Philosophy Writing Reflection Help
Philosophy Writing Reflection Help
Syllabus: An Introduction to Ethical Theories: A Procedural Approach
Week One: Normative Ethics – What is a good act?
· Syllabus & Introduction to the course: Beginning to Think about Ethics (IET, p. 1-14)
· The Divine Command Theory: Euthyphro- Plato (BB)
· The Divine Command Theory: The Problem of Evil- St. Augustine (BB)
· Utilitarianism: Chapter 5 (IET) 6/14- Utilitarianism: The Singer Solution to World Poverty- Singer (BB)
Week Two: Metaethics – Which acts are right and wrong?
· Utilitarianism: The Experience Machine- Nozick (BB)
· Ethical Relativism: Chapter 2 (IET)
· Emotivism: Chapter 3 (IET) & A Critique of Ethics- Ayer (BB)
· Deontology- Kant: Chapter 6 (IET) & The Goodwill and the Categorical Imperative- Kant (BB)
· MIDTERM
Week Three: Applied Ethics- How do we make moral judgments?
· Teleology- Aristotle: Chapter 8 (IET) & Nicomachean Ethics- Aristotle (BB)
· Ethical Egoism: Chapter 4 (IET)
· Ethical Egoism: Ethics of Emergencies- Rand (BB)
· Feminist Ethics: Chapter 9 (IET)
· Feminist Ethics: What is Feminist Ethics?- Lindemann (BB)
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CITY OF GOD: BOOK XIX
CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL- ST. AUGUSTINE
12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the Creator of all nature is
supremely good. But nature is not supremely and an immutable good
as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created things can be
diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still,
however much it is diminished, something must remain of its
original nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or
however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its “nature”
cannot be destroyed without the things itself being destroyed. There
is good reason, therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it
were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it
would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise. When, however, a
thing is corrupted, its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so
much, a privation of the good. Where there is no privation of the
good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding
diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted,
there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if
something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted, this
will then be an incorruptible entity [natura incorruptibilis], and to
this great good it will have come through the process of corruption.
But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease
having some good of which it cannot be further deprived. If,
however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is not
good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. Wherefore
corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the
thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater
good if it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the
foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good even when
corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the
corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent
being in which to exist.
13. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there
is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely
good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or
defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good. This
leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, insofar as
it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it
would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that
only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from
something good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis
natura bonum est]. Nothing evil exists in itself only as an evil aspect
of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be noting evil except
something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical
connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the
same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic
judgment which reads: “Woe to those who call evil good and good
evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter
sweet and the sweet bitter.” Moreover, the Lord himself saith: “An
evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart.” What,
then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an
entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity,
what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we
distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is
not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked.
Rather, he is a good entity insofar as he is a man, evil insofar as he is
wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or
that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic
judgment: “Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil.” For this
amounts to finding fault with God’s work, because man is an entity
3 4 *This refers to Aristotle’s well-known principle of “the excluded middle”.
of God’s creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in
this particular man because he is a wicked person. Thus, every
entity, even if it is a defective one, insofar as it is an entity, is good.
Insofar as it is defective, it is evil.
14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the
rule of the logician fails to apply.* No weather is both dark and
bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the
same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and
black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. This
principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries
cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one
maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only
coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing
that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil.
For a man or an angel could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas
there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to
be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. These two
contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is
evil, then the evil simply could not be, since it can have no mode in
which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless
it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot
be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than the
deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the
good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not
anything at all. There is no other source whence an evil thing can
come to be. If this is the case, then, insofar as a thing is an entity, it is
unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible entity, it is a great good.
But even if it is a corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence
except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by corrupting
something good can corruption inflict injury.
15. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not
suppose that this denies our Lord’s judgment: “A good tree cannot
bear evil fruit.” This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth:
“Men do not gather grapes from thorns,” since thorns cannot bear
grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we can see both vines and
thorns spring up. Likewise, just as a bad tree does not grow good
fruit, so also an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a
human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a
good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil
could have arisen in the first place except from the nature- good in
itself- of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord himself most
clearly shows in the passage about the trees and the fruits, for he
said: “Make the tree good and the fruits will be good, or make the
tree bad and its fruits will be bad.” This is warning enough that bad
fruit cannot grow on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet
from that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts of trees
can grow.
Marino, Gordon. 2010. Ethics- The Essential Writings. 116-118.