Case Analysis Only For Kim Woods
Cases
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Case 1
Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A 25 F. Supp. 2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
A Hispanic employee sued his employer for national origin discrimination, alleging he was the only His- panic in his unit and the only person subjected to name calling and racial slurs because of it. After the EEOC’s determination and before bringing the case to court, the employee amended the complaint to in- clude race discrimination. The employer argued that race was not included in the original EEOC complaint; therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to hear it at this point. In holding that it was permissible to include the new category because it was within the scope of what could reasonably have been expected to grow out of the EEOC investigation, the court discussed the uncertainty of race versus national origin discrimination.
Whereas the term “black,” or even “Asian,” does not trigger the concept of national origin or an affiliation to a particular country, the term “Hispanic” may trig- ger the concept of race. Thus, the allegations con- tained in Alonzo’s EEOC charge would reasonably cause the EEOC to investigate discrimination based both on national origin and race, thereby satisfying the “reasonably related” requirement, even though he only checked the box labeled “national origin” on his EEOC charge.
Alonzo stated his belief that he was discriminated against because he is Hispanic. While the term “black” is not associated with national origin, some courts have treated “Hispanic” as a racial category. In an oft-cited passage, the court in Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977), reasoned that:
The terms “race” and “racial discrimination” may be of such doubtful sociological validity as to be scientifically meaningless, but these terms none- theless are subject to a commonly-accepted, albeit sometimes vague, understanding . . . On this ad- mittedly unscientific basis, whites are plainly a “race” susceptible to “racial discrimination.” His- panic persons and Indians, like African- Americans, have been traditional victims of group discrimination, and, however inaccurately or stu- pidly, are frequently and even commonly subject to a “racial” identification as “non-whites.”
Whether being Hispanic constitutes a race or a national origin category is a semantic distinction with
historical implications not worthy of consideration here. Thus, submits Alonzo, neither he nor the EEOC em- ployee who filled out his EEOC charge should be penal- ized for not checking the box marked “race”. Alonzo points out that because he did not state that he was the only Hispanic from a particular country treated in a dis- criminatory manner, he did not confine his claim to one of national origin discrimination.
Due to Alonzo’s pronouncement that he was dis- criminated against because he is an Hispanic, because it has not been established that the designation of be- ing an Hispanic precludes a claim of racial discrimina- tion, and given the uncertainty among courts as to whether “Hispanic” is better characterized as a race or a national origin, Alonzo’s claims of racial discrimina- tion are reasonably related to his claims of national origin discrimination as they fall within the reasonable scope of EEOC investigation. Accordingly, Defen- dants’ MOTION for judgment on the pleadings re- garding the claims premised on racial discrimination is DENIED.
Case Questions
1. What do you think of the court’s quote from the Budinsky case about classification of race being stu- pid and inaccurate? Explain.
2. Do you think it matters whether someone’s category is called “race” vs. “ethnicity”? Explain.
3. Do you agree with the court that the employee should not be penalized for checking the race box? Explain.
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Chapter Six Race and Color Discrimination 293
294 Part Two Regulation of Discrimination in Employment
Case 2
Jones v. Robinson Property Group, L.P., d/b/a Horseshoe Casino & Hotel 427 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. 2005)
A better-than-average black poker dealer with a good deal of experience sued a casino for refusing to hire him over an eight-year period, alleging it was only because of his race. Based on the facts, the court agreed.
Stewart, J.
Ralph Jones is an African-American male living in Tunica County, Mississippi. He is a certified poker dealer who has worked in various casinos as a poker dealer and in other capacities. He has also dealt in several major poker tournaments, including the World Poker Open held at the Horseshoe Casino. It is undisputed that Jones is a well qualified poker dealer, whose dealing skills are better than the average poker dealer in Tunica County, Mississippi.
Robinson Property Group (RPG) first opened the Horseshoe Casino and Hotel in Tunica, Mississippi, in 1995. Ken Lambert has served as the poker room man- ager at the Horseshoe since that time.
Jones alleges that he has repeatedly sought and been refused a position with RPG. Jones first applied for a position at Horseshoe in late 1994, before the casino opened. In May 1995, Jones applied for a poker floor person and a poker dealer position at Horseshoe. Jones was not hired for either position. Two weeks later, Jones complained to Anna West, Horseshoe’s Director of Human Resources, that his non-hiring was due to racism. Jones asked her whether the casino had a problem with hiring blacks as poker dealers because he observed that there were no African-Americans working at the Horseshoe as poker deal- ers at that time. Lambert was summoned to respond to Jones’ question. Lambert responded to Jones’ complaint by stating that there were no qualified African-American poker dealers in Tunica County. Jones informed him that there were at least five qualified African-Americans in the area, including himself. Lambert testified that he became indig- nant at Jones’ accusation, and he felt “misjudged” and “embarrassed.” He claims that he nonetheless offered Jones a position as a poker dealer again. When Jones refused and he persisted in his racial allegations, Lambert testified that his feelings became hurt and he ended the conversation. Jones denies that he was offered a position as a poker dealer.
Between 1995 and 2002, Jones submitted applications for a poker dealer position no less than 10 times. Horseshoe has employed Jones in other departments and on a
temporary basis as a poker dealer during high profile poker tournaments; however, Jones has never been hired by Horseshoe on a permanent basis. The record reveals that during the relevant time period the Horseshoe was hir- ing poker dealers for permanent positions. The Horseshoe generally employs a staff of 40–45 poker dealers.
*** Under Title VII, an employer cannot “fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race[.]” An employee can prove discrimination through direct or cir- cumstantial evidence. If an employee presents credible direct evidence that discriminatory animus at least in part motivated, or was a substantial factor in the adverse em- ployment action, then it becomes the employer’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the discriminatory animus.
*** We have previously held that “statements or docu-
ments which show on its face that an improper criterion served as a basis—not necessarily the sole basis, but a basis—for the adverse employment action are direct evidence of discrimination.” When a person or persons with decision making authority evinces [sic] racial ani- mus that may constitute direct evidence of discrimina- tion. [sic] (“This court has implied that calling an employee a ‘nigger’ would be direct evidence of race discrimination.”) We have also previously observed that racial epithets undoubtably demonstrate racial animus.
*** . . . Upon extensive review of the parties’ arguments
and the record in this case, we find that Jones has demon- strated direct evidence of discrimination.
Mims [a poker dealer and part-time supervisor] stated that she inquired why an African-American poker dealer
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was not hired and was told, by either Lambert or his as- sistant, that “they hired who they wanted to hire and there [sic] were not going to hire a black person unless there were extenuating circumstances.” She was then told by Lambert, or his assistant, that “good old white boys don’t want blacks touching their cards in their face.” Sam Thomas [a former Horseshoe employee] testified that in 1995, that Lambert told him that “maybe I’ve been told not to hire too many blacks in the poker room.” It is in- controvertible that Lambert made the hiring decisions at Horseshoe and Presley as his assistant would have pro- vided input, therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jones, the aforementioned evidence proves, without inference or presumption, that race was a basis in employment decisions in the poker room at Horseshoe. The evidence need not show that race was the sole basis in order to constitute direct evidence. . . . Mims’ and Thomas’ testimony clearly and explicitly indicates that decision maker(s) in the poker room used
race as a factor in employment decisions, which is by definition direct evidence of discrimination. Thus, we find that Jones has presented direct evidence of discrimi- nation and accordingly, he has established a prima facie case of discrimination. The district court erred in grant- ing summary judgment for RPG. We thus REVERSE and REMAND this case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Case Questions
1. Are you surprised that this is a 2005 case? Explain. 2. Giventheevidence,doyouunderstandwhythelower court would have found that no race discrimination
had taken place? Explain. 3. What do you think of the statements that management
allegedly made? Do they seem like appropriate bases for making workplace decisions? Explain.
Vaughn v. Edel 918 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1990) Case 3
During a retrenchment, a black female was terminated for poor performance. She alleged race discrimination in that her employer intentionally determined not to give her necessary feedback about her performance that would have helped her perform better and perhaps avoid dismissal. The court upheld the employee’s claim.
Chapter Six Race and Color Discrimination 295
Wiener, J.
Emma Vaughn, a black female attorney, became an associate contract analyst in Texaco’s Land Department in August of 1979. Her supervisors were Robert Edel and Alvin Earl Hatton, assistant chief contract analyst. In Vaughn’s early years with Texaco, she received promo- tions and was the highest ranked contract analyst in the department.
The events leading to this dispute began on April 16, 1985, the day after Vaughn returned from a second maternity leave. On that day, Edel complained to Vaughn about the low volume of her prior work and the excessive number of people who visited her office. Vaughn later spoke with Roger Keller, the head of the Land Depart- ment, about Edel’s criticism of her.
In a memorandum concerning this discussion, Keller wrote that he had told Vaughn that he had been told that Vaughn’s productivity “was very low”; that he “had become aware for some time of the excessive visiting by predominantly blacks in her office behind closed doors”; and that “the visiting had a direct bearing on her produc- tivity.” Keller then told Vaughn, as he noted in his memo, that “she was allowing herself to become a black matri- arch within Texaco” and “that this role was preventing her from doing her primary work for the company and that it must stop.”
Keller’s remarks offended Vaughn, so she sought the advice of a friend who was an attorney in Texaco’s Legal Department. Keller learned of this meeting and of
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296 Part Two Regulation of Discrimination in Employment
Vaughn’s belief that he was prejudiced. To avoid charges of race discrimination, Keller told Vaughn’s supervisor, Edel, “not [to] have any confrontations with Ms. Vaughn about her work.” Keller later added that “if he [Edel] was dissatisfied, let it ride. If it got serious, then see [Keller].”
Between April 1985 and April 1987 when Vaughn was fired, neither Edel nor Hatton expressed criticism of Vaughn’s work to her. During this period all annual writ- ten evaluations of Vaughn’s work performance (which, incidentally, Vaughn never saw) were “satisfactory.” Vaughn also received a merit salary increase, though it was the minimum, for 1986. Keller testified that for sev- eral years he had intentionally overstated on Vaughn’s annual evaluations his satisfaction with her performance because he did not have the time to spend going through procedures which would result from a lower rating and which could lead to termination.
In 1985–86 Texaco undertook a study to identify ac- tivities it could eliminate to save costs. To meet the cost- reduction goal set by the study, the Land Department fired its two “poorest performers,” one of whom was Vaughn, as the “lowest ranked” contract analyst. The other employee fired was a white male.
In passing Title VII, Congress announced that “sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”
When direct credible evidence of employer discrimi- nation exists, employer can counter direct evidence, such as a statement or written document showing discrimina- tory motive on its face, “only by showing by a prepon- derance of the evidence that they would have acted as they did without regard to the [employee’s] race.”
Vaughn presented direct evidence of discrimination. Keller testified that to avoid provoking a discrimination suit he had told Vaughn’s supervisor not to confront her about her work. His “black matriarch” memorandum de- tails the events that led Keller to initiate this policy. Keller also testified to deliberately overstating Vaughn’s evalua- tions in order not to start the process that might eventually lead to her termination. This direct evidence clearly shows that Keller acted as he did solely because Vaughn is black.
Although Vaughn’s race may not have directly moti- vated the 1987 decision to fire her, race did play a part in Vaughn’s employment relationship with Texaco from 1985–1987. Texaco’s treatment of Vaughn was not color- blind during that period. In neither criticizing Vaughn when her work was unsatisfactory nor counselling her how to improve, Texaco treated Vaughn differently than it did its other contract analysts because she was black. As a
result, Texaco did not afford Vaughn the same opportunity to improve her performance and perhaps her relative rank- ing, as it did its white employees. One of those employees was placed on an improvement program. Others received informal counselling. The evidence indicates that Vaughn had the ability to improve. As Texaco acknowledges, she was once its highest ranked contract analyst.
Had her dissatisfied supervisors simply counselled Vaughn informally, such counselling would inevitably have indicated to Vaughn that her work was deficient. Had Keller given Vaughn the evaluation that he believed she deserved, Texaco’s regulations would have required his placing her on a ninety-day work improvement pro- gram, just as at least one other employee—a white male—had been placed. A Texaco employee who has not improved by the end of that period is fired.
When an employer excludes black employees from its efforts to improve efficiency, it subverts the “broad overriding interest” of Title VII—“efficient and trusty workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.” Texaco has never stated any reason, other than that Vaughn was black, for treating her as it did. Had Texaco treated Vaughn in a color-blind manner from 1985–1987, Vaughn may have been fired by April 1987 for unsatisfactory work; on the other hand, she might have sufficiently improved her per- formance so as not to be one of the two lowest ranked employees, thereby avoiding termination in April 1987.
Because Texaco’s behavior was race-motivated, Tex- aco has violated Title VII. Texaco limited or classified Vaughn in a way which would either “tend to deprive [her] of employment opportunities or otherwise ad- versely affect [her] status as an employee” in violation of the law.
Case Questions
1. Do you agree with the court’s decision? Why or why not?
2. How would you have handled this matter if you were the manager?
3. What do you think of Keller’s remarks about Vaughn becoming the “black matriarch” of Texaco, “meeting behind closed doors,” and “excessive meetings with predominantly blacks”? What does it signify to you? What attitudes might it reflect that may be inappro- priate in the workplace? What concern, if any, might be appropriate?
Case 4
Eisele, J.
In the complaint filed with the Court, Chandler (who is white) alleges that she was the victim of a discriminatory employment practice at the hands of her employers. Chandler, a former manager of employer’s restaurant, claims that her employer thwarted her efforts to employ and promote African-American employees, and that as a result the conditions of her employment became so intolerable that she was forced to resign. The employer argues that because they are alleged to have adopted discriminatory hiring and promotional practices targeted only at African-Americans, a white person has no standing to assert a Title VII claim premised upon these policies.
It is true that only individuals whom employers are claimed to have failed or refused to hire or promote were African-Americans. However, by focusing on the “fail or refuse to hire” provision of 2000e-2(a)(1), employer’s argument misperceives the unlawful employment prac- tice alleged by Chandler. Chandler does not claim that she was a target of employer’s allegedly anti–African- American employment practices. Rather, Chandler ar- gues that employer’s insistence that she enforce these practices violated her fundamental right to associate with African-Americans, and as a consequence employer committed a separate violation by engaging in an unlaw- ful employment practice that “otherwise discriminate[d] against an individual,” namely Chandler.
Although the Court recognizes that Chandler’s Title VII claim is somewhat novel, it is of the opinion that such a claim, if proven, would state a cause of action un- der Title VII. A white person’s right to associate with African-Americans is protected by Sec. 1981. Therefore, the Court concludes that an employer’s implementation of an employment practice that impinges upon this right is actionable under Title VII.
Additionally, Chandler’s allegations are sufficient to establish a Title VII claim under a separate provision of the statute. The relevant provision of Title VII is found in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a), which provides in perti- nent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employ- ees . . . because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].
In order to establish a prima facie case under the “opposition” clause of § 2000e-3(a), an employee must show: (1) that she was engaged in an opposition activ- ity protected under Title VII; (2) that she was a victim of adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal nexus exists between these two events. The Court has no doubt that an employee who exercises her authority to promote and employ African-Americans engages in protected “opposition” to her employer’s unlawful employment practice which seeks to deprive African- Americans of such benefits. Thus, Chandler’s allega- tions are clearly sufficient to meet the first requirement of a § 2000e-3(a) claim. The Court further concludes that employer’s insistence that Chandler enforce such an employment practice, if proven, would certainly cause an “adverse employment action” to be visited upon her. Title VII forbids an employer from requiring its employees “to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment,” and included within this prohi- bition is the right of white employees to a work environment free from discrimination against African- Americans, or any other class of persons. Indeed, sub- jecting an employee to such a hostile working environment may result in an actionable constructive
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Chapter Six Race and Color Discrimination 297
Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc. 868 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Ark., W. Div. 1994)
A white employee brought suit against her employer for constructive dismissal under Title VII and other statutes, alleging that she was forced to leave her job when the employer would not allow her to hire and promote African-Americans. The employer argued that since its policies discriminated only against African-Americans, the white employee had no right to sue under Title VII. The court disagreed and permitted the case to be brought.
298 Part Two Regulation of Discrimination in Employment
discharge, a result that is especially likely under facts similar to those presently alleged. Under Title VII, a constructive discharge occurs whenever it is reason- ably foreseeable that an employee will resign as a result of her employer’s unlawful employment prac- tice, and it is plainly foreseeable that an employee might choose to resign rather than to acquiesce in or enforce her employer’s discriminatory and illegal employment practice.
The Court is therefore satisfied that employer’s efforts to hinder Chandler from hiring and promoting African-Americans, and their insistence that she dis- criminate against such persons, if proven, would result in an actionable Title VII claim. Indeed, “[u]nder the terms of § 2000e-3(a), requiring an employee to dis- criminate is itself an unlawful employment practice.” Accordingly, it is therefore ordered that employer’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Case Questions
1. What do you think of the employer’s argument that since its policies discriminated against African- Americans, the white employee should not be able to bring a suit for discrimination? Explain.
2. Do you understand the court’s reasoning that the white employee was being discriminated against by not being able to hire and promote black employees? Explain.
3. What reason can you think of as to why the employer had the policy of not hiring or promoting African-Americans? Do you think it makes good economic sense? (Consider all facets of economics, including the possibility of litigation over the policies.)
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