logic and critical thinking

The essay by W.V. Quine, particularly as it pertains to his famous article “On What There Is,” explores the philosophical issue of how we handle reference to “non-existing” entities. This discussion is framed through a disagreement between two hypothetical characters, McX and Wyman, and Quine’s critique of their respective positions.

McX vs. Wyman: The Disagreement on Non-Existence

• McX’s Position: McX argues that when we speak of “non-existing” entities, such as a fictional character like Pegasus, these entities must somehow exist in order for us to refer to them. For McX, existence in some sense is required to discuss or think about anything, even fictional or abstract objects.
• Wyman’s Position: Wyman, a stand-in for the view Quine associates with philosophers like Meinong, contends that non-existing entities have a form of “subsistence” or “being.” For example, Pegasus exists in a “realm of being” distinct from physical existence but nonetheless real in a metaphysical sense.

The core disagreement lies in whether and how non-existing entities can be said to “exist” in any meaningful sense to ground our reference to them.

Quine’s Critique and Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

Quine critiques both McX and Wyman for reifying non-existent entities—treating them as if they have some form of existence or reality. To resolve this issue, he draws on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, which provides a way to discuss non-existent entities without committing to their existence.

• Russell’s Solution: According to Russell, a statement like “Pegasus does not exist” can be reformulated to avoid implying that Pegasus exists as a subject. Instead, the statement is understood as a logical structure:
  • “There is no x such that x is Pegasus.” This rephrasing eliminates the need to assume that “Pegasus” refers to a real or subsistent entity. The statement simply asserts that the predicate “is Pegasus” is not satisfied by anything in reality.

Quine adopts this method to dissolve the issue of reference to non-existing entities, arguing that we can speak meaningfully about them without metaphysical commitments to their existence or subsistence.

Quine’s Ultimate Position

Quine ultimately rejects the notion that non-existing entities need any special metaphysical status. For Quine, if we cannot identify an entity within the empirical world or as part of a well-defined theoretical framework, then it should not be included in our ontology. He famously advocates for a principle of ontological parsimony, encapsulated in the dictum: “To be is to be the value of a variable.” If something does not play a role in a well-formed scientific or logical theory, we have no need to posit its existence.

Personal Evaluation of Quine’s Solution

I find Quine’s solution to be a compelling and pragmatic approach to the problem. By using Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, he provides a way to engage with language and reference that avoids unnecessary metaphysical baggage. This aligns with the goals of logical positivism and empiricism, emphasizing clarity and the rejection of unverifiable entities.

However, some might argue that this solution is overly reductive. It dismisses the nuanced roles that abstract or fictional entities play in human cognition, art, and culture. Critics might claim that Quine’s strict criteria for existence exclude important aspects of how we understand and interact with the world symbolically.

Conclusion

Quine’s use of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions offers an elegant resolution to the philosophical puzzle of non-existence. While it is a powerful tool within the logical and empirical framework Quine champions, its strictness may not fully accommodate the richness of human experience and conceptualization. Whether one finds Quine’s position satisfying likely depends on one’s metaphysical inclinations and the importance one places on ontology relative to linguistic analysis.