one journalist dramatically put it, in many urban neighborhoods, “talking to the law has become a mortal sin, a dishonorable act punishable by social banishment—or worse” (Kahn, 2007). Subjected to this “cultural intimidation” by their community to not “snitch,” to the authorities, the casualties of

beatings, stabbings, and shootings may be forced to either settle the score privately or to let the mat- ter rest. But that only perpetuates a cycle of attacks and retaliatory strikes as part of a neighborhood sub- culture of violence that adds to the level of danger and misery in high crime areas, especially in poverty-stricken inner-city areas. Government offi- cials and community activists need to counteract this drift toward “do-it-yourself” acts of revenge that are deemed to be “street justice” (see Chapter 13) by developing creative ways to protect those who are urged by officials to cooperate with law enforcement agencies and the prosecution (Kahn, 2007).

This often-cited example shows how a person who did her civic duty by cooperating with the authorities ended up murdered, along with her family, sparking a public outcry for beefed up wit- ness protection strategies:

A woman repeatedly files complaints with the police against the dealers who sell drugs in front of her row house in a tough urban area. One night, an angry 21-year-old dealer kicks open her front door and throws a firebomb inside. The woman, her husband, and her five children are burned to death in the resulting inferno. The dealer is sentenced to life behind bars without parole, and local residents hold a vigil each year to commemorate her courage and sacrifice. After remaining boarded-up for years, the row house is renovated and turned into a “safe haven community center” named after her. It offers a computer lab, an arts and crafts program, and other activities to children who live nearby. A bright blue light flashes 24 hours a day, reminding passers-by—as well as street-level dealers—that a surveillance camera is trained on that corner. (Simmons, 2007)

Much of the intimidation problem can be traced to officials who have shirked their responsi- bilities to victims. Police officers might con victims into cooperating by making empty promises of added protection, knowing full well that their pre- cincts don’t have the resources to provide such spe- cial attention. Because attrition lightens their

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workload, ADAs might allow cases to collapse when key witnesses and complainants fail to appear after being subpoenaed—perhaps due to intimidation. Judgesmay not be vigilant for the same reason: intim- idation leads to nonappearances and ultimately dis- missals, which reduces caseloads. To reduce fears about reprisals, theAmerican Bar Association’s Com- mittee on Victims (1979) put forward five recom- mendations decades ago, but these measures still have not been implemented in many jurisdictions:

1. Legislatures should make attempts at intimida- tion a misdemeanor.

2. Police forces ought to set up victim/witness protection squads.

3. Judges should issue orders of protection and consider violations as grounds for contempt- of-court citations and revocations of bail.

4. Judges should grant continuances rather than drop all charges against defendants if com- plaining witnesses mysteriously fail to appear when subpoenaed.

5. Prosecutors must avoid carelessly revealing information concerning the whereabouts of victims, even after cases are resolved.

Prosecutors always have had to coax victims and other witnesses to cooperate by offering them pro- tective services until the trial is over, or even longer. However, inadequate funding limits the ability of prosecutors’ offices to offer these protective mea- sures to all who need them (New York State Law Enforcement Council, 1994). Also, some victims understandably are reluctant to accept offers of pro- tection if it means uprooting their families and vir- tually starting their lives over, as this case illustrates.

A mother’s house is riddled with bullets because her son is willing to testify against a young man who allegedly shot him. The district attorney’s office offers to move her and her family to another town with the help of the state’s witness relocation program. The program would pay for 120 days of temporary hous- ing, moving expenses, storage costs, and two months’ rent. But the family would have to agree never to return to the neighborhood where they have other

family members and friends. The mother turns down the government’s offer. Her fiancé explains, “That house is everything she’s earned in life. It’s hard for her to turn her back on it.”Noting that she has nearly finished paying off the mortgage after living in her home for 16 years and raising seven children in it, she despairs, “It just doesn’t work for us. We will do our best to hang in there, I guess.”When she tells her son to keep away from the neighborhood, he decides he won’t testify. (Newall, 2011)

The establishment of witness-protection pro- grams on the state and federal levels represents the government’s greatest possible commitment to address the threat of reprisals. These secretive pro- grams provide tight security to victims, witnesses, and their immediate families. Their services are intended primarily to safeguard witnesses willing to testify against criminal organizations like mob families, street gangs, and drug trafficking networks. Often the beneficiaries are not really victims but lawbreakers like mob turncoats, former drug deal- ers, and defectors from street gangs. The federal Witness Security Program promises relocation, new identities, new jobs, and payment of moving expenses (U.S. Marshals Service, 2011). Successful relocation, even if at a temporary shelter or safe house and on an emergency basis, requires a multi- agency response that usually involves police, prose- cutors, public housing agencies, and social service providers. Lesser measures require sturdier locks, alarm systems, stepped-up police patrols and escorts; efforts to avoid publicly identifying cooperating witnesses so they won’t be labeled as “rats” or “snitches”; measures to limit contacts with potential intimidators (through unlisted numbers, caller ID, and call blocking); and supportive services through existing VWAPS. Also, the authorities must admonish potential intimidators, assist victims to obtain restraining orders and no-contact conditions of bail, and enforce speedy trial provisions and wit- ness tampering statutes. Compelling victims to tes- tify by holding them as material witnesses or threatening them with contempt of court usually is ineffective. Unfortunately, criminal justice agen- cies sometimes are intimidated themselves from

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doing more—they fear being held liable in terms of civil lawsuits—if their efforts fall short of protecting the injured party from suffering further harm (Dedel, 2006).

In sum, jurisdictions that fail to adequately confront the problem of victim and witness intimi- dation will suffer from high levels of retaliatory vio- lence, low levels of public confidence in the ability of the criminal justice system to protect them, low reporting rates, subpar clearance rates, and reduced conviction rates.

To be fair and balanced, one additional type of intimidation must be addressed. One-sided formu- lations of the intimidation problem imply that it is improper for anyone other than law enforcement agents to contact witnesses and victims. But an important principle of the adversary system is that a person accused of a crime has a constitutional right to confront his accusers. Therefore, defense attorneys must be allowed to interview witnesses and compel them to testify truthfully. But reluctant witnesses who have information that will help the case of the accused also can be intimidated—not by the threat of violence but by worries about unfa- vorable media coverage and by fear of harassment by the authorities, especially in highly publicized “must-win” cases (see American Bar Association Committee on Victims, 1979).

Dismissing Charges and Rejecting Cases

Crime victims, police officers, and prosecutors are all supposed to be on the same side within the adversary system. Yet their alliance—based in the- ory on a common commitment to convict people guilty of crimes—often unravels. Victims may feel rebuffed and abandoned when prosecutors dismiss or reduce charges and counts against suspects. A decision not to go forward means no further official action will be taken, and victims will not achieve the goals they sought when they reported the crime, whether they were looking for maximum punishment as revenge, compulsory treatment of the offender, or court-ordered restitution.

To prosecutors, these decisions, even if they infuriate victims, are unavoidable. It is impossible

for prosecutors to fulfill their legal mandate to enforce every law and to seek the conviction of all lawbreakers. When evaluating the cases brought before them by police and deciding whether to go forward, ADAs must take into account many other considerations besides the victims’ wishes: How are cases of this kind usually handled in this jurisdiction? What are the odds of a conviction rather than an acquittal? Are there serious doubts about the guilt of the accused? How credible and how cooperative are the victim and other witnesses? Does the com- plainant have any improper motives for pressing charges? Was the evidence obtained according to constitutional guidelines, or will it be tossed out of court under the exclusionary rule? Is the whole undertaking worth the state’s limited resources? How much will it cost in time and money to resolve the matter? Would indictment, prosecution, and conviction of the defendant serve as a general deter- rent to others who are contemplating committing the same type of offense (an application of the theory of general deterrence)? Would punishment discour- age the offender from repeating this illegal act (an application of the theory of specific deterrence)? Would pressing charges and seeking conviction enhance the community’s sense of security and boost confidence in the criminal justice system? Could the accused cooperate with the authorities as a police informant or as a key witness for the prose- cution in other cases in return for leniency? Would pressing or dropping charges set off protests from powerful interest groups in the community? If this office declines to prosecute, would the case be pur- sued by another branch of government or in a differ- ent jurisdiction? Are appropriate pretrial diversion programs available that provide treatment to wrong- doers as an alternative to adjudication? And last but certainly not least, would a victory in this case sub- stantially advance the careers of the ADA handling the case and of the prosecutor heading up the office? (see the National Advisory Commission, 1973; Sheley, 1979; and Boland and Sones, 1986).

When all these factors are taken into account, it is clear that the victim is only one of several key players who influence the decisions of prosecutors. Police officials, other colleagues in the prosecutor’s

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office, defense attorneys, judges, community lea- ders, journalists covering the story, and vocal inter- est groups all affect prosecutorial decision making.

Cases that have been “solved” by arrests might not be pursued for a number of reasons. Prosecutors might screen them out because of perceived weak- nesses that undercut the chances of conviction. Judges might dismiss charges on their own initiative if they feel that the evidence is weak. In general, jurisdictions in which prosecutors weed out many cases before going to court have low case-dismissal rates at later stages of judicial proceedings. Where prosecutors toss out few cases, judges throw out many more. Periodic nationwide surveys of overall felony case processing revealed that nearly half of all cases that were “solved” by arrest were not carried forward (either rejected at screening by prosecutors, dismissed in court by judges, or diverted out of the system) (Boland and Sones, 1986; and Boland, Mahanna, and Sones, 1992). Clearly, the outcomes of these decisions could cause a great many victims to become dissatisfied with the adjudication process.

Negotiating Pleas

The vast majority of cases that are carried forward (not diverted to treatment programs, screened out by prosecutors, or dismissed by judges) are resolved by out-of-court settlements known as negotiated pleas. Plea negotiation is the process in which the ADA and the defense counsel meet in private to hammer out a compromise and thereby avoid hold- ing a public trial. The typical outcome of the “bar- gaining” (as most observers and participants derisively refer to the offers and counteroffers) is that the defendant agrees to waive his constitutional rights to a trial in front of a jury of his peers and instead confesses in return for some consideration from the government. Many types of concessions from the prosecution are possible, such as dropping certain charges (often the more serious ones carrying the most severe penalties) or the dismissal of particu- lar counts (accusations of harm against specific vic- tims). Often, the consideration is a promise or a recommendation for a lesser punishment: a sus- pended sentence, probation, a fine, or incarceration

for an agreed-upon period of time that is less than the maximum permitted by the law. An overwhelming 95 percent of all convictions were secured by the accused admitting guilt (possibly just to a misde- meanor instead of the original felony charge) rather than by a jury rendering a guilty verdict, according to a study of cases adjudicated in the 75 busiest urban U.S. counties during 2006 (Cohen and Kyckelhahn, 2010).

The expression plea bargain gives the errone- ous impression that defendants who “cop a plea” invariably get a break or good deal that permits them to escape the more severe punishment they deserve. Actually, police officials and prosecutors routinely engage in bedsheeting and overchar- ging so that they will have more bargaining chips in anticipation of the negotiations that will follow. Bedsheeting is the practice of charging a defendant with every applicable crime committed during a single incident. For example, an armed intruder captured while burglarizing an occupied home could face charges of criminal trespass, breaking and entering, burglary, attempted grand larceny, and carrying a concealed weapon, in addition to the most serious charge of all, robbery. Overchar- ging means filing a criminal indictment for an offense that is more serious than the available evi- dence might support (for example, charging some- one with attempted murder after a fistfight). Some of these charges could not be proven in court, but defendants and their lawyers might be too cautious to gamble and call a prosecutor’s bluff. For these reasons and others, most accused individuals who plead guilty in return for concessions receive the penalties that they probably would have received if convicted after a trial (Rhodes, 1978; Beall, 1980; and Katz, 1980). Plea negotiation, even though it has been widely condemned for decades, appears to be the only practical way of handling a huge volume of cases. If all the defendants detained in a jail demanded their constitutional right to be judged by a jury of their peers after a trial, the local courts would be paralyzed by gridlock.

Because doing away with deals and induce- ments is unrealistic, some victims want to play active roles in the plea negotiations that resolve

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their cases. They justify their quest for empower- ment by emphasizing that they were the ones directly involved and personally harmed, and thus it is “their” case. But this demand and formulation of the issue has evoked considerable resistance from prosecutors.

It is often presumed that the adversarial model characterizes the actual workings of the adjudica- tion process. In the hard bargaining between pros- ecution and defense, the ADA must be able to produce a cooperative witness eager to testify in order to convince the defendant to cave in, negoti- ate a plea, and confess guilt to at least some of the charges. But the reality of the situation might be that the courtroom work group (composed of the judge, ADA, and defense counsel) shares a mutual interest in processing large numbers of cases expeditiously. Victims serving as witnesses for the prosecution are outsiders whose presence and involvement is often unwanted by these insi- ders because it will slow down their assembly-line practices that resolve cases quickly. Victims see their situations as unique events that deserve careful con- sideration, not as routine occurrences to be rapidly disposed of according to some formula based on that jurisdiction’s current going rate (typical pen- alty or sentence for the type of crime in question, routinely agreed upon by the insiders) (see Walker, 2010).

Predictably, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges make dire predictions about what would happen if victims (and police officers and defendants as well) joined them at the table at pretrial confer- ences. These insiders contend that the candid dis- cussions necessary to foster settlements would be inhibited by the presence of outsiders and that vol- atile confrontations between victims and defendants would break out. Furthermore, both victims and defendants could misconstrue the role of judges and accuse them of improper conduct, and as a result the dignity of judges would be diminished by their open involvement in negotiations in front of outsiders (Heinz and Kerstetter, 1979). Prosecu- tors in particular feel threatened by the inclusion of victims (whom they supposedly represent, in addi- tion to the state) at such meetings. They object

because victims might try to use the administrative machinery as an instrument of revenge and might put forward unreasonable demands for the imposi- tion of maximum penalties. Deals would fall through, and risky and costly trials would result (McDonald, 1976).

In general, victims do not have a right to partici- pate in or even be consulted during the process of plea negotiation. Few jurisdictions grant victims a clearly defined role, and most state laws still do not provide them with any formal mechanisms to chal- lenge the decisions of the prosecuting attorneys who act in their names as well as on behalf of “the people.” The Supreme Court has issued several rul- ings that specifically deny complainants the right to challenge the decisions prosecutors make about han- dling their cases. (See Box 7.1 on pages 208–209.)

Many victims are convinced that criminals gain an advantage when they accept plea bargains offered by the prosecution. Actually, resolving cases by negotiating pleas rather than by holding full-scale trials might be in the best interests of cer- tain victims. Besides ensuring a conviction, plea bargaining spares victims the ordeal of testifying in court and undergoing hostile questioning during cross-examination by defense attorneys. For some victims, testifying in painful detail means reliving the horror of the crime, as in this trial:

A tearful victim tells a jury how she had fallen asleep cuddling her toddler while her husband was working late. She awoke when she heard a prowler enter through a kitchen window, but remained still. Unfortunately he spotted her, pulled out a knife, and put the blade to her daughter’s throat. Faced with a nightmare choice, she quietly submitted and was raped. “It was disgusting,” she testifies. On cross-examination, she admits that she can’t identify the accused (whose DNA was lifted from the bedding) because the intruder covered her head with a sheet. (Ginsberg, 2005)

Concerns about emotional distress suffered by a victim on the stand are voiced most often in cases of forcible rape and child molestation. Other types of complainants also may be particularly reluctant to

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undergo cross-examination if the facts of the case portray them in a negative light or reveal aspects of their private lives that they do not want exposed to the world via media coverage (especially in jurisdic- tions where trials can be televised, which includes most states).

VICTIMS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

Victims and defense attorneys are on opposite sides and therefore are natural enemies within the adver- sary system. Whether hired privately for a fee or provided free to indigents, these lawyers have a duty to advise suspects, defendants, and convicts about legal proceedings and the options they can exercise. Defense lawyers have an obligation to zealously represent their clients’ best interests, which usually translates to getting out of trouble with the law entirely, or at least being sentenced to less than the maximum punishment.

Conflicts often break out between victims and defense lawyers over two matters: how long the process takes and the number of court appearances needed, as well as the line of questioning directed at victims who testify in court when they appear as prosecution witnesses. From a victim’s view, defense attorneys might engage in two abusive practices: asking judges for postponements of their clients’ cases to wear victims down, and using unfair tactics to undermine the credibility of complainants when they appear as prosecution witnesses.

Postponing Hearings

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guaran- tees the accused the right to a speedy trial. Hence, problems of congested court calendars and needless delays usually have been approached from a defen- dant’s standpoint. Many states and the federal courts have set limits on the amount of time that can elapse between arrest and trial (not counting con- tinuances requested by defense attorneys). But complainants serving as government witnesses also suffer from the uncertainty that envelops unre- solved cases, and they share a common interest

with defendants in having legal matters settled in as short a time as possible.

If accused people have been released on bail, however, defense lawyers may have an incentive to stall proceedings to “buy time on the streets” and to wear down witnesses for the prosecution. As delays mount and complainants appear in court unnecessarily, they and other crucial prosecution witnesses may lose patience with the protracted deliberations of the legal system. Their commit- ment to see the case through to its conclusion may erode. Stalling succeeds when a complainant or another key witness gives up in disgust and fails to appear in court as required. For example, a vic- tim who lost her handbag to an unarmed bandit might miss so many days from work that the lost wages far exceed what the robber took, so she may eventually drop out. Stalling for time might also pay off if victims or other witnesses for the prose- cution forget crucial details, move away, become ill, or die in the interim. At that point, the defense attorney can move for a dismissal of charges (Reiff, 1979). Prosecutors can also manipulate continu- ances for their own ends. If defendants are in jail rather than out on bail, then government attorneys may stretch out proceedings to keep them behind bars longer and as a way to pressure them to give in and accept unfavorable plea offers. In the pro- cess, the defendant’s right to a speedy trial could be violated.

Postponements can prolong and intensify the suf- fering of complainants. In order to be available if called to testify, they might have to arrange repeatedly for child care, miss school or work, cancel vacations, and break appointments, only to discover (often at the last minute) that the hearings have been rescheduled. To defeat this wear-the-victim-down strategy, some defense motions for postponements could be opposed more vigorously by prosecutors. Similarly, requests for a postponement should be rejected by judges if they suspect the defense’s call for a continuance is a stalling tactic (President’s Task Force, 1982). To prevent complainants and police officers from showing up in court on days when hearings have been postponed, victim/witness assistance programs in prosecutors’ offices operate last-minute notification systems.

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As a general rule, the more serious the charges against the defendant are, the longer it takes to resolve the case. Cases resolved by negotiated pleas don’t take as long as cases resolved by trials (Boland, Mahanna, and Sones, 1992). Researchers determined that murder cases in state courts took an average of just about one year to be resolved, rape cases required 228 days, and robbery cases went on for 144 days from arrest to sentencing, according to a study of more than 50,000 felonies processed in the nation’s 75 largest counties during 2006 (Cohen and Kyckelhahn, 2010). However, in some high-crime areas,hugebacklogs causeevengreaterdelays, prolong- ing the anxiety of both complainants and defendants waiting for the final outcome of their conflicts.

Cross-Examining Witnesses during Trials

If they can’t wear down victims by stalling, defense attorneys might try to discredit them, along with other prosecution witnesses, before or during a trial. Attorneys for the accused are duty-bound to seek evidence that contradicts or undermines what the accusers contend. In addition to a speedy trial, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution gives defendants the right to confront their accusers. The burden of proof falls on the prosecution, and the defendant is considered innocent unless proven guilty. The accuser must be presumed to be mis- taken until his or her credibility is established beyond a reasonable doubt. The strategy of portray- ing the victim in a negative light (as a person who makes charges that should not be believed) is employed frequently in rape and sexual assault cases where credibility is a crucial issue, as this example shows.

A 20-year-old woman and a 61-year-old man briefly chat as their flight takes off. Then she puts her feet up on an empty seat between them and falls asleep. When she awakens, she finds that her legs are on his lap. Claiming that he had slipped his hand inside her shorts and molested her, she pushes him away, calls the flight attendant over, and has him arrested when the airplane lands. Weeks later, his attorney informs the prosecution

that he has obtained a Facebook post which shows that within a few hours after the alleged sexual assault, the supposedly traumatized young woman had contacted her brother about mundane matters, like what she had eaten that day. The young woman realizes that she mistakenly “friended” someone who later turns out to be connected to the defendant’s son, and reports that she feels revictimized by this invasion of her privacy. Court proceedings will determine whether the defendant’s constitutional right to confront his accuser trumps the victim’s right under the rape shield law to be free from inquiries into her past sexual behavior and lifestyle, and whether communications disseminated by social media like Facebook and Twitter are public information or private matters. (McDonald, 2011)

Because defense attorneys are obliged to be vigorous advocates for their clients, they may advance arguments at a trial or during plea negotia- tions that the defendant is in fact innocent. In casting doubt on the version of events cobbled together by police and the prosecution, defense attorneys draw upon their skills and training to undermine the accu- satory testimony of victims. Under the adversary system, each side puts forward its best case and assails the version of events presented by the opposition. Cross-examination is the art of exposing the weaknesses of witnesses. The intent is to impugn credibility by revealing hidden motives, lapses of memory, unsavory character traits, embarrassing indiscretions, prejudices, or dishonest inclinations.

Cross-examinations can be ordeals for wit- nesses. But if defense attorneys were not allowed to sharply question prosecution witnesses, then the right of defendants to try, through their lawyers, to refute the charges against them would be under- mined. The concerns of complainants and other witnesses (including defense witnesses who are cross-examined by prosecutors) of being embar- rassed on the stand under oath must be balanced against the public humiliation suffered by defen- dants who are arrested and put on trial.

The defense attorney goes up against a formi- dable professional foe when the witness for the

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government is an expert in forensic science or forensic psychology, or is a seasoned law enforce- ment officer (although the credibility of police tes- timony has become the subject of much debate). But when the full brunt of the defense’s well- honed counterattack is directed at a novice, the complainant, the potential for adding insult to injury reaches disturbing proportions. At its best, the confrontation in the courtroom puts the victim-as-eyewitness to the test. At its worst, the victim is a target to be injured again by being made to look like a liar, a fool, or an instigator who got what he or she deserved.

Because defense attorneys have a duty to vig- orously represent the best interests of their clients, their courtroom tactics might seem harsh. To rattle a witness, discredit damning testimony, and sow seeds of doubt and confusion among jurors, they may have to resort to theatrics and hyperbole. The Code of Professional Responsibility that guides legal strategies permits a zealous defense to gain an acquittal or a lenient sentence, but it prohibits any line of questioning that is intended solely to harass or maliciously harm a witness. Experts and the pub- lic often disagree over whether a defense attorney or prosecutor crossed the line and acted unethically by badgering a witness during a cross-examination. Cases that provoke the greatest controversy are those in which defense attorneys cast aspersions on the character of victims or blame them for their own misfortunes (Shipp, 1987).

Trials are relatively rare events, so most victims are not called to testify and undergo cross- examination. Because the outcomes of trials are uncertain and involve risks, attorneys for both sides usually prefer to strike a deal out of court. However, statistically speaking, most trials are suc- cessful from the point of view of victims and pro- secutors: defendants usually are found guilty.

The percentage of criminal indictments that result in trials before juries or in bench trials before judges varies according to two factors: the jurisdic- tion and the nature of the charges. Some prosecu- tors are more willing to put defendants on trial. Cases involving serious felony charges such as mur- der, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery go to trial

more often than cases involving lesser crimes such as burglary or auto theft. Rape complainants are the most likely to be subjected to hostile cross- examination by defense attorneys. But only about 5 percent of rape cases were resolved through trials with the help of the complainants’ testimony in the nation’s largest prosecutorial jurisdictions in 2000 (Rainville and Reaves, 2003).

In murder trials, families and friends of the deceased find it particularly upsetting if defense attor- neys attack the attitudes and actions of the deceased persons to try to justify or exonerate the behavior of the accused killers. Unlike cross-examinations, these attempts to sully the reputation (or “trash the mem- ory”) of murder victims are peculiarly one-sided affairs. The deceased subjects of nasty insinuations are not around to rebut the inflammatory things that the alleged offenders say about them during trials. The defense attorney pictures the accused as respectable and believable and the departed as a person of ill repute, as the two cases below show. In the first case, which was highly publicized, the “preppy’s” defense was that his partner enjoyed engaging in sex that was dangerously rough.

An 18-year-old dies of strangulation late at night in a public park in the arms of a six-foot-four 19-year-old she was dating. He tells police that she passed away accidentally as he protected himself during “rough sex play.” His lawyer subpoenas her diary, in which she allegedly graphically described aggressive sexual exploits with other young men— but later, it turns out that the diary doesn’t contain such information. Some members of the jury are swayed by the defense’s arguments. The jury remains deadlocked for days. Before it can render a unanimous verdict, a last-minute plea is negotiated that permits the defendant to admit guilt to the lesser charge of manslaughter instead of murder. At a press conference, the father denounces the defense’s portrayal of his dead daughter, and calls it a bizarre pack of lies. After serving 15 years, the killer is released. He later develops a heroin habit and gets convicted of selling cocaine. He is sentenced to 19 years behind bars. (Hackett and Cerio, 1988; Lander, 1988; and Eligon, 2008)

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Similarly, in another case that was widely cov- ered in the news media, the defense attorney for a famous TV detective portrayed the dead wife in such a highly negative way that jurors might con- sider her undeserving of any sympathy.

An actor is on trial for shooting his wife. According to the prosecutor, he referred to her as a “pig” whom he wanted to “snuff.” The defense attorney raises doubts about each of the prosecution’s specific charges, and portrays the murdered woman as a “sleazy grifter” who recruited rich and famous men by sending them form letters attached to nude pictures of herself. The defense claims she told friends that she always wanted to marry a celebrity. Calling her a “scam artist,” the defense tells the jury that she used at least a dozen aliases and left behind 10 former husbands. She allegedly pressured the 71-year-old star into a loveless marriage by getting pregnant in order to get at his money. The jury decides he is not guilty of murder and is deadlocked over the charge that he sought to hire a TV stuntman to kill her. (LeDuff, 2005; AP, 2005)

VICTIMS AND JUDGES

Judges are supposed to act as referees within the adversary system. Defendants often consider them to be partisans representing the state and favoring the prosecution. Angry victims, however, fre- quently see judges as guardians of the rights of the accused rather than protectors of injured parties. Victims who have been mistreated by the offender, police officers, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney expect that the judge will finally accord them the even-handed justice they seek. But con- flicts between victims and judges can erupt over bail decisions and sentencing.

Granting Bail

Police officers often resent the granting of bail as a repudiation of their hard work and the risks they took to apprehend perpetrators. To them, releas- ing defendants on bail is tantamount to turning

dangerous criminals loose. Victims also can be outraged by judges’ decisions to grant bail to defendants whom they see as the culprits who harmed them.

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the setting of excessive bail. Whether it establishes a chance to be bailed out as an affirma- tive right, however, is a subject of scholarly debate and considerable public concern. State and federal courts routinely deny bail to defendants accused of first-degree murder. In noncapital cases, bail can be denied to jailed suspects who have a history of flight to avoid prosecution or who have tried to interfere with the administration of justice by intimidating a witness or a juror. Otherwise, defendants generally are given the chance to raise money or post bond to guarantee that they will show up at their hearings and trials.

The amount of bail is usually determined by the judge and is set according to the nature of the offense and the record of the defendant. The pros- ecutor usually recommends a high figure while the defense attorney argues for a sum that is within the defendant’s reach. Making bail is a major problem for defendants who are poor and have no prosper- ous friends or relatives. Across the country, houses of detention are crammed with people unable to raise a few hundred dollars to purchase their free- dom until their cases are resolved. Nationwide, a little more than half of all victims of violent crimes faced the prospect that the person accused of harm- ing them would be let out on bail in the 75 largest counties in 2004 (Kyckelhahn and Cohen, 2008).

The question of bail versus jail raises a number of troubling issues. When accused people are denied bail and subjected to preventive detention, or are unable to raise the necessary amount, they are sent to jail and thereby immediately undergo punishment before conviction. The living condi- tions in houses of detention are usually far worse than in prisons, which hold convicted felons. Yet the release of a defendant who is genuinely guilty and may strike again poses an immediate danger to the entire community and a direct threat to the complainant who will serve as a witness for the state. A possible solution to this dilemma is for

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the judge to impose and strictly enforce as a condi- tion of bail that the defendant must avoid all con- tact with the complainant and other prosecution witnesses or else forfeit the privilege of pretrial release.

Sentencing Offenders

After a defendant—by an admission of guilt as part of a negotiated plea or by a jury verdict after a trial— is convicted, the judge has the responsibility of imposing an appropriate sentence. Judges can exer- cise a considerable amount of discretion when pro- nouncing sentences unless there are mandatory minimums or explicit guidelines. Sentences can involve incarceration, fines, enrollment in treatment programs, community service, and obligations to repay victims. The particular objectives that guide sentencing are specific deterrence, general deter- rence, incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and restitution.

The substantial variation among judges in the severity of punishment they mete out in compara- ble cases is termed sentence disparity. Civil liber- tarians find great disparities troubling because judges might be expressing their social prejudices, to the extent that they deal more harshly with certain groups of offenders. Convicts might view sentence disparities as a sign of unjustifiable arbitrariness. Crime control advocates consider wide ranges as evidence that judges on the low end are too “soft” or “lenient” toward offenders. Activists in the victims’ rights movement find the spectrum of possible punishments as a motivation to press for greater input in sentencing.

Historically, excluding victims from the sen- tencing process has been justified on several grounds. If the purpose of punishing offenders is to deter others from committing the same acts, then sanctions must be swift, sure, and predictable, and not subject to uncertainty and modification by injured parties. If the objective is retribution, then lawbreakers must receive the punishments they deserve and not the penalties their victims request. If the goal of sentencing is to rehabilitate offenders, then the punitive urges of the people they harmed

cannot be allowed to interfere with the length and type of treatment prescribed by experts (McDonald, 1979).

The potential impact of victims’ desires on sen- tencing is limited because so many other parties already shape those decisions. Victims who want to help determine their offenders’ sentences have to compete for influence with other individuals and groups that routinely affect judicial discretion. State legislatures pass laws that set maximum andminimum limits for periods of confinement and for fines. Prose- cutors make recommendations based on deals arrived at during plea negotiations and draw upon the court- room work group’s mutual understandings about appropriate penalties for specific crimes in that juris- diction at that time (“the going rate”). Defense attor- neys use whatever leverage they have on behalf of their clients. Defendants determine their own sen- tences to some degree by their demeanor, degree of remorse, prior record of convictions, and other miti- gating or aggravating personal characteristics and cir- cumstances. Probation officers conduct presentence investigations and make recommendations to guide judges. Parole boards determine the actual time served when they release convicted felons from prison ahead of schedule or keep them confined until their maxi- mum sentences expire. Corrections officers influence whether or not convicts earn “good-time” reductions and parole by filing reports about cooperative or trou- blesome behavior. The news media can shape case outcomes by their coverage or lack of it. The public’s reactions also can affect the handling of cases, prompt- ing harshness or leniency. And ultimately, state gov- ernors can shorten terms of imprisonment and even stop executions by issuing pardons or commuting sen- tences. Therefore, the victim’s notion of what would be an appropriate sentence is just one of many.

If victims want to compete against this constel- lation of forces and play a role in shaping sentences, they can make their wishes known in two ways: by conveying their requests to judges in writing or by expressing their views orally (allocution) at sentenc- ing hearings. Written victim impact statements enable judges to learn about the actual physical, emotional, and financial effects of the offense on the injured parties and their families. Questionnaires

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ask (under the threat of penalties for perjury) about wounds, medical bills, counseling costs, other expenses, insurance reimbursements, and lifestyle changes resulting from the crime. Statements of opinion ask victims what they would consider to be fair and just. In most jurisdictions, the victim impact statement is incorporated into the presen- tence investigation report (PSIR) prepared by a probation officer.

Allocution enables injured parties to directly convey to the judge (and the public) the extent of their suffering and their beliefs about what an appropriate sentence might be. Whereas written impact statements are permitted in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, allocution at sentenc- ing hearings is allowed at the judge’s discretion. Because of allocution’s highly subjective and emo- tional content, civil libertarians feared that direct appeals to judges could undermine the judiciary’s professional objectivity by injecting inflammatory considerations into the proceedings that could jeop- ardize a convict’s Eighth Amendment rights to be spared from cruel and unusual punishments (see Frey, 2009).

An 11-year-old girl is kidnapped and held for nearly two decades by a middle-aged married couple with demented religious beliefs. She is repeatedly raped and gives birth to two children, when she is 13 and again at age 16. At the couple’s sentencing hearing, her statement is read: “There is no God in the universe who would condone your actions. You stole my life and that of my family… But, you do not matter any more.” The kidnapped girl’s mother rises and speaks of her own suffering, “I thought I was going insane, my baby was gone. It was you … that broke my heart. I hate you both.” The judge sen- tences the man to 431 years, and his wife to 36 years to life. The wife tells the judge, “I deserve every moment of it.” (McKinley, 2011)

The invention and adoption of impact statements and the granting of the allocution privilege were important gains for the victims’ rights movement. Prior to their acceptance and implementation, victims had to rely on prosecutors to present their views and to fully describe their plights. But advocates of victims’

rights argued that the situation was unbalanced. Con- victed persons did not have to depend solely on their lawyers to speak for them. They were permitted to directly address the court before their sentences were handed down. Yet two lives—the injured party’s as well as the wrongdoer’s—were profoundly shaped by the sentence, which represented an official evaluation of the degree of harm inflicted. Judges couldn’t make informed decisions if they heard from only one side: the defendants themselves and their lawyers, families, friends, and other character witnesses. Notions of fair- ness dictated that suffering individuals also be allowed to write or speak about their experiences before sen- tenceswere determined (President’s Task Force, 1982).

Just because activists in the victims’ rights movement succeeded in securing the right to sub- mit an impact statement or to speak in person at a sentencing hearing does not mean that these prac- tices have become widespread and effective. On the contrary: studies have concluded that few victims took advantage of these opportunities, that when they did their participation had very little influence, and that they did not necessarily feel better after their allocutions (Villmoare and Neto, 1987; and Frey, 2009).

When a sentence is handed down, it is possible that the victim is misled into thinking that it is more severe than it actually is. Therefore, the victims’ rights movement has urged states to impose a truth-in-sentencing rule that would require judges to calculate and announce the earliest possible date (actual time served) that a convict could be released from confinement, taking into account time off for good behavior behind bars and parole immediately upon eligibility (Associated Press, 1994b). For example, during the 1980s, felons sent to prison by state court judges across the country served an estimated 38 percent of their maximum sentences. A federal truth-in-sentencing law, passed in 1987 and adopted since then in most states, requires felons to serve at least 85 percent of their court- imposed sentences (Langan, Perkins, and Chaiken, 1994). A study of more than 300 victims of felonies in eight jurisdictions across the country established that most victims were dissatisfied with the sentences judges handed down in their cases.

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Eighty-six percent agreed with the statement that “guilty offenders are not punished enough” (Forst and Hernon, 1984).

The persistence of this widespread impression raises a crucial question: Just how much punish- ment is enough? Victims might feel that the offen- ders convicted of harming them don’t stay in prison long enough. But no formula or equation exists to calculate the gravity of an offense and translate this rating into the “proper” amount of time a perpe- trator should be incarcerated. Profound disagree- ments divide people over the issue of whether certain murders should carry the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole. Usually over- looked, however, are the dramatic differences in maximum penalties from state to state for lesser crimes such as rape, robbery, or burglary. Clearly, legislators who have the authority to set the upper limits for penalties can’t agree on the maximum length of prison time that one person who harms another really deserves. It is impossible to conclude with any degree of objectivity that a particular offender “got off too lightly” when the maximum sentences differ so sharply from one jurisdiction to another (see Katz, 1980).

A bitter controversy rages over whether members of the immediate family of a murder victim should be permitted to try to influence the jury’s sentencing decision in bifurcated cap- ital trials during the penalty phase (after the defendant has been convicted and faces the possi- bility of execution). The following case brought before the Supreme Court was at the core of the debate over the admissibility of highly emotional information from victim impact statements or via allocution.

During a drug-induced frenzy, a man stabs to death a mother of two toddlers as well as her two-year-old daughter. During the penalty phase of the trial, the grandmother describes to the jury how the three-year-old boy who survived the attack still cries mournfully for his mother and little sister. The jury sentences the murderer convict to die in the electric chair. (Clark and Block, 1992)

Victims’ rights groups and prosecutors’ organi- zations argued that it was illogical to demand that a jury focus all of its attention on the defendant’s difficult circumstances and other mitigating factors and then ignore the suffering of the survivors of the deceased. But civil rights and civil liberties groups argued that the introduction of impact statements could be highly inflammatory and prejudicial in capital cases, diverting the jury’s attention toward the victim’s character (how much or how little the dead person would be missed and mourned) and away from its duty of evaluating the defen- dant’s blameworthiness and the circumstances of the crime. The first time the high court considered a case that raised this issue, it voted to exclude impact statements. But when this issue came up a second time, the majority of justices ruled that sur- vivors could testify during the penalty phase of a capital case (Clark and Block, 1992).

Appealing to the Supreme Court

On rare occasions, a case involving a crime victim raises significant legal issues that have not yet been addressed and resolved by an earlier judicial ruling. In these instances, victims and their supporters, as well as prosecutors and defense attorneys, have turned to the U.S. Supreme Court to make wise and fair decisions that will serve as a precedent for future cases to follow.

The Supreme Court is the highest appellate body in the judicial system. It hears only those cases on appeal from federal and state courts that appear to raise important principles of constitu- tional law. Its nine justices are appointed by the president (who must secure the approval of the Senate) for life so that they can make decisions without fearing repercussions from powerful out- side pressure groups. When a majority of Supreme Court justices (five or more) agree on a decision, that ruling sets a precedent that must be followed in all lower courts throughout the nation. These land- mark decisions also guide the procedures followed by police departments, prosecutors, trial judges, corrections officials, and other agencies within the criminal justice system.

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Over the past several decades, a number of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court have affected the rights and interests of crime vic- tims (see O’Neill, 1984). Some of these far- reaching rulings are summarized in Box 7.1. In most of these landmark decisions, the Court rejected arguments raised by victims and their supporters.

VICTIMS AND JURIES

The jury system, pioneered hundreds of years ago in Britain, has been hailed as an inspiring example of participatory democracy because ordinary citi- zens—not government officials, scientific experts, or criminal justice professionals—decide whether an individual is guilty as charged.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant that he will be judged by a jury of his peers who live in the jurisdiction where the alleged offense took place. Exactly what that means (especially the inter- pretation of the term “peers”) is a subject of ongoing controversy, and has led to many court decisions over the years. In order to choose the 12 people (plus alternates) who will listen to the testimony and evaluate the evidence before rendering a verdict, a complicated set of procedures and steps that vary from state to state (and the federal government) must be followed in a sometimes protracted and costly process. In general, the adversarial system empowers the prosecutor as well as the defense attorney to exer- cise a certain number of challenges for cause (they must explain why) plus peremptory challenges (no reason needs to be given), in order to eliminate par- ticular potential jurors. Supposedly both of these opponents are seeking thoughtful, reasonable, open-minded individuals who start out as impartial. In reality, the prosecution would prefer to launch the trial with jurors leaning toward conviction while the defense would hope to seat individuals already skep- tical of the government’s version of events who will ultimately thwart the achievement of a unanimous verdict. Therefore, picking those who will sit in judgment is a crucial stage in which each side tries to uncover the biases of prospective jurors in that

day’s pool of citizens called for jury duty (the “venire”) by carefully questioning them (the process of voir dire).

From a victim-centered perspective, several issues and questions arise: First of all, do victims influence the outcomes of trials either by displaying emotions (that they are appropriately upset, in pro- portion to the suffering they endured) or by acting so restrained that they come across as less deserving of sympathy and vindication (see Rose, Nadler, and Clark, 2006)? Secondly, which kinds of jurors will be most likely to accept and trust the testimony of the victim, who is serving as a witness for the pros- ecution, that the person on trial is truly the one who allegedly committed a harmful act? Third, are those jurors who have been on the receiving end of serious crimes themselves (or who have suf- fered because of what happened to loved ones) more likely to vote for conviction during jury deliberations than the others who have heard the same arguments advanced by the prosecution and challenged by the defense? Finally, when jurors not only decide whether the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but also determine what the sen- tence should be—as in bifurcated death penalty trials—do they factor in the victim’s characteristics and plight?

The confidential decision making of the mem- bers of a jury that takes place behind closed doors precludes researchers from reconstructing who voted to convict or acquit, and why. So most stud- ies either focus on simulated trials in front of mock juries, or they seek out statistical patterns running through the verdicts of many similar cases.

The decision to accept or reject a particular prospective juror is made on the basis of each coun- sel’s stereotypes, hunches, and accumulated wisdom from past experiences as a trial lawyer. But picking a jury has evolved from an “art” to a “science” with the advent of consultants who use statistical meth- ods, especially findings from surveys of the local residents’ attitudes and biases, to predict which kinds of people are more likely to convict or acquit in a case based on similar facts and accusations.

One bit of conventional wisdom taught to law- yers is that prospective jurors who disclose that they

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B O X 7.1 Supreme Court Decisions Directly Affecting Victims

Decisions Advancing Victims’ Interests and Rights

Victimized Children Can Testify via Closed-Circuit Television In 1990, in a 5–4 decision (Maryland v. Craig), the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for a state to pass a law that shields a child who accuses an adult of sexual abuse from a face-to-face confrontation during a trial. The child’s testi- mony and the defense attorney’s cross-examination can take place in another room and can be shown to the jury over closed-circuit television if the prosecutor can convince the judge that the young witness would be traumatized by hav- ing to testify in the defendant’s presence. The majority felt that the state’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of the abused child may outweigh the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to face his or her accuser in person (Greenhouse, 1990).

Rape Victims’ Past Experiences Can Be Kept Out of Court In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled by a 7–2 vote that the rape shield laws passed in all 50 states were constitutional. The laws allow judges to suppress as irrelevant attempts by the defense to introduce allegations about past sexual experi- ences of rape victims (Rauber, 1991).

Victim Impact Statements Can Be Used in Capital Cases In 1987 (Booth v. Maryland), the Supreme Court overturned a death sentence because the jury during the penalty phase of the trial heard a particularly heartrending impact state- ment about how the murder of an elderly couple shattered the lives of three generations of their family. The majority ruled that the use of such “inflammatory” impact statements created a constitutionally unacceptable risk that juries might impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner, swayed by the social standing and reputation of the deceased person. The majority believed that the victim’s “worth” was not an appropriate factor for a jury to consider when weighing the killer’s fate—imprisonment or execution —because it would undermine the guarantee of equal pro- tection (Triebwasser, 1987b). But in 1991 (Payne v. Tennes- see), the Court reversed itself and ruled that prosecutors could introduce victim impact statements and that the sur- vivors of murder victims could testify. The majority held that courts have always taken into account the harm done by

defendants when determining appropriate sentences (Clark and Block, 1992).

People Concerned about Crime Have a Right to Keep Handguns in Their Homes In 2008 (District of Columbia et al. v. Heller), five justices interpreted the Second Amendment as granting individuals who fear that criminals might invade their residences the right to own loaded handguns to defend themselves, their families, and their property, even in large cities with very strict gun control laws. The dissenters cited the dangers of accidental domestic fatalities and the need to protect chil- dren from access to firearms (Greenhouse, 2008; Wasserman, 2008).

A Victim’s Dying Words Can Be Reported to a Jury In 2011 (Michigan v. Bryant), six of the eight justices inter- preted the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause as per- mitting a dying man’s identification of his assailant to police officers to be admissible as evidence against the defendant in a murder trial (Liptak, 2011).

Decisions Opposing Victims’ Interests and Rights

Government Has No Constitutional Duty to Protect Individuals In 1989 (De Shaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Ser- vices), six of the nine justices decided that a government agency could not be sued for failing to intervene (on behalf of a child repeatedly beaten and permanently injured by his father) because the state does not have a special obligation to protect individuals from harm by other private persons (“U.S. Supreme Court,” 1989).

Victims Can’t Sue Police Departments for Failing to Enforce Orders of Protection In 2005 (Gonzales v. Castle Rock Police), the Supreme Court by a 7–2 margin ruled that a victim of domestic violence did not have the right to sue her local police department for failing to enforce a restraining order against her husband who sub- sequently murdered their three children. The court upheld the principle that police departments are not liable to law- suits challenging the way officers exercise discretion in the performance of their duties, unless there is evidence of extreme negligence (Bunch, 2005).

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Victims Cannot Compel Prosecutors to Take Action against Suspects A number of decisions handed down in 1967, 1973, 1977, 1981, and 1983 have established that attorneys general and district attorneys have absolute discretion over whether to charge defendants with crimes and what charges to press or drop. Victims cannot compel prosecutors to take particular actions, and courts cannot intervene in this decision-making process (see Stark and Goldstein, 1985).

Victims of Rape and Domestic Violence Can’t Sue Attackers in Federal Court In 2000 (United States v. Morrison), the Supreme Court by a 5–4 margin struck down a provision of the 1984 Violence Against Women Act, which had granted injured parties in domestic violence and rape cases the additional option of suing their assailants for monetary damages in federal court. The majority voted to uphold the doctrine of state sover- eignty over gender-based violence rather than extend federal authority via the interstate commerce clause (Biskupic, 2000).

Newspapers Can Publish the Lawfully Obtained Names of Rape Victims In 1989, a majority of six justices argued that the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press protected a newspaper from liability for printing the name of a woman who already was identified as a rape victim in publicly avail- able police reports. However, the decision did not declare unconstitutional state laws in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina that prohibit the publishing of a rape victim’s name as an invasion of privacy (Greenhouse, 1989).

Offenders Can Escape Paying Restitution to Victims In 1989 (Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport), the Court ruled 7–2 that if convicts declare bankruptcy, they can avoid paying court-ordered restitution because restitution obligations are dischargeable debts. In 1990 (Hughey v. United States), the Court ruled that a federal judge cannot order a defendant to pay restitution to a victim if the charge involving that victim was dropped as part of a negotiated plea. The Court based its ruling on a provision of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (Eddy, 1990).

Victims Can’t Easily Claim Income Gained by Notorious Offenders In 1991 (Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board), the Supreme Court struck down New York’s 1977 “Son-of-Sam” statute, which served as a model for 41 other state laws. The law confiscated fees and royalties offenders gained from selling their inside stories to book publishers or moviemakers and permitted victims to claim that money. The unanimous opinion held that the state’s worthwhile goals of ensuring that crim- inals do not profit from their crimes, and of transferring the proceeds to victims, did not justify infringements on the First Amendment right of free speech (Greenhouse, 1991).

Victims of Identity Theft Can’t Have Extra Time to Sue Credit Bureaus In 2001 (TRW v. Andrews), the Supreme Court ruled that people who find out that impostors have ruined their financial reputa- tions have only two years from the time the mistake about their real creditworthiness was made to file damage lawsuits against the major credit bureaus that generate ratings, even if they don’t discover these errors in sufficient time (Savage, 2003).

The Statute of Limitations on Child Sexual Abuse Charges Cannot Be Extended In 2003, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that had lengthened the state’s statute of limitations to enable criminal prosecutions of alleged molesters whose accusers came forward many years after the events took place. However, the decision did not block victims from pursuing lawsuits in civil court (Garvey and Winton, 2003).

Insufficient Proof That the Lives of Murdered Black People Count for Less In 1987 (McCleskey v. Kemp), in upholding a death penalty conviction, the Supreme Court rejected a statistical analysis that seemed to show that the deaths of black victims were not taken as seriously as the deaths of white victims by criminal justice decision makers—prosecutors, juries, and judges. The court ruled that a pattern—in which offenders convicted of killing white people were 11 times more likely to be sentenced to die than those found guilty of murdering black victims—was not compelling evidence of intentional discrimination in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Triebwasser, 1987a).

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have been victims in the past can be expected to consciously or subconsciously identify with the injured party who is serving as a prosecution witness. This tendency is presumed to be especially strong if the crime committed against them resembles the charge that the defendant is facing in the upcoming trial (Gobert and Jordan, 2009). Judges often ask venire-members about their own past experiences with criminals, and send home victims who admit that they will have trouble being open-minded about the presumption of innocence. Although no jurisdiction has strict laws that address the issue of jury ineligibility because of prior victimization, elim- inating victims from the pool often might be justified on an individual basis but impractical as a general procedure since being harmed by criminals is such a common experience. Former victims are indeed more likely to vote to convict than other jurors, according to the findings of a simulation in which 2,400 people were asked to decide guilt or innocence after watching a one-hour mock trial about a burglary of a dwelling (Culhane, Hosch, and Weaver, 2004).

Concealing a hidden bias due to past experi- ences can get a juror in trouble, as the following case demonstrates:

A young man is serving as a juror in a capital murder case in which a former Marine is accused of stabbing a woman to death. He confides in a court bailiff that he doesn’t think he can be impartial because two of his family members had been killed in robberies. The bailiff informs the judge, who angrily asks the young man why he didn’t reveal these troubling relationships on a detailed questionnaire or to the two attorneys who vetted him. The judge lectures him about the disruption his tardy disclosure has caused, and warns, “I’m not going to put you in jail, but you’re going to forfeit your jury fee ($90). Now, get out of here before I change my mind!” The prosecutor and the defense attorney urge the judge not to declare a mistrial and start over, and both agree to continue with just 11 jurors. (Emily, 2010)

The findings of several other research projects shed additional light on the victim–juror relationship.

In death penalty cases, prosecutors, judges, and juries seem to be influenced by the race of the victim as much as by the race of the defendant. Blacks who murder whites and whites who dispatch whites are much more likely to be sentenced to die by juries than whites who slay blacks or blacks who kill blacks, according to a statistical study entered as evidence in a case that led to a landmark decision by the Supreme Court (see Baldus, 2003). Murder victims families (referred to as “co-victims”) find death penalty cases understandably burdensome and emotionally frustrat- ing because the legal process marginalizes them, leav- ing them with a very limited role to play in resolving their traumatic loss. During bifurcated capital trials, prosecutors often urge murder victims’ families to attend all the proceedings, and if a conviction takes place, to testify during the penalty phase to provide “victim impact evidence” that might influence jurors to choose execution over life imprisonment (Karp and Warshaw, 2009). Just as first responders (like police officers and emergency technicians) and caregivers (such as doctors, social workers, and advocates) can suffer “vicarious traumatization,” so too can sensitive jurors succumb to the stresses generated by gruesome evidence and harrowing testimony, and by emotion- ally draining arguments during protracted jury delib- erations behind closed doors (Robinson, Davies, and Nettleingham, 2009).

VICTIMS AND CORRECTIONS OFFICIALS

Corrections officials include jail and prison wardens and guards, and probation and parole officers. Vic- tims whose cases led to successful prosecutions occasionally seek their cooperation but may find themselves in conflict over issues of safety and money.

Keeping Track of Offenders and Receiving Reimbursement from Them

Victims are more likely to have contacts with county probation departments than with county jail, state prison, or state parole authorities. Of

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those found guilty in state courts, more felons are sentenced to probation for up to several years than are sent to jail for up to a year or to prison for longer stretches (Brown and Langan, 1998).

Victims want two things from probation and parole officers. When offenders are placed on pro- bation or are released on parole after serving time in prison, victims want to be protected from harass- ment and further harm. They can feel especially endangered by a vengeful, violent ex-offender if their cooperation and testimony was a crucial factor leading to conviction. And if making restitution is a condition of probation or parole, victims want to receive these payments right on schedule. Proba- tion and parole officers share these goals but often find their caseloads so overwhelming that they can- not enforce these requirements effectively.

According to legislation in most states, correc- tions officials must safeguard the well-being and best interests of victims by keeping them notified of the inmates’whereabouts, parole board appearances, and release dates. Correctional agencies can go further and develop victim safety plans that make sure pris- oners on temporary leave (on furlough, work release, or educational release) or who escape from an insti- tution do not threaten, track down, stalk, and attack the people they injured earlier (see National Victim Center, 1990; and Gagliardi, 2005).

When victims discover from other sources that their offenders (especially those guilty of aggravated assault, armed robbery, rape, or sexual molestation) are back on the streets, conflicts can erupt with cor- rections officials who did not meet their notification obligations. A widely used computer-based notifica- tion system now allows corrections officials to alert registered victims to a jail or prison inmate’s where- abouts, including his release on bail; attendance at classes or work outside the institution; fulfillment of his sentence, probation, or parole obligations; or his escape from custody (Harry, 2002).

Influencing Parole Board Decisions

Statistically, few victims ever deal with members of parole boards because only small percentages of offenders are caught, convicted, and sent away to

prison for years. However, this group of corrections officials has received a great deal of attention from the victims’ rights movement because it determines the fates of inmates who have inflicted serious harm.

By definition, parole means an early release for a felon before the maximum or upper limit of the judge’s sentence has been served. Prisoners become eligible for parole after serving a specified propor- tion of their sentences, but parole is not automatic. After hearings, parole boards turn down most con- victs, keeping them incarcerated for many more years. (However, even without parole, early release is still possible because most correctional institutions subtract time off for good behavior.)

The board grants conditional liberty to convicts who have earned the privilege of parole. They may return to their communities but must abide by restrictions on their conduct. Parolees who violate the rules can be reimprisoned for the remainder of their unexpired full sentences at the discretion of administrative judges after revocation hearings.

Victims with a punitive outlook will want parole boards to vote to keep convicts behind bars for their entire sentences. Victims seeking reim- bursement will want boards to grant parole to con- victs but impose strict restitution obligations on them. Victims concerned about offender rehabilita- tion will want boards to impose treatment obliga- tions as a condition of parole.

Because many parolees commit additional crimes after serving time, boards granting early release have come under intense criticism and scru- tiny. Even though the origins of parole date back to the mid-1800s, convicts are finding it much more difficult to earn early release these days. Tradition- ally, three rationales justify setting up boards to grant the privilege of a shortened sentence to selected prisoners. The first is that ex-convicts can make smoother transitions from a tightly controlled prison regimen to civilian life with the guidance of parole officers. Second, corrections officers can control the behavior of inmates more effectively if a possibility of early release looms as a reward for continuous good behavior. The third justification is that parole enables correctional authorities to better

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manage the flow of prisoners into and out of insti- tutions, ensuring that sufficient cell space is available for new arrivals.

Prisoners’ rights groups have rejected the notion that parole is a form of benevolence that serves as an incentive for rehabilitation. They have criticized the practice as a way of extending the length of time ex-convicts are under governmental control, as a device to prolong punishment, and as a source of anxiety and uncertainty for prisoners. These groups have called for the abolition of the practice of parole and have suggested determinate or fixed sentences of shorter duration as a replace- ment for indefinite sentences with widely varying minimums and maximums (Shelden, 1982).

Crime control organizations and think tanks also have demanded an end to the parole system but for different reasons. They perceive parole boards as granting undeserved breaks and unwar- ranted leniency because dangerous criminals are let out prematurely. They want parole ended and replaced with definite sentences of longer duration (President’s Task Force, 1982). Victims, too, may bitterly resent the practice of parole if it reduces sentences of incarceration that they originally con- sidered too short. If parolees harass victims or fail to pay them restitution in a timely manner, then parole board decisions will be resented.

As a result of the widespread dissatisfaction with parole, the federal prison system and a number of state systems have phased it out. In other jurisdic- tions, parole is granted less often. The reliance on parole reached its peak in 1977, when as many as 72 percent of prisoners returning to society were granted conditional liberty with community super- vision. By 1986, the proportion of released prisoners who were let out on parole had dropped to 43 per- cent (Hester, 1987); by 1990, that figure stood at 41 percent (Jankowski, 1991); and by 1998, only about 35 percent (see Beck and Mumola, 1999; and Bon- czar and Glaze, 1999). The proportion of inmates achieving discretionary early release crept back up to 39 percent during 2003 (Glaze and Palla, 2004) but then slipped back down to 35 percent in 2006 (Glaze and Bonczar, 2007). In sum, trends in the data reveal that more than one-third of prisoners still do

not serve their maximum terms, so victims retain an interest in exercising their rights before parole boards.

Although procedures to standardize and ratio- nalize parole board decision making have been implemented, measures also have been adopted to open up the process by providing notice to and soliciting input from groups that were formerly excluded. In 43 states, legislation expressly grants victims (and often law enforcement officers, prose- cutors, and judges) the right to attend parole hear- ings (usually held inside prisons in remote locations) and to personally inform board members of their views. Alternatively, they can submit written or videotaped impact statements. Board members can serve victims by inviting them to participate in decision-making processes, by warning them in advance that the persons they helped send to prison are being let go, and by ordering the convicts to pay restitution as a condition of release. In some states, restitution is a mandatory requirement for parolees unless the board excuses them from it (National Victim Center, 1990; and Parker, 2009). Under- standably, the next of kin of murder victims often argue, “don’t release the convict on parole,” as this case demonstrates:

An off-duty police sergeant spots an armed robbery-in-progress at an ATM. The robber, a drug addict who has previously served time for two manslaughters, fires at the policeman and kills him; the officer’s bullet is deflected by the robber’s zipper, and he escapes. An innocent man confesses to the crime. When the actual killer eventually is captured, prosecutors are compelled to negotiate a plea of 15 years to life. After the 15 years are up, the slain officer’s father has to attend parole board meetings every two years. The father, a retired DEA agent who carried out 3,000 arrests without once firing his service revolver, tells the parole board in a written statement, “Anyone who sets this creature free, from this day on, know that innocent blood is on your hands. This is no longer about vengeance. Nothing I say can bring my son back.” When the board turns down the convict’s application for parole for the third time, the father

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declares, “There’s no celebration. It is what it is.” (McShane, 2011a; 2011b)

As with sentencing, the potential impact of vic- tim input on decision making about parole is lim- ited. The boards receive statements not only from victims, but also from prosecutors, judges, and other concerned parties. They interview the inmates and review their criminal records and the prison files describing their behavior behind bars. Most of the time, the decisions arrived at by boards are not determined by the wishes of victims but rather by intense political pressures to keep convicts confined longer or by pragmatic administrative considera- tions to let some out ahead of schedule to make room for new arrivals.

AND JUSTICE FOR ALL?

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution promises equal protection under the law for all citizens: federal and state criminal justice systems ought to regard social factors such as class, race, nationality, religion, and sex as irrelevant to the administration of the law (“blind justice”). Tradi- tionally, criminologists and political activists have examined whether this important principle of equal protection really governs the way suspects, defendants, and convicts are treated by officials and agencies. The main focus of concern has been whether poor or minority offenders are subjected to discriminatory treatment. Whether certain kinds of victims are handled in a discriminatory manner is an equally significant concern but it has escaped notice.

It is often said that the United States is a coun- try “ruled by laws, not men.” This maxim implies that the principles of due process and equal protec- tion limit the considerable discretionary powers of criminal justice officials. “Due process” means procedural consistency (following all the required steps) and equal protection require that different categories of people be treated similarly. Yet enough discretion remains at each stage in the

criminal justice process to generate unequal out- comes. Of course, those who do exercise discretion can and do justify their actions. Explanations range from practical considerations about time and money to philosophical rationales about the true meaning of justice. Nevertheless, the actions they take gen- erate, maintain, and reveal double standards, or more accurately (because sometimes more than two groups are involved) differential handling, ranging from exemplary service and support for some to second-class treatment for others.

Recognizing “Second-Class” Treatment

The wife of a wealthy doctor disappears while walking her dog. The police launch a massive search, hold a press conference, assign two dozen detectives to work full time to canvass the affluent neighborhood, circulate flyers, and try to pick up her trail with a bloodhound. Her body later is found floating in the river, but it cannot be deter- mined if she fell in, jumped in, or was pushed. Less than two months later, a shy and studious African American college student never returns from running an errand in a working-class immigrant neighborhood. Her mother calls 911 the next morning, and two officers fill out a missing persons report—reluctantly, saying that because she is 21 years old, they really are not supposed to. Once 24 hours have elapsed, a detective marks the case closed. The family appeals to local elected officials, and after a few days the police department reopens the case. But it is too late— during that time two kidnappers who torture and rape her in a dingy basement a few blocks away decide to kill her. A federal judge permits the victim’s mother to file a lawsuit alleging bias in the police department’s response, based on the race, class, and age of the missing person. (Gardiner, 2008)

Many social institutions have two or more tracks and deliver unequal services to their clients or consumers. For instance, the health care system does not treat all patients the same; some get

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higher-quality medical attention than others. Simi- larly, the school system does not provide all students with equal educational opportunities. Some are challenged, nurtured, and as a result excel, while others are discouraged, neglected, and consequently fail to reach their academic potential.

A systematic examination of how cases are pro- cessed by the criminal justice system must address a crucial question. Now that victims have rights and are no longer routinely overlooked, do some get better service than others?

Criminologists have documented the discrep- ancy between official doctrines and actual practices. For example, race and class ought to be extraneous factors in a system of “blind justice,” but, in reality, they are useful predictors of how officials respond to offenders. When victimologists pieced together scattered research findings about how different cat- egories of victims were treated, a comparable pic- ture emerged. Certain victims were more likely to be given red carpet or VIP treatment, while others tended to be neglected, abused, and treated as second-class complainants by the same agencies and officials. In other words, how a case was han- dled was determined by the victim’s as well as the offender’s social standing, in addition to the cir- cumstances surrounding the crime.

The findings of many independent studies car- ried out decades ago are summarized in Box 7.2. They yield a profile of the groups of people who in the past tended to be treated far better or much worse than others. Victims who were innocent and from “respectable” backgrounds and privileged strata were more likely to receive better service from police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges. Individuals whose backgrounds were “tarnished” or who came from disadvantaged groups were less likely to get favorable treatment.

Many social handicaps that have held people back in life also impede their ability to receive fair treatment as crime victims. The same discretionary powers that result in overzealous law enforcement in some communities contribute to lax enforce- ment in others. Apparently, calls for help from members of groups that traditionally have suffered discrimination were not perceived as entirely

legitimate or as compelling by some at the helm of the criminal justice system. The credibility of complainants from disadvantaged backgrounds often was eroded by a belief that these same people were the wrongdoers in other incidents. Such ste- reotypical responses by the authorities poisoned relations between the two camps.

From bitter experience, victims from “out groups,” the lower strata, and marginal lifestyles have anticipated that their requests for intervention would be greeted with suspicion or even hostility. They expected perfunctory treatment at best. As a consequence, they have turned to the criminal jus- tice system only under the most desperate circum- stances (Ziegenhagen, 1977).

The manner in which police and prosecutors respond to homicides provides some clear examples of differential handling. When a “very important person” is murdered, the police department comes under tremendous pressure from the media, elected officials, and powerful constituencies within the public to arrest someone quickly. To give an illus- tration, a highly publicized robbery and murder of a foreign visitor was so threatening to Florida’s multibillion-dollar tourist trade that local business interests and the Chamber of Commerce generated tremendous pressure to apprehend whoever was preying upon vacationers (see Rohter, 1993; and Boyle, 1994). But when an “undesirable” is slain, overworked and understaffed homicide detectives may carry out only a superficial, routine investiga- tion. For example, the fatal shooting of a street- level prostitute or drug peddler would attract little public notice or official concern and certainly wouldn’t merit the establishment of a task force of detectives to track down the killer who carried out what the police mockingly term a “misdemeanor homicide” (see Simon, 1991; and Maple, 1999).

On the other hand, when a member of the police force is slain, the homicide squad will work day and night to follow up every possible lead in order to catch the killer and reinforce the message that the death of an officer will not go unpunished. To illustrate how law enforcement agencies assign capturing the killer of “one of their own” the high- est priority, consider this comparison: In 1992,

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police departments across the country solved 65 percent of murders and 91 percent of the killings of fellow officers (FBI, 1993). Similarly, during 1998, 93 percent of line-of-duty officer killings

were cleared, compared to 69 percent of civilian murders across the nation (FBI, 1999). And in 2007, right after homicide solution rates sank to an all-time low of 61 percent, 50 out of 51 murders of

B O X 7.2 Which Victims Get Better Treatment?

Arrests

Suspects are more likely to be taken into custody if the victims:

■ Request that officers make an arrest in a deferential, nonantagonistic manner (Black, 1968)

■ Convince the police that they themselves were not involved in any illegal activity before the incident (La Fave, 1965)

■ Prove to officers that they are not a friend, relative, or neighbor of the suspect (Goldstein, 1960; La Fave, 1965; Black, 1968; Reiss, 1971; Giacinti, 1973)

Prosecutions

Charges are more likely to be lodged against defendants if the victims:

■ Are middle-aged or elderly, white, and employed (Myers and Hagan, 1979)

■ Have high status in the community (“Prosecutorial discretion,” 1969)

■ Are women and the offender is a male stranger (Myers, 1977)

■ Are women without a reputation for promiscuity (Newman, 1966)

■ Are not known to be homosexual (Newman, 1966)

■ Are not alcoholics or drug addicts (Williams, 1976)

■ Have no prior arrest record (Williams, 1976)

■ Can establish that they weren’t engaged in misconduct themselves at the time of the crime (Miller, 1970; Neubauer, 1974; Williams, 1976)

■ Can prove that they didn’t provoke the offender (Newman, 1966; Neubauer, 1974; Williams, 1976)

■ Can show that it wasn’t a private matter between themselves and a relative, lover, friend, or acquaintance (McIntyre, 1968; Williams, 1976)

■ And the offender are not both black and are not viewed as conforming to community subcultural norms (Newman, 1966; McIntyre, 1968; Miller, 1970; Myers and Hagan, 1979)

Convictions

Judges or juries are more likely to find defendants guilty if the victims:

■ Are employed in a high-status job (Myers, 1977)

■ Are perceived as being young and helpless (Myers, 1977)

■ Appear reputable and have no prior arrest record (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Newman, 1966)

■ Had no prior illegal relationship with the defendant (Newman, 1966)

■ In no way are thought to have provoked the offender (Wolfgang, 1958; Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Newman, 1966)

■ Are white and the defendants are black (Johnson, 1941; Allredge, 1942; Garfinkle, 1949; Bensing and Schroeder, 1960)

■ And the offender are not both black and are not viewed as acting in conformity to community subcultural norms (Newman, 1966; McIntyre, 1968; Miller, 1970; Myers and Hagan, 1979)

Punishments

Judges will hand down stiffer sentences to defendants if the victims:

■ Are employed in a high-status occupation (Myers, 1977; Farrell and Swigert, 1986)

■ Did not know the offender (Myers, 1977)

■ Were injured and didn’t provoke the attack (Dawson, 1969; Neubauer, 1974)

■ Are white and the offenders are black (Green, 1964; Southern Regional Council, 1969; Wolfgang and Riedel, 1973; Paternoster, 1984)

■ Are females killed by either males or females (Farrell and Swigert, 1986)

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police officers were cleared by the arrest of a suspect or by exceptional means (the perpetrator was justifiably killed by the dying officer or by other officers, or the assailant afterwards committed suicide or died under other circumstances) (FBI, 2008).

Most of the research uncovering evidence of differential handling was conducted before the

victims’ rights movement scored sweeping legisla- tive victories. Therefore, victimologists need to carry out a new round of investigations to discover whether the past inequity of differential handling noted in Box 7.2 persists to this day, or whether the lofty goals of “equal protection under the law” and “justice for all” are becoming a reality in state criminal justice systems across America.

SUMMARY

Whether they want to see their attacker punished via incarceration, given effective treatment in some rehabilitation program, or ordered to make restitu- tion, victims might find themselves in conflict rather than in cooperative relationships with prose- cutors, judges, and corrections officials.

Victims want prosecutors’ offices to provide them with lawyers who will represent their inter- ests faithfully, but they may be disappointed if the assistant district attorneys assigned to handle their cases don’t take steps to protect them from repri- sals, don’t consult with them during plea negotia- tions, or fail to gain convictions from juries after trials. Victims are not surprised if defense attorneys try to wear them down by stalling tactics and try to impeach their testimony by asking hostile ques- tions during cross-examinations at trials. Victims hope that judges will be evenhanded but can

become upset if judges set bail low enough for defendants to secure release and then threaten them, and if judges impose sentences that do not reflect the gravity of the offenses that harmed them. Victims want corrections officials to keep them posted concerning the whereabouts of con- victs, protect them from reprisals after release, and effectively supervise restitution arrangements that might have been imposed as conditions of proba- tion or parole.

Several decades ago, before the rise of the vic- tims’ movement, insensitive mistreatment by agen- cies and officials within the criminal justice process was common. Victims from privileged backgrounds clearly were treated much better than others. Researchers need to document whether the system now delivers equal justice for all or if the problem of differential handling persists.

KEY TERMS DEFINED IN THE GLOSSARY

allocution, 204

assistant district attorneys, 190

bedsheeting, 198

bifurcated capital trials, 206

consideration, 198

cop a plea, 198

courtroom work group, 199

differential handling, 213

disposed of, 199

district attorneys, 190

due process, 213

equal protection under the law, 213

going rate, 199

overcharging, 198

plea bargain, 198

plea negotiation, 198

presentence investigation report, 205

red carpet, 214

second-class treatment, 213

sentence disparity, 204

victim impact statements, 204

VIP treatment, 214

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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

1. Argue that victims should not be allowed to participate in plea negotiations.

2. Argue that victims should have much more of a voice in determining sentences.

3. Argue that victims should not be allowed any input into parole board decisions.

4. Describe how decisions by the Supreme Court have had an effect on the rights and best interests of victims.

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. Identify a group of victims who do not, in your opinion, deserve red carpet or VIP handling by prosecutors.

2. In what ways could probation officers, correc- tions officials, and parole boards do even more for crime victims?

SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROJECTS

1. Draw up a checklist of all the ways a prosecutor’s office can provide assistance and support to victims of violent crimes. Find out what services are offered by the district attorney’s office in your jurisdiction, and compare the two lists.

2. For each of the landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court listed in Box 7.1 that had an impact upon victims, find out the facts of the case, the legal reasoning that was accepted by the majority of justices, and the arguments that

were put forward in the dissenting minority position.

3. See if there is any evidence in articles in newspapers and magazines that the differential handling outlined in Box 7.2 either persists or has been rectified in recent years.

4. See if you can find out whether victims harmed by delinquent youth are handled more or less favorably in juvenile court compared to adult court in your local jurisdiction.

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