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CITY OF GOD: BOOK XIX

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL- ST. AUGUSTINE

12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the Creator of all nature is

supremely good. But nature is not supremely and an immutable good

as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created things can be

diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still,

however much it is diminished, something must remain of its

original nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or

however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its “nature”

cannot be destroyed without the things itself being destroyed. There

is good reason, therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it

were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it

would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise. When, however, a

thing is corrupted, its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so

much, a privation of the good. Where there is no privation of the

good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding

diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted,

there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if

something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted, this

will then be an incorruptible entity [natura incorruptibilis], and to

this great good it will have come through the process of corruption.

But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease

having some good of which it cannot be further deprived. If,

however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is not

good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. Wherefore

corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the

thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater

good if it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the

foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good even when

corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the

corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent

being in which to exist.

13. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there

is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely

good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or

defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good. This

leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, insofar as

it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it

would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that

only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from

something good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis

natura bonum est]. Nothing evil exists in itself only as an evil aspect

of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be noting evil except

something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical

connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the

same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic

judgment which reads: “Woe to those who call evil good and good

evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter

sweet and the sweet bitter.” Moreover, the Lord himself saith: “An

evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart.” What,

then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an

entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity,

what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we

distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is

not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked.

Rather, he is a good entity insofar as he is a man, evil insofar as he is

wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or

that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic

judgment: “Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil.” For this

amounts to finding fault with God’s work, because man is an entity

 

 

3 4 *This refers to Aristotle’s well-known principle of “the excluded middle”.

of God’s creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in

this particular man because he is a wicked person. Thus, every

entity, even if it is a defective one, insofar as it is an entity, is good.

Insofar as it is defective, it is evil.

14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the

rule of the logician fails to apply.* No weather is both dark and

bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the

same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and

black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. This

principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries

cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one

maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only

coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing

that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil.

For a man or an angel could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas

there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to

be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. These two

contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is

evil, then the evil simply could not be, since it can have no mode in

which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless

it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot

be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than the

deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the

good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not

anything at all. There is no other source whence an evil thing can

come to be. If this is the case, then, insofar as a thing is an entity, it is

unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible entity, it is a great good.

But even if it is a corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence

except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by corrupting

something good can corruption inflict injury.

15. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not

suppose that this denies our Lord’s judgment: “A good tree cannot

bear evil fruit.” This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth:

“Men do not gather grapes from thorns,” since thorns cannot bear

grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we can see both vines and

thorns spring up. Likewise, just as a bad tree does not grow good

fruit, so also an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a

human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a

good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil

could have arisen in the first place except from the nature- good in

itself- of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord himself most

clearly shows in the passage about the trees and the fruits, for he

said: “Make the tree good and the fruits will be good, or make the

tree bad and its fruits will be bad.” This is warning enough that bad

fruit cannot grow on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet

from that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts of trees

can grow.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Marino, Gordon. 2010. Ethics- The Essential Writings. 116-118.