Research Paper Sufism

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Introduction

As Egypt holds the title of one of the oldest civilizations on Earth, it comes with many

lessons around leadership, power and control. From the Pharaohs, to the Kings and Queens and

ultimately the modern Presidents of Egypt. The history of Egypt is enshrouded in military

leadership since Nasser through Sadat and eventually Muhammad Hosni Mubarak. This study

will focus on Mubarak’s presidential term and how he has led the country. Mubarak was the

fourth president of Egypt that followed many of the previous president’s leadership style – gain

control and loyalty over the military elites for personal gain and to maintain power. The military

elites have controlled the Egyptian political structure ever since the start of Egyptian

presidencies.

Military elites who preserve and control the overall power structure have transformed the

country. These generals manage change, policies, and oversee authoritative control of the entire

country. Egypt’s military elites under Mubarak’s leadership profited from financial rewards and

governorship positions throughout the regime’s existence, which highlights their complete

loyalty to the president. The president used powerful positions and monetary rewards to purchase

loyalty from the military elites as a method of ensuring political stability in Egypt, which

effectively controlled the army from engaging in any form of political activities that were

opposing his government. Mubarak knew that political stability depended on an established

circle of top military elites drawn from the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) who controlled the

country to eliminate any conflict against his government.

This study will cover Mubarak’s presidential term, his rise to complete power, the

approaches used to in order to achieve complete power and if he was successful in creating an

established Egypt. This research will also shed light to some important events that has taken

place during Mubarak’s presidency which will be covered in-depth further in this research.

 

Research Questions

This paper will be able answer the following research questions:

1. How did Mubarak gain complete power over Egypt during his presidency?

2. Did the appointment of top elite military personnel into high leadership positions

increase Mubarak’s capacity to control Egypt?

 

 

 

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3. Did the use of elite military enhance stability in Egypt during Mubarak’s rule of

three decades?

These research questions will allow us to develop more knowledge on Mubarak as a

president as well as ultimately achieve the objectives of the research; to understand how

Mubarak maintained his power in Egypt for over three decades, to analyze his strategies when it

came to control over the military elites and finally, to determine if these strategies were effective

in creating a stable Egypt.

 

Methodology

The study provides answers to the research questions by discovering relevant literature

such as scholarly articles, academic journals and books that critically covers Mubarak’s rule and

Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF), their strategies as well as the elite military positions in

Mubarak’s government. The literatures used were found in the American University in Dubai’s

library resources and online databases; including JSTOR, Education Research Complete

EBSCO, Academic Research Complete EBSCO and Oxford Islamic Studies Online. An informal

interview was conducted with a male interviewee, Ahmed Issa, whose family had close relations

with the late former Egyptian President. This qualitative study will understand the political,

social and economic context that the army plays in the government structure in the course of

Egypt’s history.

 

Research Literature and Analysis

The military has been the backbone of the Egyptian political structure and strategy since

the 1920s when the monarchy was in power. With Mubarak being aware that creating a group of

top military elites from the Egyptian Armed Forces will aid his regime drastically, he was able to

organize a group that will ultimately give their full support and loyalty to him. This ultimately

led to Mubarak gaining complete power over Egypt during his presidency.1

1 Stephan Roll. “Managing Change: How Egypt’s Military Leadership Shaped the

Transformation,” Journal of Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 (2014): 23, Academic Research Complete EBSCO. Roll clarifies that the military elites have controlled the Egyptian political structure that began with Nasser and Sadat. Likewise, the overthrow of the monarchy in 1951 by the military gave generals more power to control the state. Findings indicate that the military could not oppose a presidential power because of the underlying culture of using the state-of-emergency as a norm in Egypt.

 

 

 

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Maswood and Natarajan confirm that Egypt has lived with a fairly long and effective

state-of-emergencies since the 1960s, which has made political events a constitutional norm.2

This constitutional right enabled Mubarak to use the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in the

1980s that effectively acted as an autonomous body, to appoint his people. SCC interfered with

electoral laws and forced parliament to dissolve allowing new elections in which Mubarak’s

favorites were selected as representative through gerrymandering, restrictive laws on the

formation of parties, and elimination of international election observers.3

As an autocratic leader, Mubarak had his way of manipulating generals and the public to

achieve his desires in the state. Mubarak understood that the EAF had a powerful role in the

political and economic sectors to the extent of authorizing their role. Marshall explains that

Mubarak knew the military elite’s interests and capitalized on their greed to control the country

to his advantage as a political leader.4 He controlled them in ways that they protected his major

position within the country’s core leadership.5 Mubarak eliminated civilians from the top

political leadership positions and appointed generals who directly implemented his policy. The

armed men also followed directives without questioning the president, which made it easier for

Mubarak to control the government’s policy and agenda without much opposition.6 Likewise,

many generals were appointed in highly paying civilian jobs, which ensured most generals

remained in good terms with the president for the sake of their private interests. This can be

supported by the interviewee Issa, when he stated that his father and grandfather were appointed

as Lieutenant General and a member of the SCC, as well as rewarded with huge sums of cash

payments and other social and economic privileges when following giving their full loyalty to

him. He said, “My grandfather’s loyalty is what brought us here… he stayed quiet even if he

2 Javed Maswood and Usha Natarajan. “Democratization and Constitutional Reforms in Egypt and Indonesia: Evaluating the Role of the Military.” Arab Spring in Egypt, no.1 (2014): 231. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/j.ctt15m7mbm.16. 3 Ibid. 4 Shana Marshall. “The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2015): 5. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 5 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” Middle East Journal 67, no.4 (2013): 511. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/43698073. He learned the tactics from Nasser, who gave officers a stake in his regime by promoting private interests after the 1952 coup. 6 Housam Darwisheh. “Egypt Under Sisi: From an Authoritarian Dominant-Party System to Strongman Politics,” Jetro-Ide Me-Review 6, no. 1 (2019): 4. Education Research Complete EBSCO.

 

 

 

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didn’t believe in what he [Mubarak] said or did…” 7 Nassif clarifies that Mubarak used the

carrots or rewards more than sticks or punishments associated with rearranging or losing a

position in government.8

Furthermore, Mubarak built a system of control by allowing military elites to accumulate

wealth through appointments that include a term during the postretirement period. Such offers

made generals aspire for appointments by prioritizing Mubarak’s policies to ensure that they had

a career throughout their lives.9 As such, the president gave direct rewards to generals who

followed his orders. This created a system of bureaucracy that made profitability the main

motivation for appointees. Mubarak delivered prompt rewards to the most efficient generals who

did his bidding without failure.

Besides appointing 63 military officers into the governorship positions between 1981 and

2011 and another 34 from the police officers, the president left 59 slots only to civilians.10

Mubarak maintained a tight grip over the administration of the country through military elites.

Throughout his regime from 1981 to 2011, Mubarak rewarded members who served in the

Second Field Army (SFA) and Third Field Army (TFA) such that out of 21 retirees among

commanders, 11 of them were appointed as governors.11 Such appointments convinced most

generals that working hard towards achieving Mubarak’s prioritize in the bureaucratic system

ensured their survival, rewards, and better life in Egypt. Besides governors that lead local

governments, the president also appointed military officers as heads of cities and boroughs.12

Military officers occupied half of the local government positions while others served in special

departments as welfare, education, and health services.

Discriminative ways of making appointments of officers into the civilian sectors of the

Egyptian economy ensured tight control over Mubarak’s trusted generals. Officers from specific

forces had a higher advantage of being appointees compared to others based on specialization in

the bureaucratic sector. Hence, the appointment of top elite military personnel into specific

7 Ahmed Issa. (son of former Lieutenant General, Egypt), In discussion with the author, May 2020. 8 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” Middle East Journal 67, no.4 (2013): 515. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/43698073. 9 Ibid., 516. 10 Ibid., 517. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 519.

 

 

 

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positions increased Mubarak’s capacity to control Egypt. Nassif asserts that officers in the army

were likely to obtain higher appointments in the civilian sector contrasted with personnel in the

navy and air force.13 Retired generals from the Signal Corps gained appointments into the

telecommunication and information sector while their counterparts from the air force controlled

the civil aviation and airports. Likewise, the Ministry of Environment occupied 35 generals who

occupied the top position in the sector.14 Officers were appointed to lead ministries that include

housing, transportation, industry, information, and oil sectors. Moreover, the military operated

production industries under the name, Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), which

controlled 35 factories and farms that generated 70% non-military merchandise.15 The group-

controlled military and business enterprises like farms, factories, hotels, and military clubs,

which all contributed to Mubarak’s power over Egypt.

Nonetheless, senior officers received prized positions while others received direct cash

payments or arms trade commissions for engaging in Mubarak’s bureaucratic government. The

government created a budget in which cash was allocated to disaster management, emergency

responses, and security-related matters that were constitutionally under the president’s office.

For example, in 1991-1992 state budget, the government set aside $333 million, which reached

$2.75 billion in 2005-2006 financial year for the said purpose.16 However, the money was

diverted as cash payments to military elites for their work on behalf of being loyal. The

government called these direct cash installments as “alawat wala” or loyalty allowance.17 The

money was paid to top officials, who in turn paid some installments to lower-ranking officers

who effectively delivered on specific assignments. Likewise, Mubarak paid cash payments in

form of commission to the arms trade. Egypt purchases weapons from the western countries and

received aid with which they purchased weapons while hiding huge sums in foreign banks. For

example, the United States aid program of $1.3 billion requires that Egypt purchased weapons

13 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” Middle East Journal 67, no.4 (2013): 523. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/43698073. The navy elites were mostly appointed to manage the maritime industry that includes the Suez Canal and the National Navigation Company that included ports. 14 Ibid., 524. 15 Ibid., 526. 16 Ibid., 527. 17 Ibid.

 

 

 

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only from America.18 Consequently, top generals negotiated deals with American arms

manufacturers and kept a cut of the money for themselves. The information clarifies that

Mubarak used cash payments and arms trade deals to ensure that military elites benefitted

directly.

This corresponds with findings by Maswood and Natarajan that the Egyptian military

took over the power formerly exercised by the monarchy with express financial independence.19

Consequently, the military elites used their influential position in the government to attain

significant economic interests. This includes direct involvement with the civilian economy,

whereby Mubarak’s regime privatized major national industries and put them under the care of

military appoints. Military interests in Egypt ranged from government control, express control of

the agricultural and industrial sectors, and other business activities. This explains the reason

behind hiding the military budget from parliament assessment to ensure that only the president

and top military generals known the precise amount allocated to the institution. Such

nondisclosure protected Mubarak and ensured that he had enough money to distribute to his

generals to maintain his control over the state. 20

With the rise of the Islamization movement, Mubarak was able to control it by including

some of the moderate supported in the opposition system, whereby members of the Muslim

Brotherhood ran for elections as independent candidates while reducing their numbers in

parliament through election fraud and gerrymandering.21 Mubarak also tolerated the rise of

Salafism, who hoped to take back the country to the pure state when Islam started and effectively

18 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” Middle East Journal 67, no.4 (2013): 528. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/43698073. 19 Javed Maswood and Usha Natarajan. “Democratization and Constitutional Reforms in Egypt and Indonesia: Evaluating the Role of the Military.” Arab Spring in Egypt, no.1 (2014): 229. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/j.ctt15m7mbm.16. 20 Shana Marshall. “The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2015): 3. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Findings indicate that the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) continue to play a critical role in the domestic economy where they rule a powerful economic and political spot. Even during the rise of Mubarak, a circle of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that took power and ruled with Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012. The group took advantage of the coup that drove out Morsi and took over as the interim government before the election of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as the president in May 2014. Evidence shows that even the current president is from the military, which clarifies the critical role that the EAF has play in the country since the 1950s. 21 Cengiz Gunay. “Egypt: The Marriage of Islamist and the System.” Global Political Trends Center, (2012): 2. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/resrep07714.

 

 

 

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countered the Muslim Brotherhood that wanted political representation in parliament.22 The

government joined the moderate conservative Islamist groups to counter political and economic

turmoil. Homoud adds that the government used legislation to stop or limit the press from

reporting in ways that would challenge the military elites who controlled the government from

1952 until now.23 Mubarak successfully detached the media from reporting in ways that

influence the public negatively by providing false information. This happened in 1993 when

Islamist militants started carrying attacks against innocent targets across the country.24 The

president used legal and regulatory means that limited the independence of the media in ensuring

government accountability. 25 Likewise, in the media industry, Mubarak was a taboo until 2003

when the press started raising issues on state-controlled television.26

El-Sherif agrees with the findings in saying that the state-authorized violence to control

and manipulate the people against rebelling.27 The presidential ability to deploy indefinite state-

of-emergency powers made Mubarak effective in dealing with civilian or military protests. The

presidents made the military his personal wing in government, which made his social

transformation work easier in controlling the institution. Therefore, Mubarak used the military to

stop civilians from expressing their concerns and demanding reforms that would have aided the

country in removing the military elites from civilian economy and positions. Maswood and

Natarajan explain that Mubarak created his autocratic regime in a way that ensured his longevity

22 Cengiz Gunay. “Egypt: The Marriage of Islamist and the System.” Global Political Trends Center, (2012): 6. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/resrep07714. 23 Maher Homoud. “Hegemony and the Interest of Egypt’s Business Elite in Post-Mubarak Press.” New Middle Studies 9, no.1 (2019): 122. https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/resrep12804. 24Adel Abdel Ghafar. Egyptians in Revolt: The Political Economy of Labor and Student Mobilizations 1919-2011. (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2016): 114. Education Research Complete. 25 Ibid., 115. Just like Nasser, Mubarak successfully detached the media from reporting in ways that influence the public by providing information. This happened in 1993 when Islamist militants started carrying attacks against innocent targets across the country. The president used legal and regulatory means that limited the independence of the media in ensuring government accountability. Likewise, in the media industry, Mubarak was a taboo until 2003 when the press started raising issues on state-controlled television.25 Journalists were unable to criticize the government’s accountability measures, which made citizens unaware of the state’s status. 26 Volker Perthes. Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 27 Ashraf El-Sherif. “Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament.” (2014): 10. https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/resrep12804. El-Sherif argues that the state exploited violence as an extra-legal measure of controlling and disciplining Egyptians that included political and social unrests against women, religious minorities, and ethnic minorities.

 

 

 

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in the country.28 Mubarak effectively controlled the rise of opposition through suppression

tactics. He did this by combining the military power and police repression programs.29

Mubarak integrated the generals in civil matters like political appointments in the national and

local governments to control the allocation of resources which weakened transparency and

accountability.30 In Egypt, Mubarak guaranteed civilians supremacy by controlling the military

as the supreme commander. However, he used this as a mechanism to play a dominant role in

national politics.

During his reign, Mubarak allowed the creation of separate fiefdoms with different

leadership, rules, and rights to the division of resources with intense use of police force to repress

citizens. These fiefdoms created unreasonable accountability whereby people were recruited

based on kinship or personal networks that included military, police, intelligence services,

judiciary, bureaucracy, and public sector companies.31 The establishment of independent taifas,

which is an exclusive and closed self-governing institution within Egypt, made it easier for

Mubarak to control regional allegiance by appointing military generals to leadership positions.

The state used institutions and the constitution to restrict opposition and used violence to restrain

rebellion. As such, the police force operated the fiefdoms with the highest possible violence that

repressed the people. Common citizens had to deal with police who ran the state affairs,

administered social relations, economic resources, and solved conflicts.32 These approaches

made Mubarak unfavorable among people, but the police’s repressiveness prevented civil

28 Maswood and Natarajan, “Democratization and Constitutional Reforms in Egypt and Indonesia (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014): 229. https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/j.ctt15m7mbm.16. 29 Ibid., 230. He remained hostile towards the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood that according to the leader, represented Islamic fundamentalism that justified his actions against them. He banned the party for practicing religious extremism and this made Mubarak a favorite among the western world leaders who also worked against the rise of such fundamentalism. 30 Ibid. The independence constitution of 1923 balanced the powers between the monarchy and parliament during the decolonization process that created a liberal democratic government.30 The country fought for freedom from Great Britain by asking a Constitution and the right to conduct internal affairs without foreign interference.30 The monarchy had the power to impose and suspend constitutional demands over parliament. However, a 1952 revolutionary group under junior military officers suspended the constitution created a new system that resulted in the first three presidents who are Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar Sadat. 31 Ashraf El-Sherif. “Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament.” (2014): 9. https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/resrep12804. 32 Ibid.

 

 

 

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conflict. Combined with the power to declare and use the state-of-emergency, Egypt under

Mubarak become unbearable to citizens during the late 2000s.

Mubarak used the military elites to enhance corruption and misuse of public resources,

which was critical in maintaining his leadership position in government. The president is accused

of conducting corrupt privatization of public institutions and property that ended up in military

elites’ ownership. Likewise, the government sold commercial plots and real estate deals below

the market price to generals. This was done as a form of exchange for personal profit. For

example, the former governor of Matruh, Major General Sa’d Khalil, was accused of

underpricing 1,659 acres of land in the El ‘Alamein region, which cost public treasury close to

$167 million loss in settlements.33 Another governor sold the Olympic Games stadium for $7.3

million while the real market price was roughly $58 million.34 Most military elite governor

appointees have been taken to court over similar allegations of corruption, which emphasizes the

extreme fortunes that they benefitted from their leadership position because of associating with

Mubarak.

The Egyptian military operates in a way that creates a link between constitutionalism and

military power. Maswood and Natarajan clarify that military professions who felt that change

threatened their political structure delayed the democratization process in Egypt.35 Moreover,

civilians have no power to question neither the military nor the president in this kind of regime.

People have no access to a fair legal process that can guarantee their rights to enhance

democratization. Mubarak undermined civilians through the regime, which reduced people’s

capacity to question resource appropriation in the military and the role of the military in

governance. While it is expected that the military should not play a domestic role, Mubarak’s

regime lured generals into becoming part of the country’s internal security forces and some

served in the intelligence agencies.36 This is against the known international code where the role

of the armed forces is to protect state sovereignty, thus leading to Egypt’s economic instability.

33 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” Middle East Journal 67, no.4 (2013): 518. https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/43698073. 34 Ibid. 35Maswood and Natarajan, “Democratization and Constitutional Reforms in Egypt and Indonesia (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2014): 224. https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.aud.edu/stable/j.ctt15m7mbm.16. 36 Ibid., 225.

 

 

 

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Results indicate that the military elites have maintained their economic influence and

benefits from the political system. Marshall confirms that under Mubarak, the EAF maintained

its financial and industrial privileges that included fuel inputs, control over profitable real estate,

access to state contracts, and use of special permits to oversight different sectors of the

economy.37 However, as Mubarak’s power waned in the late 2010 and 2011, the military elites

started securing joint production agreements with foreign defense firms that ensured them of

access to export and imports with excess costs that doubled up their commission. For example, in

February 2011 when Mubarak was at the brink of resigning, the navy renegotiated a contract of

$13 million with Swift-ships that had been signed in 2008 for four patrol vessels at a new cost of

more than $20 million that include technology transfer.38 Likewise, the government that was

exclusively composed of military elites managed to make top economic agreements and signed

deals that made them millions.39 Likewise, the government made sure that ministers would sign

no-bid contracts that directed funds to military firms and their partners. The military signed a

$770 million in contracts, $1 billion in no-bid government contracts in 2014, and a $40 billion

low-income housing project awarded to a Dubai-based developed without following the

competitive award procedure.40

 

Conclusions

The leader maintained a powerful control over the military and generals in ways that

ensure complete stability of his three-decade rule in Egypt. The results of the study assert that

Mubarak understood the strong political and economic connections associated with the Egyptian

Armed Forces as rent-seeking elites. Consequently, he gave them access to economic

opportunities that include direct cash payments, appointments, and economic opportunities that

expanded their ownership of wealth in return for loyalty. This is supported by the interviewee

37 Shana Marshall. “The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2015): 5. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. This includes the $4.9 billion stimulus package obtained from the UAE to fund infrastructure development in the military sector. 40 Ibid. The findings indicate that the military used the power vacuum in the post-Mubarak and before Sisi come to power to manipulate contracts through which the elites obtained exclusive commercial contracts worth billions of dollars.

 

 

 

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Issa when he states that his grandfather and father has been appointed to top leadership positions

for following Mubarak’s commands and ultimately providing their full loyalty and support.

Mubarak exploited rewards effectively not only with the military but also with the police force in

repressing the public against protesting about his incompetency and used media to contain any

speculation about his doings.

Mubarak appointing his favored individuals to high leadership positions and economic

benefits because of their loyalty and efficiency when establishing his orders has motivated others

to do the same. This has increased Mubarak’s capacity to control Egypt by appointing not only

top military elite personnel, but also members of the police force into high positions and

influential roles. Mubarak has given them so much power that they started exploiting civilian

rights for their own self-interests and profited billions of dollars with arms deals between the

United states and the EAF. The late former president also used state-authorized violence, media

censorship and privatization to maintain his power.

This has backfired on Mubarak when he desired to create a stable Egypt. Civilians were

not able to express their concerns about Mubarak’s government and the power of the military

because he used violence against anyone who said otherwise. He persuaded generals to take

positions in internal security forces and intelligence agencies that went against the sovereignty of

the country. This has united the Egyptian state’s sovereignty with their military which violated

international enigma. With the vast volume of corruption within his government, it has created

the building up of resentment amongst the civilians for over thirty years until they revolted.

Mubarak was not able to create a stable Egypt, but rather control and maintain it for his own self-

interests and self-gain. This exploitation materialized until his bubble regime popped and could

no longer stay put.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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